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NEW    YORK 

THEOSOPHICAL  PUBLISHING  Co. 

244  LENOX  AVENUE. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1896,  by  the 

DUNLAP   PRINTING   COMPANY, 
In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress  at  Washington,  D.  C. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PLOTINOS. 

INDEX, 

Page 

Chapter  I.     PLATONISM   ..." i 

1.  Plato's  Three  Realms  i 

2.  The  Archetypal  World  of  Ideas 2 

3.  The  World  of  Matter 3 

4.  The  Universe  3 

5.  The  Rank  of  Ideas 3 

6.  The  Human  Soul 4 

Chapter  II.     ARISTOTELIANISM    6 

1.  Plato  and  Aristotle 6 

2.  The  Deity 7 

3.  The  Psychology   .- 7 

4.  The  Ethics 8 

Chapter  III.     STOICISM 9 

1.  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  the  Stoics 9 

2.  The  Aristotelian  Dialectic  9 

3.  Cosmology 10 

4.  Ethics  : ii 

Chapter  IV.     EMANATIONISM 12 

1.  The  Date  of  Hermes 12 

2.  Relation  to  Christianity 12 

3.  Difference  from  Platonism  14 

4.  Hermetic  Conceptions    14 

5.  Cosmology 14 

6.  Ethics   15 

7.  Spiritual   Destiny    15 

Chapter  V.     AMMONIUS  SAKKAS,  PLOTINOS,  AND 

THEIR  RELATION  TO  CHRISTIANITY 17 

1.  Ammonius  Sakkas  17 

2.  Plotinos   17 

3.  Relation  to  Christianity  18 

4.  The  Recognition  of  the  Authority  of  Plato 20 

5.  Relation  to  Greek  Philosophy 20 

Chapter  VI.     MIKROKOSM  AND  MAKROKOSM 22 

1.  The  Contemplative  Life  r  .  y. . . _v  .  22 

2.  Mikrokosm .r/v1r.'. . .  22 

3.  Psychology  ttS&f^ftttW-JiiU  M  '  23 

4.  Cosmological  Import  of  Psychology 24 


146280 


INDEX. 


Page 

Chanter  VII.     THE  FIRST  REALM,  THE  GOD 26 

1.  The  One  and  the  Many 26 

2.  The  God  Above  Cognisability 26 

3.  The  Nomenclative  Symbol  for  the  Divinity 27 

4.  The  God  is  the  First  Cause 27 

5.  The  God's  Necessity  to  Love 27 

6.  Manner  of  Begetting 28 

7.  Relation  of  Cause  and  World 28 

Chapter  VIII.     THE  SECOND  REALM,  GOD,  COSMIC 

MIND   30 

1.  Saturn,  the  Cognisable  Deity 30 

2.  Identity  of  Being  and  Thought 30 

Chapter  IX.     THE  THIRD  REALM,  THE  SOUL 32 

1.  The  Trinity  :  Over-God,  Saturn,  and  Zeus-Rhea 32 

2.  Co-equality  of  Souls 33 

3.  The  World-Soul  33 

4.  The  Transcendent  Over-Soul  34 

5.  Inter-relation  of  Over-Soul  and  Souls  34 

Chapter  X.     THE  FOURTH  REALM,  REASON 36 

1.  Individual  Mind 36 

2.  Other  World-Souls   36 


Chapter  XI.     THE  FIFTH  REALM,  SENSE 37 

1.  The  Senses  of  the  Over-Soul 37 

2.  Unity  of  Souls  in  the  Fifth  Realm 37 

3.  Human  Sense-Realm  37 

4.  Celestial  and  Physical  Senses 38 

5.  Senses  of  Animals   39 

Chapter  XII.     THE  SIXTH  REALM,  VITALITY 39 

1.  The  Sixth  ivealm  39 

2.  The  Sixth  Realm  of  the  Over-Soul 39 

3.  The  Doctrine  of  Sympathy  39 

4.  The  Beautiful  40 

5.  Astrology  and  Vaticination  40 

6.  Free   Will 4i  - 

7.  The  Daemon   42 

Chapter  XIII.     THE  SEVENTH  REALM,  MATTER....  43 

1.  Evil    • 43 

2.  Uncognisability  of  Matter 44 

3.  Intelligibility  of  Matter  44 


INDEX.  Hi 


Page 

Chapter  XIV.     REINCARNATION  45 

1.  Need  for  Reincarnation  46 

2.  Justice   46 

3.  The  Three  Factors 46 

4.  Objection  from  Oblivion 47 

5.  Objection  from  Suicide  47 

Chapter  XV.     ETHICS   48 

1.  Virtue  and  Vice 48 

2.  Philosophy  of  Sin • 49 

3.  The  Path  of  Enlightenment :  49 

4.  The  Daemon  of  Conscience  50 

5.  Ecstasy    51 

6.  Happiness   52 

Chapter  XVI.     AESTHETICS    54 

1.  The  God,  the  Over-Beautiful  • 54 

2.  Human  Beauty  54 

Chapter  XVII.     PLOTINOS  AND  PAGANISM  56 

1.  Pagan  Deities   56 

2.  Monotheism  56 

3.  Augustine's  Debt  to  Plotinos  : 56 

4.  The  Last  Light  ot  Greece 56 


CHAPTER  I. 
PLATONISM. 

i.  Plato's  Three  Realms. — Plato  united  in  his  system  that  which 
was  valuable  in  the  systems  of  philosophy  which  preceded  his. 
We  may  therefore  begin  immediately  with  Plato  in  our  prelimi- 
nary sketch  of  Greek  philosophy. 

Plato  divides  existence  into  two  great  realms  :  that  which  can 
be  felt  by  the  senses,  the  "sensible"  "to  aistheton,"  and  that 
which  can  be  understood,  the  "  knowable,"  "  to  noeton."  The 
most  cursory  examination  of  the  sense-world  reveals  the  prob- 
lem of  the  One  and  the  Many  :  for  every  object  is  one,  inasmuch 
as  it  is  an  object,  yet  manifold  in  its  qualities.  Which  of  these 
is  the  most  fundamental  distinction?  Earlier  Greek  philosophy 
had  given  various  answers  to  this  question  ;  but  none  of  their 
conclusions  satisfied  Plato  wholly.  Being,  "  ousia, "  as  such, 
could  not,  thought  he,  be  attributed  to  any  finite  thing  ;  on  the 
contrary,  "becoming,"  "genesis,"  was  a  fitting  description  of  the 
phenomenal  world.  He  proceeded  further  to  reduce  this  dis- 
tinction to  its  Pythagorean  terms,  the  Limited  and  the  Unlimited. 
As  both  of  these  conceptions  are  united  in  that  of  a  definite 
number,  so  the  truth  of  both  the  categories  of  the  One  and  the 
Many  is  their  unity,  their  mixture,  which  fittingly  represented 
the  eternal  process  of  Becoming  which  may  be  witnessed  in  the 
phenomenal  world. 

Unity  will  apply  fittingly  to  the  intelligible  world,  which  alone 
has  true  Being,  being  "  existing  being,  "  "  reason,  "  and  "  ex- 
istence," "  Ontos  on,  Logos,  Ousia." 

The  Manifold,  on  the  contrary,  must  apply  to  the  formless, 
odorless,  chaotic  matter,  "  hule,"  of  which  the  world  was  form- 
ed. We  thus  reach  a  third  realm  of  existence,  which,  however, 
can  only  be  distinguished  as  having  existed  before  the  creation 
or  formation  of  the  phenomenal  world. 

Plato  thus  recognizes  three  realms  of  existence  :  "  that  which 
becomes  (the  sense- world),  that  in  which  it  becomes  (matter), 
and  that  from  which  it  is  copied  (the  intelligible  world).  "  God, 
is  the~Father,  the  reason,  the  "  whence  it  grows,"  the  "  hothen 
phuetai,"  of  the  world  ;  matter  is  the  mother  and  nurse,  the  con- 
comitant cause,  the  "  En  ho  gignetai  to  gignomenon,"  of  the 
world  ;  and  thus,  the  world  is  the  offspring  of  God  and  Matter. 

But  we  must  not  fail  to  analyze  this  intelligible  world,  this 
"  knowable  "  "  to  noeton."  The  phrase  given  above,  "that  from 


The  Philosophy  of  Plotinos. 


which  it  is  copied  "  implies  that  somebody  copies  something  : 
that  the  Deity  copies  the  Ideas  or  archetypes.  There  is  then, 
above  the  intelligible  world  proper  a  still  higher  realm  of  ex- 
istence, the  Deity  :  which,  in  the  Pythagorean  terminology  ad- 
duced above  would  be  the  Mind,  the  "  Nous,"  the  principle  or 
"  cause  "  "  aition,"  of  the  phenomenal  world. 

We  have  thus  four  realms  of  existence  :  the  Deity,  the  world 
'  of  Ideas,  the  world  of  Sense,  and  Matter.  But  as  the  latter 
realm  has  ceased  to  exist  since  the  creation  of  the  phenomenal 
world  as  such,  there  remain  three  realms  of  existence,  which 
are  sometimes  referred  to  as  the  Platonic  Trinity  :  "  Nous"  or 
the  Deity,  the  intelligible  world  of  Ideas,  and  the  Sense-world 
the  "  sensible,"  "  to  aisthetikon."  How  loose  and  inaccurate 
such  an  appellation  is,  is  clear  from  the  fact  that  Plato  himself  did 
not  recognize  it.  The  Sense-world,  the  supposititious  third 
member  of  the  Trinity,  is  the  only-begotten  Son,  "Huios  mono- 
genes  "  of  the  Deity,  the  "  Eikon  tou  Theou,"  "Zoon  aidion 
kai  noeton,"  it  is  a  "  second  "  God,  "  future  "  before  its  genesis. 
and  "  created  "  after  it  ;  a  "  blessed  deity." 

As  the  world  of  Ideas  is  a  "  Zoon  aidion  kai  noeton,".  an 
"  eternal  and  intelligible  organism,"  so  the  world  of  Sense  is  a 
"  Zoon  ennoun,"  an  "  intelligible  organism,"  a  reasonable  living 
being,  the  creating  principle  of  "Nous,"  Reason,  having  reduced 
the  chaotic,  necessary,  and  "  alogos,"  irrational  Matter  to  an 
image  of  the  world  of  Ideas. 

Thus  the  problem  of  the  One  and  the  Many  was  apparently 
solved  :  every  object  being  One,  in  view  of  its  similarity  to  the 
Idea  according  to  which,  as  a  pattern,  it  has  been  created  ;  and 
Manifold,  in  view  of  the  formless  matter  which  had  been  the 
condition  of  its  origination. 

2.  The  Archetypal  World  of  Ideas. — In  explaining  what  Plato 
meant  by  his  World  of  Ideas,  we  must  notice  the  fact  that  he 
accepts  the  identification  of  Being  and  Thought  of  Parmenides. 
As  a  consequence,  his  "  intelligible  world  "  is  the  world  of  true 
existence,  and  everything  exists  only  inasmuch  as  it  participates 
in  this  existence.  An  Idea  is  that  which  makes  a  horse  a  horse, 
and  a  tree  a  tree  ;  in  short  it  is  a  general  notion,  an  universal,  a 
species  or  genus,  which  abides  unchanged  amidst  all  the  changes 
of  the  individuals  to  which  it  applies.  Hence  the  world  of  Ideas 
is  "  in  the  supercelestial  place,"  "  En  topo  huperouranio,"  be- 
yond all  change,  far  beyond  this  world,  separate  from  the  ob- 
jects participating  in  it.  The  Ideas  are  archetypes,  "paradigms" 
"  Paradeigmata,"  of  every  quality  and  every  thing,  many  Ideas 
at  times  being  present  in  one  and  the  same  thing,  as  "just"  and 
"  tall  "  in  a  "  man."  These  Ideas  are  co-ordinate,  being  distinct 
entities,  although  they  also  rank  hierarchically  from  the  highest 
genus  to  the  lowest  species,  as  they  are  the  existence,  being,  aim 
and  end  of  everything  subsumed  under  them.  Yet  they  are 
passive  thoughts,  and  are  without  energy  ;  they  are  only  objects 
of  contemplation,  far  from  the  world. 


Platonism. 


3.  The  World  of  Matter.— It  the  Intelligible  world,  the  "  One  " 
is  real  existence,  it  follows  that  Matter,  the  "  Many,"  is  nonex- 
istence.    It  is  therefore  absurd  to  call  Plato's  philosophical  sys- 
tem a  dualism.     Matter,  "  Hule,"  the  indeterminate,  has  only  neg- 
ative predicates,  it  lacks  form  and  quality,  and  cannot  be  appre- 
hended by  the  senses.     It  can  only  be  space,  the  form  of  out- 
wardness, that  is,  coexistence  and  unordered  sequence.     It  is  an 
empty  form  waiting  for  a  content  to  be  impressed  upon  it.     It 
is  nothing,  an  abstraction  from  reality  ;  yet  it  is  absolute  neces- 
sity, and  though  not  able  to  oppose  the  divine  power,  yet  able  to 
mar  its  works. 

4.  The  Universe. — The  Sense- world  is  the  most  beautiful  world * 
possible,  being  framed  according  to  the  most  perfect  of  patterns,5 
by  the  best  cause.     "  He  was  good  ;  and  in  a  good  being  no 
envy  in  relation  to  anything  ever  resides,  but  being  without  this 
he  wished  everything  to  become  as  like  himself  as  possible."  We 
saw  that  the  Sense-world  was  an  "  intelligible  organism,"  "Zoon 
ennoun."     It  is  consequently  able  to  think:    and  this  is  the  char- 
acteristic of    mind,  and  mind    exists  in  a  soul,  and    a  soul  in  a 
body.    As  the  younger  should  not  rule  the  elder,  and  mind  rules 
the  body,  the  mind  of  the  world  was  older  than  the  body  of  the 
world.    The  Universe  is  therefore  a  living  being,  with  a  rational 
soul  interpenetrating  its  body.     It  regulates  and  harmonizes  the 
world  ;  for  as  human  bodies  partake  of  the  physical  Universe, 
so  do  human  souls  proceed  from  the  souls  of  the  Universe. 

The  Universe  thus  created  is  formed  in  two  circles  with  a 
common  centre,  in  different  planes  ;  the  inner  circle  is  subdivid- 
ed into  seven  circles  moving  in  directions  opposite  to  that  of  the 
outer  one.  Here  we  have  the  fixed  stars  and  the  seven  planets 
with  their  orbits. 

5.  The  Rank  of  Ideas. — Having  explained  the  nature  of  Ideas  it 
remains  for  us  to  describe  the  rank  and  dignity  they  occupy.  All 
together  they  form  an  "intelligible  world."  an  "intelligible  place" 
an  "intelligible  organism,"  "Kosmos  noetos,"  a  "Topos  noetos," 
a  Zoon  noeton."     The  cause  of  a  thing  is  not  the  condition  of 
its  existence,  but  its  purpose  ;  and  the  ultimate  purpose  of  pur- 
poses is  the  ruler  of  all  other  Ideas,   "  basileus,"  the  king  of 
heaven,   "  Dophia,   Zeus."     Plato  combined  here  the   Mind  of 
Anaxagoras,  and  the  Good  "  /-vgathon,"  of  the  Megareans  and 
Sokrates  into  an  "  Epekeina  tes  Ousias,"  a  "  somewhat  beyond 
existence"  an  existence  beyond  all  Being,  the  Ideas  partaking  of 
Being,  "  ousia."     This  Being  is  both  Mind  and  Good  :  a  con-  ) 
scious  good  Being,  the  Idea,  the  absolute  Unity  excluding  all, 
Manifoldness,  a  glorious  fulfilment  of  the  Eleatic  dreams.     Such  : 
a  conception  of  the  Deity  lifts  him  in  a  separate  realm  of  exis- 
tence, above  all  other  Ideas  soever. 

That  this  was  Plato's  conception  has  been  much  doubted.  He, 
the  Creator,  has  been  identified  with  the  Idea  of  the  Good,  as 
both  are  called  by  Plato  "  the  best  of  the  intelligible  and  eter- 
nally existing  beings."  He  is  himself  the  pattern  he  copies  in 


The  Philosophy  of  Plotinos. 


the  creation,  since  he  is  said  to  copy  an  eternal  pattern.  The 
world  is  therefore  called  a  "  sensible  God,"  an  "  image  of  the  in- 
telligible," and  an  "  image  of  the  eternal  gods."  Zeller  thinks 
the  ideas  cannot  depend  on  God  without  affecting  their  self-exis- 
tence ;  God  cannot  be  dependent  on  the  ideas,  for  the  same  rea- 
son, and  both  cannot  be  co-ordinate  without  creating  a  dualism 
Plato  knows  nothing  of.  Consequently,  God  and  the  Idea  of 
the  Good  are  identical.  This  view  of  Zeller's  creates  more  diffi- 
culties than  it  explains  ;  for  it  does  not  account  for  the  language 
quoted  above,  and  it  permits  us  to  ask,  why  was  it  the  Idea  of 
the  Good  and  not  some  other  Idea  which  took  upon  itself  the 
office  of  a  Creator  ?  Why  do  not  several  Ideas  create  separate 
universes? 

And  besides,  a  Creator  such  as  we  have  described  is  absolute- 
ly needed  by  Plato  in  his  Physics.  The  Ideas  are  true  existence, 
and  Matter  is  non-existence  ;  and  both  are  separate.  How  shall 
the  rational  principle  infuse  itself  into  matter  to  make  it  a  ration- 
al organism,  unless  the  God  who  contemplates  the  Idea,  gen- 
erates them  as  a  poet  in  himself,  and  thus,  so  to  speak,  incar- 
nates them  ?  For  Plato  has  no  principle  of  Emanationism  to 
assist  him,  as  had  Aristotle. 

6.  The  Human  Soul.— We  have  seen  that  the  Soul  of  the  Uni- 
verse began  the  human  souls.  Yet  we  have  other  accounts 
of  their  creation,  which  set  forth  that  the  Creator  compounded 
human  souls  in  the  same  vessel  in  which  he  had  compounded 
the  Soul  of  the  Universe,  the  difference  being  that  the  elements 
used  were  less  pure  ;  and  after  creating  them,  the  Creator  as- 
signed to  each  Soul  its  appropriate  star.  Thus  the  World-Soul 
and  each  human  soul  are  sisters,  and  not  related  to  each  other 
as  mother  and  daughter. 

Each  soul  is  composed  of  three  parts.     The  first  is  reason,  "  ten 
logistikon,"  which  has  its  seat  in  the  head,  and  is  the  organ  of  ± 
knowledge.    Its  moderate  regulation  is  the  virtue  called  wisdom,) 
the  opposite  of  this  virtue  is  the  vice,  foolishness.     The  second 
part  of  the  soul  attends  to  all  bodily  wants,  and  its  name  is  the 
"  Epithumetikon."     It  is  the  organ  of  perception,  and  has  its 
seat  in  the  abdomen  (the  solar  plexus).     To  this  part  of  the  soul 
God  has  added,  in  the  liver,  an  organ  of  intuitive  and  presen- 
timentative  knowledge.     The  moderate  exercise  of  this  part  of 
the  soul  is  the  virtue  "  Sophrosune,"  self-control,  and  its  op- 
'posite  habits  is  the  vice  "  Akolasia,"  intemperance.     Lastly,  we\ 
have  the  third  part  of  the  soul,  "to  Thumoeides"  the  courageous  \ 
part  of  the  soul,  prepared  by  the  secondary  deities,  presumably 
the  World-Soul,  and  this  is  the  organ  of  whose  moderate  exer- 
cise is  the  virtue   "  Andria,"   courage,   as   opposed  to  the  vice 
"  Deilia,"  cowardice.     The  fourth  virtue,  "  Dikaiosune,"  justice, 
is  the  right  relation  between  the  above  three  virtues,  and  when  it 
is  exercised  towards  God,  it  becomes  "  Hosiotes,"  holiness  or 
piety,  since  it  is  man's  end  to  resemble  God,  who  is  absolutely 
good.     This  is  happiness.     Virtue  is  the  health  and  order  and 
harmony  of  the  soul,  and  should  therefore  be  followed  irrespec- 


Platonism. 


tive  of  consequences  or  sanctions  ;  for  to  do  injustice  is  worse 
than  to  suffer  it  from  another.  This  philosophy  demands  the 
rationality  of  the  entire  man. 

Yet,  in  a  single  life  on  earth,  injustice  to  souls  is  patent.  God 
is  just  :  consequently  this  life  cannot  be  all.  The  soul  exists 
both  before  and  after  this  life;  it  transmigrates  through  all  forms 
according  to  inexorable  justice.  If  the  soul  of  a  wise  man  erred, 
his  next  incarnation  would  be  in  the  body  of  a  woman  ;  if  the 
soul  persisted  in  its  evil  ways,  the  next  incarnation  would  be 
that  of  an  animal.  If  howeyer  a  soul  for  several  incarnations 
chose  the  study  of  philosophy,  it  would  soon  become  perma- 
nently freed  from  the  necessity  of  reincarnating. 

Pleasure  is  not  necessarily  good  :  it  may  indeed  be  evil  ;  mod- 
eration and  health  of  the  soul  are  pleasurable  in  themselves. 
Pleasure  is  in  itself  antithetically  opposed  to  all  true  insight. 


j 


CHAPTER   II. 
ARISTOTELIANISM. 

i.  Plato  and  Aristotle. — In  order  to  understand  Aristotle  it 
will  be  advantageous  to  notice  his  points  of  contact  with  and  dif- 
ference from  his  great  Master. 

Both  were  agreed  that  Matter  was  indeterminate,  the  ground 
of  all  Plurality,  the  concomitant  cause,  the  feminine  principle, 
the  mother  and  the  nurse  of  the  world.  Here  they  separate. 
With  Plato,  Matter  is  non-existence,  emptiness,  vo'id,  "in  which" 
"  En  ho.w  With  Aristotle  Matter  is  incomplete,  undeveloped 
"  dunamis  "  or  power  and  possibility,  "  Ex  hou,"  "out  of  which." 
Matter,  according  to  Aristotle,  is  much  moie  real  than  according 
to  Plato  ;  the  latter's  system  may  be  described  as  a  monism  ; 
even  though  the  former's  may  be  interpreted  as  a  dualism. 

With  Plato,  the  Ideas  were  transcendent  above  the  World  that 
participated  in  them.  They  were  self-existent,  objectively  real. 
With  Aristotle,  all  objective  existence  apart  from  immanence  in 
the  things  which  participated  in  them  was  denied  them.  They 
are  only  the  essence  of  the  species,  energy,  "  energeia,"  form. 
These  universals  realise  themselves  in  the  matter,  and  particu- 
larize themselves  into  things. 

Matter,  or  potentiality,  and  Form,  or  energy,  are  so  closely 
united  that  Reality  results  from  both  as  a  third  principle.  This 
their  invariable  union  is  "  perceptible  substance,"  as  the  statue 
which  results  from  the  union  of  the  bronze  and  the  shape.  In 
all  reality,  therefore,  we  may  distinguish  the  mover  and  the 
moved,  the  active  and  the  passive.  Thus  all  reality  is  teleologi- 
cal,  having  an  end  or  aim  to  which  it  moves,  as  the  magnet 
moves  to  the  steel.  A  teleological  aim  is  the  very  reason  of  mo- 
tion, and  of  every  change  of  matter  ;  which  is  real  existence. 
We  now  have  a  principle  which  is  a  satisfactory  solution  to 
Plato's  unanswered  question  why  the  Ideas  were  impressed  in 
Matter  ;  for  we  have  here  purposive  activity,  ranging  through 
all  the  octaves  of  creation,  the  moving  and  the  moved  principles. 

This  conception  which  is  original  to  Aristotle  is  that  of  de- 
velopment, with  which  he  finally  solved  the  ever  recurring  prob- 
lem of  the  One  and  the  Many,  which  Greek  philosophy  was 
haunted  by,  and  which  Plato  only  restated  in  new  terms. 

Reality  is  thus  the  essence  of  the  phenomena  ;  being,  "  ousia," 
becomes  essence,  the  "  what  it  might  be  to  exist  "  "  To  ti  en 
einai  "  ;  and  all  appearance  is  the  realisation  of  essence.  The 


A  ristotelianism. 


mere,  inert.  "  becoming  "  of  Plato  has  become  the  living  "  de- 
velopment "  as  soon  as  a  teleological  view  of  it  is  taken.  This 
self-realization  of  essence  in  the  Sense-world  is  called  an  en- 
telechy,  "  Entelechia,"  which  takes  place  under  four  principles, 
Matter,  Form,  End  and  Cause.  The  first  two  of  these  principles 
refer  tp  things  related  to  each  other  ;  and  the  latter  to  individual 
things. 

2.  The  Deity. — When  we  ask  for  the  origin  of  the  motion  of 
the  moving  principles,  it  is  answered  that  this  must  again  be  a 
moving  principle.    As,  however,  we  cannot  make  a  regress  into 
the  infinite,  we  musr  come  to  some  prime  Mover,  himself  un- 
moved, that  excludes  all  passivity  and  potentiality,  and  is  pure 
activity   and   energy.     This   is   without   Matter,    "  aneu   hules," 
purus  actus,  eternal  in  its  motion,  simple,  continuous,  without 
the  limitation  of  space.    Thus  the  source  of  movement  is  found 
outside  of  the  substances  moved.     It  cannot  cause  motion,  be- 
cause every  end  aimed  at  is  an  instance  of  this  process,  and  the 
prime  Mover  of  the  world  is  its  final  end,  the  best,  the  efficient 
cause.     All  reality  lies  between  Matter  and  the  prime  Mover  after 
which   everything   strives   and   which   everything   desires.     The 
prime  Mover  is  One,  devoid  of  all  multiplicity:  therefore  immortal, 
pure,  desiring  nothing,  desired  of  all.     On  this  account  it  is  the 
end  of  scientific  cognition  ;  and  because  eternal,  and  eternally 
desired  of  all,  no  unification  between  God  and  his  world  be- 
yond eternal  desire  is  possible.    The  divine  Mind  thinks  of  itself 
eternally  :   in  it  thinker  and  thought  are  eternally  one,  and  at 
rest  ;  ^f  it  thought  of  creation  or  of  something  else  it  would  not 
be  at  rest.     Human  speculation  or  contemplation  of  pure  thought 
is  the  most  divine  occupation  possible  to  man,  re-discovering 
God  in  blissful  rest.     Thus  God  is  the  end  of  human  contem- 
plation, thought  of  thought. 

The  Deity,  according  to  Plato,  was  an  Idea  of  Ideas  ;  accord- 
ing to  Aristotle,  it  was  a  self-contained  prime  Mover  of  all  real- 
ity, transcendent  above  his  world.  And  this  world  lay  between 
himself  and  Matter,  opposed  to  him,  because  excluded  from  him. 

The  name  of  the  Deity  of  Aristotle  is  the  same  as  that  of 
Plato,  The  Good,  and  The  Mind.  Aristotle  claims  to  take  these 
names  not  from  Plato  but  from  Anaxagoras,  from  whose  Deity 
Plato  has  also  borrowed  the  name  of  his  Idea  of  Ideas.  Yet  it 
is  true  that  the  Deity  of  Aristotle  is  nearer  to  that  of  Anaxagoras 
than  that  of  Plato  ;  for  the  former  one  was  the  all-including  end 
of  all  the  "Logoi"  of  things,  the  principle  of  motion  in  all  reality. 

3.  The  Psychology. — The  psychology  of  Aristotle  is  radically 
different  from  that  of  Plato.     Man  is  a  mikrokosm  ;  his  soul 
unites  all  the  faculties  of  other  orders  of  living  beings.     Never- 
theless, the  human  soul  may  be  divided  into  two  parts:  that  which 
pre-exists  and  survives  the  body,  and  that  which  dies  with  it.  The 
former  is  called  "  Nous,"  reason,  in  general.     It  is  the  faculty 
by  which  man  excels  all  living  beings.     The  latter  is  subdivided 
into  five  "  souls  "  or  planes  of  consciousness.     Each  organ  ex- 
ists in  view  of  some  end,  which  is  an  activity  :  so  the  body  ex- 


The  Philosophy  of  Plotinos. 


ists  for  the  soul.  The  two  lowest  "  souls  "  man  possesses  in 
common  with  animals  and  plants  :  the  "  vegetable  "  and  "  as- 
similating "  or  "  reproductive  "  souls.  The  difference  between 
plants  and  animals  is  that  the  latter  have  a  common  centre  or 
central  organ,  the  heart  ;  which  the  former  do  not  possess.  With 
animals,  men  share  the  "  sensitive,"  "  appetitive,"  and  "  loco- 
motive "  souls,  which  include  memory,  desire,  and  self-activity. 
The  reason  itself,  the  distinctively  human  faculty,  may  be  divid- 
ed into  two  parts  :  the  passive  and  active  reason  ;  the  passive 
"  dunamis  "  is  a  "  tabula  rasa  "  and  receives  forms  ;  on  the  other 
hand  the  active  "  energeia  "  generates  forms  and  this  active  rea- 
son alone  has  substantial  eternal  existence.  The  active  "  Nous  " 
is  represented  as  divine,  although  in  Aristotle's  cosmology  we 
found  no  place  for  such  a  direct  unification  of  soul  and  God  ; 
since  God,  rapt  up  in  himself  transcended  the  Universe.  In  this 
its  highest  sphere  we  must  consider  Aristotle's  psychology  and 
cosmology  inconsistent. 

So  far,  then,  the  human  soul  is  composed  of  seven  subordinate 
souls  or  planes  of  consciousness.  If  however  we  take  the  two 
lowest  as  only  one,  then  man  will  be  found  to  have  only  six  con- 
stituent elements,  or  counting  the  body  as  one,  in  addition,  we 
will  have  seven. 

4.  The  Ethics. — As  little  as  Aristotle's  cosmology  and  psycho- 
logy agree,  so  little  does  his  system  of  Ethics  agree  with  either. 
Plato's  Ethics  we  saw  to  be  intimately  connected  with  his  psy- 
chology. Aristotle  is  however  here  the  true  empiricist  ;  he  finds 
in  Plato's  account  five  virtues  ;  he  adds  to  them  other  virtues  he 
finds  in  other  philosophies,  without  much  regard  to  his  psychol- 
ogy. Besides,  he  differs  from  Plato  in  making  a  virtue  the  mean 
between  two  extremes,  whereas  his  Master  had  only  known  of 
a  virtue  and  its  contradictory  vice.  The.  teleological  end  of 
action  which  Aristotle  assumes  is  happiness,  "  eudaimonia," 
the  mean  habit  of  human  activity.  He  pretends  to  deduce  it 
from  experience  ;  but  finally  assumes  it  as  self-evident.  He  di- 
vides his  virtues  into  dianoetic  and  natural  ;  but  here  he  forgets 
to  define  what  the  dianoetic  virtues  are.  He  only  points  out 
various  gradations  of  truth-conception,  of  which  the  "  Nous," 
with  its  immediate  grasp  of  intelligible  principles  reaches  the 
highest.  The  good  of  every  being  is  the  rational  development 
of  its  powers,  and  as  man's  characteristic  quality  is  his  reason, 
the  dianoetic  will  be  the  highest.  But  we  have  already  remarked 
that  he  neglect?  to  define  these  all-important  virtues. 


CHAPTER  III. 
STOICISM. 

1.  Plato,  Aristotle  and  the  Stoics. — What  Aristotle  was  to  Plato, 
that  the  Stoics  were  to  Aristotle.     Aristotle  denied  the  trans- 
cendence of  the  Ideas  beyond  their  immanence  in  things  ;  the 
Stoics  denied  the  transcendence  of  Aristotle's  Deity,  and  recog- 
nized it  as  only  immanent  in  the  world,  so  that  while  Aristotle 
called  his  Theology  "  Dialectics,"  the  Stoics  called  theirs  "Phy- 
sics."    Yet  the  Stoics  belong  to  a  later  age  than  either  Plato  or 
Aristotle,  for  with  the  latter's  comprehensive  glance  all  former 
constructive  work  was   ended.     It  remained   for  the    Peripate- 
tics and  Academicians,  the  Stoics  and  Epicureans,  to  combine 
what  was  given  before.     Besides,  the  Stoics  and  Epicureans  were 
more  interested  in  Ethics,  or  the  practical  life,  than  in  theoretic 
discussions.     They  preferred  to   borrow  their   Dialectic   almost 
ready-made  from  Aristotle,  and  their  Physics  from  Herakleitos. 
In  this  interest  in  Ethics  they  considered  themselves  followers  of 
Sokrates,  looking  on  him  as  the  pattern  of  the  virtuous  wise  man. 
and  were  the  beginners  of  the  movement  in  philosophy  which 
lasted  for  several  centuries,  being  characterized  by  this  prefer- 
ence for  Ethics  over  abstract  reasoning. 

2.  The  Aristotelian  Dialectic. — Their  Dialectic  they  borrow  from 
Aristotle  with  the  following  changes.     It  is  named  Logic,  be- 
cause its  treats  of  "  Logos,"  reason,  which  is  already  conceived 
as  "implicit"  "Endiathetos"  and  "explicit"  "Prophorikos."  Logic 
then  is  divided  into  Rhetoric  and  Dialectic  proper  ;  its  business 
is  however  only  secondary  to   Ethics,  teaching  how  to  avoid 
errors.     Doing  away  with  all  but  the  first  four  of  Aristotle's 
categories,  they    reach  a  criterion   of    truth,   "  right    reason," 
"  orthos  Logos  "  the  quality  of  compelling  assent,  logical  neces- 
sity.    Knowledge  originates  from  sensation,  the  mind  being  a 
"tabula  rasa"  at  first.     Thus,  instead  of  Platonic  Ideas  or  Aristo- 
telian essence  we  have  reflection  or  abstraction  from  these  men- 
tal images  or  impressions.     This  shows  us  that  nothing  is  real 
except  corporeal  matter  ;  the  best  of  reality  is  nothing  but  the 
quality  of  occupying  space.     Reality  which  with  Aristotle  was 
the  product  of  four  principles,  Matter,  Form,  Efficient  Cause  and 
Final  Cause,  is  now  the  product  of  only  two  principles,  the  active 
and  passive  ones,  which  are  inseparable.     They  do   not  know 
anything  of  a  pure  "  Energeia,"  or  "  Nous  ";  they  only  know  of 


io  The  Philosophy  of  Plotinos. 


a  conscious  principle  "  Reason  "  or  "  Logos  "  connected  insep- 
arably with  the  universe,  just  as  the  human  soul  or  "  Reason  " 
or  "  Logos  "  is  united  to  the  human  body.  This  cosmical  force, 
moving,  active,  moulding,  reasonable,  is  "  Reason,"  "  Logos," 
and  is  the  Deity.  This  form-principle  is  called  "  Logos,"  Soul, 
ether,  nature,  Zeus,  and  fire — not  destructive,  but  constructive. 
Being  constructive  this  divine  fire  is  the  womb  and  grave  of  all 
things,  containing  the  rational  germs  "  spermatic  reasons," 
"  logoi  spermatikoi,"  of  all  things.  The  human  soul  is  of  like 
character  with  the  World-Soul,  and  the  breathing-in  of  the  cool 
air  of  the  atmosphere  assists  its  generation  and  preservation. 

The  human  soul  however,  seems  to  be  composed  of  different 
elements,  the  governing  force,  is  "  the  logical  powers,"  "  to 
logistikon,"  seated  in  the  breast,  the  generative  function,  speech 
and  the  five  senses.  This  would  make  eight  component  parts, 
the  crudeness  of  which  classification  is  apparent  at  first  sight. 

Although  the  Stoics  recognised  only  two  principles,  the  pass- 
ive "  matter,"  "  He.  apoios  ousia,"  and  the  active,  "  The  God  " 
"  Ho  Theos,"  "  in  which  reason  exists,"  yet  on  the  other  hand 
the  divine  soul  is  represented  as  being  composed  of  Hexis, 
phusis,  psuche,"  "  habit,"  "  nature,"  "  soul,"  and  finally  "  Nous." 
In  this  we  may  trace  a  faint  resemblance  to  Aristotle's 
psychology. 

The  formation  of  the  world  then  took  place  by  change  of  the 
divine  fire  into  air  and  water  ;  which  water  separates  into  earth, 
water  and  fire.  Earth  and  water  are  passive  ;  the  finer  air  and 
fire  are  active.  Finally  at  the  end  of  a  definite  age,  all  things  are 
resolved  into  the  divine  fire  (conflagrative)  after  which  the  world 
will  be  once  more  created,  the  same  things  as  before  happening 
without  variation  into  infinity,  without  any  thing  new.  This  of 
course  brings  into  the  finite  spherical  world  absolute  "  destiny  " 
"  Heimarmene,"  and  "  providence,"  "Pronoia  ".  Destiny  how- 
ever only  related  to  auxiliary  causes  so  that  primary  causes  re- 
mained in  our  own  free  will  and  desire,  whose  actions  were  fore- 
seen but  not  predetermined  by  providence.  As  to  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul,  Stoic  teachers  differed. 

3.  The  Ethics. — The  Stoics  introduced  into  the  domain  of 
Ethics  several  new  conceptions.  In  the  first  place,  man  was 
considered  only  in  relation  to  himself,  not  in  relation  to  the 
State  of  Plato  or  Aristotle.  To  live  according  to  nature  is  not 
to  live  according  to  the  nature  of  others,  but  according  to  one's 
own  nature  ;  the  sage  need  only  know  himself.  Thus  the  max- 
im to  live  harmoniously  with  reason  becomes  an  exhortation  to 
live  harmoniously,  in  an  absolute  sense.  In  the  second  place, 
they  introduced  the  conception  of  Duty,  "  ofncium  ".  This  does 
not  only  regulate  a  natural  impulse,  as  with  Aristotle,  but  has  the 
power  to  suppress  it.  It  suppresses  all  "affective  states,"  "Pathe." 
fear,  trouble,  desire  and  pleasure,  as  leading  only  to  morbid 
states,  pleasure  and  pain  and  therefore  worthless.  "Apathy  " 
"  Apatheia  "  is  consequently  the  highest  human  state — in  con- 
tradistinction to  the  Epicurean  freedom  from  pain.  This  state 


Stoicism.  1 1 


can  be  attained  by  making  dominant  in  one's  nature  those  ele- 
ments which  do  not  depend  on  external  circumstances,  so  that 
the  sage  is  dependent  on  none  but  himself,  and  can  be  happy 
even  in  the  bull  of  Phalaris.  The  sage  is  then  equal  to  Zeus, 
except  in  the  unimportant  physical  things.  Pleasure  may  legiti- 
mately follow  the  activity  of  the  sage,  but  should  not  precede  it. 
The  sage  is  perfectly  virtuous — for  if  he  has  one  virtue  he  will 
have  all  the  rest — the  usual  Platonic  virtues,  the  end  of  man 
being  not  contemplation  but  action.  In  this  account  of  the  four 
virtues  the  Stoics  seem  to  have  completely  lost  sight  of  the  rela- 
tion between  them  and  Plato's  psychology,  their  own  psychology 
being  at  best  very  crude. 

All  men  are  either  fools  or  advancing  towards  wisdom,  which 
is  to  live  according  to  nature,  making  human  conduct  agree 
with  the  all-controlling  law  of  nature,  or,  as  some  prefer  to 
put  it,  the  Divine  Will.  Yet  to  live  in  associations  is  but  the 
means  of  living  for  oneself,  to  attain  the  chief  good  ;  for  the 
sage  is  neither  husband  nor  citizen.  The  wise  will  live  in  an 
ideal  state  embracing  all  men  as  such,  dividing  wealth  and  ad- 
vantages equally  to  all.  Suicide  was  a  legitimate  means  of  end- 
ing suffering. 

The  Ethics  of  the  Stoics  were  in  later  times  formulated  into 
maxims  by  Epictetus  and  Marcus  Aurelius,  which  agree  so 
closely  with  some  of  the  teachings  of  the  New  Testament  that 
they  have  been  charged  with  plagiarism.  Such  a  charge  is  only 
plausible  to  those  who  are  ignorant  of  the  writings  of  the  earlier 
Stoics  and  the  natural  development  of  doctrine.  The  best  evi- 
dence of  this  is  that  Marcus  Aurelius  detested  Christianity.  And 
this  may  have  arisen  from  the  fact  that  while  its  ethical  maxims 
agreed  with  his,  yet  he  could  not  make  rational  to  himself  the 
Incarnation. 

This  sketch  of  Stoicism  would  not  be  complete  without 
mention  of  their  tendency  to  seek  an  allegorical  meaning  be- 
neath the  exoteric  sense  of  the  words.  Demokritos,  Anaxagoras, 
Aristotle  and  the  Cynics,  had  already  explained  the  fables  of  the 
gods  as  beautiful  allegories,  symbolizing  spiritual  truths.  To 
the  Stoics,  however,  belongs  the  merit  of  having  done  this 
systematically  in  relation  to  all  Pagan  divinities,  recklessly  violat- 
ing the  most  evident  rules  of  etymology.  We  will  find  this 
allegorical  method  of  interpretation  in  Philo  Judaeus,  and  after 
him  in  the  mystics  of  all  ages. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
EMANATIONISM. 

1.  The  Date  of  Hermes. — The  time  in  which  Hermes  Trismeg- 
istus  lived  is  lost  in  uncertainty.     It  is  impossible  to  assume  his 
identity   with  the  traditional   Hermes  of  Egyptian   fame.     Cas- 
aubon  and  L.  Menard  suppose  the  writer  of  the  Hermetica  to 
have  been  an  Alexandrian  living  at  the  end  of  the  first.and  at 
the  beginning  of  the  second  century,  who  may  have  assumed 
the  name  of  Hermes  for  several  reasons,  either  that  he  thought 
his  doctrines  agreed  with  those  of  Hermes,  or  because  his  dia- 
logues introduced  Hermes  as  a  speaker,  just  as  Plato  introduced 
Sokrates  ;  or,  finally,  to  gain  authority  and  fame  for  his  works. 
He  must  have  lived  after  Philo  Judaeus,  and  Josephus,  and  have 
been  thoroughly  imbued  with  the  writings  of  Plato.     He  must 
have  been  an  early  contemporary  of  Justin  Martyr,  who  refers 
to  his  doctrine  of  the  Unity  of  God,  and  one  of  whose  writings 
contains  a  passage  verbally  identical  with  one  in  thePoemandres, 
the  only  complete  extant  Hermetic  work.     Besides,  Tertullian. 
136-216,  A.  D.,  mentions  him,  so  that  the  writer  must  have  lived 
between  the  time  of  Josephus  and  that  of  Tertullian. 

That  the  Hermetic  writings  had  influence  over  Ammonius 
Sakkas,  241  A.  D.,  is  rendered  possible  by  mention  of  him  in  the 
works  of  Asklepios,  the  reputed  grandson  of  Hermes.  Besides, 
several  Hermetic  fragments  are  addressed  to  an  Ammon,  who 
might  be  Ammonius  Sakkas,  if  these  Hermetic  fragments  were 
of  the  times  of  a  disciple  of  Hermes  living  in  the  time  of  Ask- 
lepios. 

2.  Relation  to  Christianity. — There  is  no  good  ground  for  call- 
ing Hermes  a  Christian.     The  Fathers  O  quote  him  whenever 
his  doctrine  agrees  with  theirs,  or  could  be  so  misunderstood  as 
to  fit.  their  purpose.     This  fact  however,  should  rather  raise  the 
opposite  presumption  ;  for  they  were  endeavouring  to  support 
their   own    opinions    by    quotations    from    well-known    heathen 
writers,  as  for  instance  Plato  and  Homer,  who  were  authorities 
among  the  heathen.     That  Lactantius  (2)  and  Cyril  of  Alexan- 
dria (3)  praised  him  means  little  or  nothing  ;  for  even  the  Chris- 
tian Justin  held  the  Logos  to  be  only  a  "  second  God,"  a  doc- 
trine condemned  at  Nicaea. 

If  Hermes  was  familiar  with  the  writings  of  Philo,  he  must 
have  also  become  familiar  with  the  locutions  of  the  Septuagint. 
which  Philo  considered  inspired.  On  this  ground,  therefore,  if 


Emanationism.  13 


Hermes  is  considered  a  Christian,  we  must  do  the  like  by  Philo. 
The  passages  which  are  most  often  advanced  as  proofs  of  the 
Christianity  of  Hermes  are  as  follows.  "  Thou,  O  Child,  send 
an  acceptable  sacrifice  to  The  God,  Father  of  all  things.  But 
add  also,  O  Child,  through  the  Logos  "  Dia  tou  Logou  (4)." 
These  words  are  Philonic  in  every  particular  ;  especially  the 
name  "The  God."  They  cannot  therefore  constitute  acquaint- 
ance with  the  Christian  dogma  of  the  Trinity.  Again,  "  Tat.— 
Who  is  the  generator  of  the  regeneration  ?  Hermes. — The  Son 
of  the  God,  One  Man,  by  the  will  of  the  God  (B)."  Here  we  see 
Philonism  again,  especially  in  the  expression  "  one  man," 
which  refers  to  the  Logos,  who  must  be  a  man  since  the  human 
race  is  in  the  image  of  the  Logos.  -That  the  "  one  man  "  cannot 
refer  to  the  human  body  of  Jesus  is  plain  because  from  the  follow- 
ing passage  we  see  that  this  "  one  man  "  existed  before  the  cre- 
ation of  the  world,  whereas  the  human  body  of  Jesus  only  or- 
iginated several  thousand  years  after  it.  "  But  the  Father  of  all 
things,  the  Mind,  being  life  and  light,  began  a  Man  like  unto 
himself,  whom  he  loved  as  his  own  child,  for  he  was  very  beau- 
tiful, having  the  image  of  the  Father.  For  The  God  loved  his 
own  form,  and  to  this  delivered  over  all  his  own  creations  (8)." 
"  Of  whom  sowing,  O  Father  ? — Of  the  son  of  the  God  (7)." 
Thus  the  Son  is  the  Organism  of  all  things  (8)  and  the  Tool  of 
God's  Will  (9). 

It  has  also  been  asserted  that  the  following  words  constitute  a 
reference  to  the  Holy  Spirit  :  "  But  The  Mind,  The  God,  being 
masculine-feminine,  originating  life  and  light,  begat  by  reason 
another  Mind-Creator,  who  being  God  of  the  Fire  and  Spirit 
created  seven  administrators — (10)."  This  refers  to  the  Logos, 
and  as  we  shall  see  these  seven  administrators  are  not  the  seven 
names  of  the  Spirit  but  the  seven  heavens  of  which  the  world 
is  composed.  It  is  therefore  another  name  for  the  Logos,  and 
nothing  more. 

Again,  "  Immediately  from  the  downborne  elements  springs 
forth  the  Word  of  The  God,  to  the  pure  creation  of  all  Nature, 
and  was  united  to  the  creative  Mind,  for  it  was  consubstantial, 
(Homo-ousios)  with  it — (")."  We  thus  see  that  what  above 
appeared  to  be  referred  to  the  third  person  of  the  Trinity  is  here 
referred  to  what  would  be  the  second  ;  which  is  also  called  "  the 
spiritual  Word  (12)."  Besides,  the  word  "consubstantial,"  "Ho- 
mo-ousios "  was  not  used  by  any  Christian  writer  of  repute  for 
more  than  a  century  after  this,  in  the  days  of  Athanasius.  Con- 
sequently, Hermes  cannot  have  used  this  word  in  the  distinc- 
tively theological  meaning,  whereas  it  agreed  with  his  Philonism, 
that  all  things  were  in  God,  but  not  God  in  them. 

But  besides  showing  negatively  that  Hermes  was' not  a  Chris- 
tian, we  may  show  this  positively  by  noticing  the  fact  that  he 
held  to  doctrines  never  countenanced  by  Christian  authorities 
The  Deity  is  masculine-feminine  (13),  there  is  a  metempsychosis 
of  souls,  regeneration  is  accomplished  by  silence,  and  divination 
is  aporoved  of  (14). 


14  The  Philosophy  of  Plotinos. 


3.  Difference  from  Platonism.— Hermetic  doctrine  differs  from 
Platonism  in  several  important  particulars. 

In  the  first  place,  we  must  notice  the  crude  anthropomorphism, 
by  which  the  first  and  second  orders  of  existence  are  likened 
to  the  human  figure.  Plato's  conception  of  the  Deity  was  too 
exalted  to  call  it  anything  but  "  Epekeina  tes  Ousias,"  "  that 
which  is  beyond  all  Being,"  "  Over-Existence." 
^  Plato's  highest  order  oi  being  was  alone  Mind,  "  Nous."  Here 
"  Nous  "  is  predicated  of  the  two  highest  orders  of  being,  with- 
out making  it  clear  whether  there  is  any  difference  of  degree 
between  them. 

Hermes  limits  the  transmigration  of  souls  to  human  bodies, 
and  represents  that  God  saves  the  souls  from  "  this  shame,"  of 
being  sent  into  the  bodies  of  animals.  Plato  in  his  figurative 
way  seemed  to  countenance  such  animal  transmigration. 

4.  Hermetic  Conceptions. — In  the  Emanationism  of  the  author 
of  the  Hermetic  writings,  the  Universe  is  composed  of  a  number 
of  spheres  of  being,  each  the  image  of  the  other  next  above  it 
(1B).     The  highest  sphere  of  being  is  The  God  (16),  the  next  is 
the  Logos,  the  Son  of  God  (17),  and  beyond  him,  there  are  seven 
successive  spheres  of  Being  of  which  all  things  in  heaven  and 
earth  are  composed  (18).    Thus,  there  are  nine  spheres  of  being, 
each  proceeding  from  the  other,  in  the  image  of  its  begettor  ; 
Matter  being  the  outermost  (19).     When  God  is  considered  apart 
from  the  world,  the  latter,  including  the  Logos,  is  called  the 
Ogdoad  C20). 

Psychology  is  analogical  to  cosmology.  The  soul  is  divided 
into  four  parts  (21) :  "  But  the  soul  of  man  is  carried  on  in 
this  way.  The  Mind  in  the  reason,  "  Logos,"  the  reason  in  the 
soul,  the  soul  in  the  spirit,  the  spirit  in  the  body."  Death  is 
only  the  retiring  of  the  spirit  from  the  physical  body  (22). 

5.  Cosmology. — Although   the    Hermetic   writer   speaks   of   an 
Ogdoad  besides  God,  he  usually  sums  up  all  existence  in  three 
orders  of  being,  by  comprehending  the  seven  spheres  proceed- 
ing from  the  Logos  under  the  title  Soul.     Thus  we  find  the  so- 
called  Platonic  trinity:     The  God,  the  World,  and  the  Soul  (23). 
He  says:    "  First  The  God,  Second  the  World,  third  the  Man  ; 
the  World  because  of  the  Man,  but  Man  because  of  the  God — 
Of  the  entities  some  indeed  are  in  bodies,  some  in  ideas,  but 
some  energies  ;  but  body  is  in  ideas,  but  idea  and  energy  in 
body  (24)." 

The  first  principle,  The  God,  is  the  beginning  and  cause  of 
all  things  (25)  ;  his  name  is  Logos,  the  God,  the  beautiful,  the 
good  (28).  In  the  Universe  there  is  nothing  which  is  not  in 
the  God;  whence  neither  magnitude,  nor  place,  nor  quality,  nor 
figure  is  about  the  God.  He  is  the  Universe  and  the  Universe 
is  around  all  things. 

The  second  principle  is  "  God,"  as  contrasted  with  "  the  God." 
He  is  the  "first-begotten  of  God,"  and  the  "second  God."  ("). 
He  is  also  called  "  the  Logos  (*)." 

The  third  principle  is  Soul,  which  may  also  be  called  "  God," 


Emanationism.  15 


though  in  a  sense  lower  than  that  in  which  it  applied  is  the 
second  principle  (29). 

The  Logos  is  the  archetypal  system  of  ideas  C30),  and  is  the 
Creator,  whom  the  first  principle  generates,  because  it  is  his  na- 
ture to  be  good,  and  because  he  has  a  passion  for  good.  "  For 
just  as  a  man  cannot  live  apart  from  life,  so  neither  can  the  God 
live  without  doing  the  good.  For  this  is  as  it  were  Life,  and  as 
it  were  motion  of  the  God,  to  move  all  things,  and  to  vivify  (81)." 

"  While  the  First  Principle  is  the  Creator  in  respect  to  the 
Second  Principle,  the  Second  Principle  is  the  Creator  proper 

C2)." 
The  physical  world  is  of  course  the  body  of  the  World-Soul 

C33)- 

6.  Ethics. — The  human  soul  develops  by  the  experiences  it 
gathers  in  a  series  of  reincarnations  (34)  which  are  limited  to 
human  bodies  by  the  guardianship  of  good  spirits.  "For  of 
The  God  is  this  law,  to  guard  a  human  soul  from  this  so  great 
disgrace  C36)  "  of  entering  the  body  of  an  animal. 

Between  the  Soul  and  the  Father  is  the  Logos,  or  Second 
Principle,  the  mediating  element,  the  organ  of  God's  will  (36). 
This  is  the  "  prize  for  souls  (37)."  "  And  this  is  the  administra- 
tion of  the  Universe,  dependent  from  the  nature  of  the  One  and 
pervading  it  through  the  Mind  of  the  One.  Than  which  nothing 
is  more  divine  and  energetic,  or  more  unitive  of  men  to  the 
Gods,  of  Gods  to  the  men.  This  is  the  Good  Daemon.  Blessed 
the  soul  which  is  fullest  of  this  ;  unfortunate  the  soul  that  is  void 
of  this  C38)." 

Man  must  hate  the  body,  in  order  to  love  himself,  the  Soul 
C").  Man  is  attracted  to  God  by  contemplation,  as  iron  to  the 
magnet  C40).  Thus,  contrariwise,  impiety  brings  its  own  punish- 
ment in  darkness  and  fire  '(41).  The  only  evil  is  ignorance  of 
the  Deity  C42).  And  it  is  possible  to  discern  him  through  all 
things  by  natural  knowledge,  since  everything  is  his  image,  re- 
motely or  directly  (43). 

The  manner  by  which  the  soul  reaches  its  development  is  the 
regeneration  of  silent  contemplation,  the  "  silent  prayer  "  of  the 
later  mystics.  "  Accept  rational  sacrifices  pure  from  soul  and 
heart  intent  upon  thee,  O  Unspeakable,  Ineffable,  Invoked  by 
silence  C44)."  Thus  intellectual  wisdom  lies  in  silence  (4B). 
"  Draw  to  thyself  and  it  will  come  ;  wish  and  it  becomes.  Lay 
to  rest  the  senses  of  the  body  and  it  will  be  the  generation  of  the 
Deity.  Purify  thyself  from  the  rational  avengers  of  the  Matter 
C46)."  The  road  to  be  travelled  by  every  soul  passes  through  the 
twelve  signs  of  the  Zodiac  (4T)  "  of  the  nature  indeed,  but  of  all 
shaped  forms." 

Besides  silence,  the  way  to  reach  God  is  to  wrong  no  man  (48) ; 
"  But  the  worship  of  God  is  one  :  not  to  be  evil  C48)." 

7.  Spiritual  Destiny. — The  end  of  life  is  to  become  divine. 
"  For  it  is  possible,  O  Child,  that  the  soul  be  deified,  placed  in 
the  body  of  man,  having  beheld  the  beauty  of  thy  good  (M)." 
"Knowest  thou  not  that  thou  hast  been  born  The  God,  and  Son  of 


16  The  Philosophy  of  Plotinos. 


the  One,  which  also  am  I?  (51)"  "  But  the  human  soul,  not  every 
one  but  the  pious,  is  a  kind  of  daemonhood  and  divine;  and  such 
a  soul,  after  the  departure  from  the  body,  having  striven  the 
strife  of  this  piety  (but  strife  of  piety  is  to  have  known  the  God, 
and  to  have  wronged  no  man)  becomes  wholly  Mind  (62)."  Thus 
some  men  are  Gods  already,  and  their  humanity  is  nigh  to  the 
Deity  (53). 

Transmigration  of  souls  is  only  the  means  by  which  such  a 
deification  can  be  accomplished.  "  And  there,  in  order,  they 
mount  upwards  to  the  Father,  and  they  deliver  themselves  up  to 
the  powers,  and  becoming  powers  they  become  The  God.  This  is 
the  good  ending  of  those  who  attain  knowledge,  to  be  made 
divine  (")•"  Again,  "Thou  seest,  O  Child,  how  many  bodies 
we  must  pass  through,  and  how  many  choirs  of  daemons,  and 
continuity  and  courses  of  the  stars  we  must  accomplish,  that  we 
may  hasten  to  the  One  and  Only  God  (M)." 


CHAPTER  V. 

AMMONIUS  SAKKAS,  PLOTINOS,  AND  THEIR  RELA- 
TION TO  CHRISTIANITY. 

1.  Ammonius   Sakkas. — The   founder    of     Neo-Platonism   was 
Ammonius  Sakkas,  of  Alexandria.     According  to  Porphyry  and 
Theodoret,  he  was  the  son  of  Christian  parents  of  humble  cir- 
cumstances, and  became  a  labourer.     Soon  however  he  changed 
his  occupation  and  devoted  himself  to  philosophy.     He  aban- 
doned Christianity,  as  he  could  not  approve  of  Christian  hos- 
tility to  science  and  speculations.     Later  in  life,  he  taught  phil- 
osophy with  great  success,  teaching  orally,  and  demanding  a 
promise  from  his  students  to  keep  his  doctrines  secret.    Among 
his  students  were  the  two  Origens,  Herennius  and  Plotinos.  We 
only  know  of  his  doctrines  that  he  discovered  the  agreement  of 
Aristotle  with  Plato,  a  remark  supported  by  a  statement  of  his 
doctrines  by  his  disciple  Plotinos,  who  said  that  he  felt  himself 
no  more  bound  by  his  promise  after  the  heathen  Origen  and 
Herennius  had  broken  theirs. 

2.  Plotinos. — Plotinos  always  remained  silent  about  his  birth- 
day and  place  of  birth  ;  he  was  almost  ashamed  of  having  a 
body,  and  would  not  sit  for  a  picture.     Yet  it  is  supposed  on 
good  authority  that  he  must  have  been  born  in  204  or  205  A.  D., 
in  Lycopolis,  in  Egypt.     In  his  twenty-eighth  year  he  became 
the  pupil  of  Ammonius  Sakkas  and  was  so  carried  away  with  the 
greatness  of  his  teacher  that  he  is  reported  to  have  said  "Teuton 
Ezetoun,"  "  this  is  the  man  for  me!"  From  the  time  he  first  met 
him,  he  never  left  his  side  until  the  death  of  Ammonius  Sakkas 
broke  up  their  mutual  intercourse,  which  had  now  lasted  eleven 
years.     Feeling  that  he  had  no  other  ties  to  bind  him  to  Alex- 
andria, he  determined  to  go  to  Persia  and  India,  to  learn  the 
wisdom  of  the  East.     To  accomplish  this  purpose  he  had  at- 
tached himself  to  the  army  of  Gordian  which  was  destined  to  a 
campaign  in  the  East  ;  but  when  the  army  broke  up,  he  was 
forced  to  return  with  it  to  Rome,  where  he  settled  as  a  teacher 
of  philosophy,  holding  consultations  and  successfully  managing 
his  school  till  in  his  sixty-sixth  year  he  died  (270  A.  D.) 

As  a  teacher  his  success  was  great,  instructing  poor  as  well 
as  rich.  The  Emperor  Gallienus  and  the  Empress  Salonina, 
among  others,  attended  his  lectures.  This  success  was  due  not 
only  to  his  wisdom  but  also  to  his  personal  influence  and  power. 
Above  all,  he  owed  much  of  it  to  his  genuineness  and  spiritual- 
ity. During  the  time  that  Porphyry  lived  with  him  he  enjoyed 
four  times  the  ecstasy  which  he  had  preached  to  others  as  being 
the  height  of  human  attainment. 


i8  The  Philosophy  of  Plotinos. 


According  to  his  wish,  Porphyry  collected  and  edited  his  writ- 
ings. These  consisted  of  twenty-one  earlier,  and  thirty-three 
later  short  essays  on  various  topics.  Porphyry  gathered  these 
into  groups  of  nine,  which  he  called  Enneads.  The  order  in 
which  he  placed  them  was  the  chronological  order  of  the  times 
when  they  were  written,  so  that  they  are  not  arranged  according 
to  the  subjects  discussed.  The  style  of  Plotinos  is  marred  by 
continual  repetitions  and  very  many  obscurities  of  thought  and 
diction,  so  that  a  systematic  representation  of  his  doctrines  is  no 
easy  task. 

As  Plotinos  considered  himself  a  disciple  of  Ammonius  Sak- 
kas,  we  may  for  practical  purposes  assume  that  his  writings  rep- 
resent the  thought  of  his  Master  on  all  important  points. 

3,  Relation  to  Christianity. — The  system  of  Plotinos  is  so  beauti- 
ful and  so  coherent  that  Christian  writers  have  not  been  slow 
to  ascribe  all  that  is  good  in  it  to  the  early  Christian  training  of 
Ammonius  Sakkas.  How  little  such  a  claim  means  can  be  under- 
stood when  we  recollect  that  Clement  of  Alexandria  accused 
Homer  and  Plato  of  stealing  their  best  thoughts  from  the  Jew- 
ish prophets.  Consequently  such  an  explanation  of  the  good 
elements  of  Neo-Platonism  would  not  merit  any  answer  if  it 
were  not  that  by  such  a  claim  (which  is  still  made  to-day)  the 
value  of  non- Christian  philosophy  is  seriously  impaired,  and 
Christianity  is  credited  with  more  than  it  deserves. 

In  the  first  place,  Ammonius  Sakkas  was  a  mere  child  when 
Christian,  and  left  Christianity  as  soon  as  he  became  able  to 
think  for  himself.  Besides,  Eusebius  (2)  distinctly  states  that  he 
left  Christianity  on  account  of  its  hostility  to  science  and  phil- 
osophy, the  very  subject  of  dispute  ;  and  it  is  well  known  that 
converts  become  the  bitterest  enemies  of  their  former  beliefs. 
Would  it  be  likely  that  Amirpnius  Sakkas  would  permit  himself 
to  be  influenced  by  Christianity  in  the  very  thing  on  account  of 
which  he  left  it? 

Not  a  single  word  or  similarity  of  expression  in  the  Enneads 
betrays  any  acquaintance  with  the  Christian  formulations,  nor 
does  Plotinos  anywhere  betray  that  his  doctrines  had  arisen  in 
opposition  to  or  imitation  of  Christianity  ;  he  utterly  ignores  it. 
And  the  reason  of  this  is  plain  ;  for  the  Christians  usually  be- 
longed to  the  lowest  and  most  unphilosophic  classes,  with  a 
few  exceptions  ;  and  it  seems  almost  amusing  to  think  that  a 
man  so  deeply  read  in  philosophy  as  Plotinos  or  Ammonius 
Sakkas  were  should  borrow  all  their  best  doctrines  from  emin- 
ently unphilosophic  sources. 

Further,  if  we  examine  the  state  of  contemporary  Christian 
philosophy  we  will  see  that  it  is  almost  without  exception  a  ste- 
reotyped form  of  Philonism  adapted  to  the  New  Testament. 
There  are  no  original  conceptions,  and  no  learning  ;  Clement's 
quotations  from  Greek  literature  being  mostly  made  up  at 
second  hand  from  cheap  anthologies  (8).  How  then  could  this 
barren  source  furnish  the  acknowledged  rich  results  of  Neo- 
Platonism? 


Relation  to  Christianity.  ig 


Besides,  none  can  read  the  Enneads  without  seeing  that  Ploti- 
nos  is  thoroughly  at  home  in  all  Greek  philosophy,  devoting 
whole  books  to  the  refutation  of  Aristotle's  categories  and  other 
tenets,  so  that  we  are  certain  he  took  all  his  philosophic  material 
at  first  hand  from  philosophy  itself. 

All  this,  however,  is  only  negative  proof  ;  positive  proof  is 
also  at  hand.  The  doctrines  of  Plotinos  do  not  in  any  case 
agree  with  the  Christian  doctrines,  and  show  no  derivation  from 
them.  The  Christian  conception  of  the  Trinity,  in  its  orthodox 
form,  is  that  all  three  Persons  are  co-equal  in  rank,  and  all  three 
are  separate  from  the  world,  and  as  far  from  it  the  one  as  the 
other.  The  Triad  of  intelligible  beings  that  may  be  found  in 
Plotinos  is  God,  the  Mind,  and  individual  Souls,  each  hierarchi- 
cally subordinated  to  the  other,  and  including  the  world  as  phy- 
cal  being  in  the  latter  term.  Moreover,  the  whole  system  of 
Plotinos  is  founded  on  the  thought  of  development  of  all  things 
from  God  as  emanations  ;  and  anybody  who  has  read  the  Po- 
lemic of  Irenaeus  against  what  he  calls  the  "  decay  "  of  God  will 
not  be  likely  to  say  that  the  system  of  Plotinos  had  any  con- 
nection at  all  with  Christian  dogma,  especially  since  Athanasius 
insisted  so  strenuously  on  the  difference  between  "  made  "  and 
"  begotten  "  which  does  not  exist  in  the  Plotinic  Cosmology. 

Besides  all  this,  we  can  account  for  almost  every  dogma  of 
Plotinos  in  earlier  Greek  philosophy,  as  he  himself  acknow- 
ledges. 

Nor  need  the  moral  earnestness,  which  is  found  in  Plotinos 
and  which  is  found  in  Plato  or  Aristotle,  point  to  a  Christian 
origin  any  more  than  that  of  the  Stoics,  from  which  without  a 
doubt,  Plotinos  and  Ammonius  Sakkas  drew  their  inspiration. 

This  brings  us  to  the  relation  of  Plotinos  to  Philo.  That 
Plotinos  had  read  the  works  of  Philo,  is  entirely  probable,  al- 
though the  chaotic  eclecticism  and  syncretism  of  the  latter  must 
have  rendered  his  works  repulsive  to  any  but  Jews  or  Christians 
who  were  unacquainted  with  the  sources  from  which  Philo  drew 
all  that  was  valuable  in  his  interpretation  of  the  Scriptures.  Yet 
it  is  very  improbable  that  the  relation  between  the  two  was  more 
than  that  both  of  them  drew  their  inspiration  from  the  same 
source  ;  for  it  would  have  been  a  great  deal  easier  for  the  phil- 
osophic and  consistent  Plotinos  to  draw  his  material  from  the 
original  sources,  Stoic  and  otherwise,  than  to  go  to  a  Jewish 
adaptation  and  a  chaotic  eclecticist  for  what  could  be1  gotten 
otherwise  with  much  less  trouble.  And  as  a  matter  of  fact,  that 
which  separates  Plotinos,  (his  emanational  explanation  of  the 
derivation  of  Matter  from  God,)  from  Christianity,  separates 
him  also  from  Philo,  who  never  explained  that  relation.  Besides, 
the  language  and  terminology  of  the  two  differ  too  much  to  sup- 
pose any  close  relation  between  them.  The  Logos  of  Philo  is 
with  Plotinos  Nous  ;  and  with  the  latter  we  cannot  find  the 
former's  important  distinction  between  the  Spoken  and  Un- 
spoken Word. 

4.  The  Recognition  of  the  Authority  of  Plato. — We  said  above 
that  we  could  account  for  all  of  Plotinos's  great  conceptions  in 


20  +        The  Philosophy  of  Plotinos. 


earlier  Greek  philosophy.  Before,  however,  making  this  state- 
ment good,  we  must  notice  that  whether  we  think  so  or  not,  it 
is  certain  that  Plotinos  either  thought  so,  or  affected  to  think 
so  in  every  work  of  his  now  extant. 

Plotinos  relies  upon  the  authority  of  Plato  in  every  small  de- 
tail (*).  He  refers  to  him  as  "  the  philosopher,"  or  even  with 
a  mere  "  he  says  (5)  ;  "  or  even  without  any  sign  of  quotation 
as  in  the  famous  paragraph  on  the  transmigration  of  souls  which 
we  shall  see  later  (°).  If  his  opinion  clashes  with  that  of  Plato, 
he  will  resort  to  what  to  us  seems  a  misinterpretation  in  order 
to  save  Plato  from  censure  (7).  He  considers  that  he  is  re- 
establishing pure  Platonism,  and  desires  to  be  called  a  Platonist; 
if  the  issue  is  raised,  he  will  refuse  to  depart  from  Plato's  norm. 

Other  philosophers  are  often  referred  to  merely  as  "  the 
ancients  "  or  "  the  ancient  and  blessed  philosophers "  "  Hoi 
archaioi  "  or  "  Hoi  archaioi  kai  makarioi  philosophoi  (8)."  He 
believes  that  his  teaching  concerning  the  Good,  the  Mind,  and 
the  Soul  is  Platonic  (9)  ;  but  he  finds  it  also  in  Parmenides, 
Herakleitos,  Anaxagoras  and  Empedokles  ;  Anaxagoras  is  said 
to  be  he  who  through  age  attained  accuracy.  He  believes  (10) 
that  some  of  the  ancients  must  have  known  the  truth  ;  the  only 
question  remains  which  of  them  knew  it  most,  fully.  Conse- 
quently, he  feels  at  liberty  to  criticise  them,  as  he  does  Emped- 
okles and  Anaxagoras  (n). 

Worthy  of  notice  is  the  fact  that  he  claims  that  the  very  mar- 
row of  his  system  is  the  same  as  that  of  Sokrates  and  Plato  : 
"  know  thyself "  "  Gnothi  Seauton."  He  says  :  "  Let  us  obey 
the  command  of  the  Deity,  and  learn  to  know  ourselves  (u)." 
This  fact  might  be  used  to  prove  that  there  existed  such  a  thing 
as  an  esoteric  Platonic  doctrine  in  which  the  moral  element 
was  the  prevailing  one  and  which  was  handed  down  under  oath 
of  secrecy.  Many  of  the  Church  Fathers  look  upon  this  maxim 
as  sufficient  guide  to  salvation  and  it  is  remarkable  how  it  meets 
us  everywhere  under  the  same  name  of  being  Platonic.  At  any 
rate  it  is  certain  that  the  problems  of  Cosmology,  Physics,  Poli- 
tics, and  Sociology  which  were  the  main  topics  of  exoteric 
Greek  philosophy,  are  to  Plotinos  important  only  inasmuch  as 
they  are  deductions  from  his  doctrine  of  the  welfare  of  the  soul. 

5.  Relation  to  Greek  Philosophy. — To  Aristotle  Plotinos  is  in- 
debted partially  for  his  conception  of  development  and  emana- 
tion ;  for  the  transcendence  of  God,  for  his  psychology,  and  out- 
lines or  suggestions  of  cosmology. 

To  Plato,  Plotinos  owes  his  Nous  (with  the  Platonic  name  of 
God)  his  conception  of  the  Earth-Soul,  his  categories,  and  al- 
most all  his  details,  as  well  as  the  transmigration  and  destiny  of 
souls. 

To  the  Stoics  Plotinos  is  indebted  for  his  exclusive  moral 
interest,  and  possibly  some  touches  of  his  conception  of  the 
Earth-Soul,  though  this  is  very  uncertain  indeed,  in  spite  of  the 
opinion  of  Erdmann. 

To  the  Emanationist  doctrines  of  writers  such  as  the  inditer  of 


Relation  to  Christianity.  ^  21 


the  "  Hermetica,"  Plotlnos  owes  his  conception  of  Emanation, 
which  completed  and  inter-connected  the  various  stages  of  the 
Aristotelian  conception  of  development.  To  this  source,  per- 
haps, Plotinos  owes  his  mysticism,  and  burning  spirituality. 

Thus  we  see  how  much  of  his  system  Plotinos  owes  to  former 
philosophy  ;  and  we  need  not  scruple  to  admit  his  claim  that 
he  is  not  an  inventor  of  bold  originality,  but  a  high-souled  phil- 
osopher who  combined  into  one  system  whatever  was  of  value 
in  philosophy  before  his  time.  Thus,  as  Neo-Platonism  is  the 
last  phase  of  Greek  philosophy,  we  may  look  upon  his  system  as 
that  which  represents  the  philosophy  of  Greece  in  its  noblest 
and  most  perfect  proportions. 


CHAPTER  VI. 
MIKROKOSM  AND  MAKROKOSM. 

1.  The   Contemplative  Life. — To    Plotinos   there    is   no    object 
worthy  of  consideration  except  the  Soul.     All  other  subjects  are 
only  interesting  to  him  in  the  measure  that  they  are  efficient  ac- 
cessories to  this  end.     "  Concerning  what  would  it  be  worth  to 
speak  and  think,  rather  than  about  the  soul  ?     Let  us  therefore 
obey  the  command  of  the   Deity  who  commands  us  to  know 
ourselves  ()."    To  this  absorbing  topic  the  first  and  last  Ennead 
are  devoted,  and  there  is  no  Ennead  between  these  two  that  does 
not  in  some  manner,  directly  or  indirectly,  refer  to  the  subject 
again. 

In  order  therefore  to  present  the  philosophy  of  Plotinos  in  its 
true  aspect,  we  shall  be  forced  to  deal  with  all  other  matters 
very  summarily,  reserving  all  of  our  space  to  the  discussion  of 
the  nature  and  destiny  of  the  Soul. 

•  Most  of  those  who  have  taken  in  hand  an  exposition  of  the 
views  of  Plotinos  have  devoted  most  of  their  time  to  his  specu- 
lative considerations.  The  reason  of  this  partiality  may  have 
arisen  both  from  the  fact  that  being  professional  philosophers, 
they  have  looked  upon  the  system  of  Plotinos  as  a  system  of 
speculative  philosophy  ;  and  also  from  the  fact  that  Plotinos 
places  the  "  contemplative  "  or  "  theoretic  "  life  as  far  above  the 
practical  life  as  the  real  Hercules  in  Olumpos  was  above  his 
shadow  in  Hades  (2).  For  Plotinos  the  practical  life  is  only  the 
means  to  attain  the  theoretic  life,  and  the  latter  is  the  aim  of 
the  former  (3). 

Yet  we  must  not  take  this  "  contemplative  "  life  in  the  Hegel- 
ian sense,  which  demands  of  the  philosopher  nothing  more  than 
acquaintance  with  the  terms  of  philosophy,  and  a  habit  to  think 
of  metaphysical  abstractions,  which  no  logician  would  have  dif- 
ficulty to  attain.  Besides,  such  a  contemplative  life  is  within 
the  reach  of  all,  whatever  their  private  moral  life  has  been,  and 
is  not  limited  to  those  who  have  lived  all  vices  out  of  themselves. 
The  fact  that  the  contemplative  life  of  Plotinos  is  exclusively 
based  upon  a  perfection  of  the  moral  life  proves  it  is  something 
more  than  mere  skill  in  logomachy.  The  contemplative  life  is 
that  one  in  which  the  soul  attains  to  knowledge  of  God,  face  to 
face,  rapt  in  ecstasy. 

Such  a  contemplative  life  is  it  that  Plotinos  seeks. 

2.  Mikrokosm. — We  have  seen  before  that  Aristotle   was  the 
originator  in  philosophy  of  the  word  "  mikrokosm."     His  con- 


Mikrokosm  and  Makrokosm. 


ception  was  that  man  is  a  universe  in  miniature,  just  as  the  uni- 
verse is  a  man  enlarged.  The  advantage  of  this  observation  is 
that  if  we  know  the  constitution  of  one  of  these  terms,  we  will 
be  able  to  reason  to  the  constitution  of  the  other.  Thus  in  order 
to  know  the  Universe,  we  will  only  have  to  know  ourselves  : 
and  if  we  seek  our  highest  self,  we  will  know  God.  If  man  and 
God  be  separate,  how  shall  man  ever  hope  for  an  at-one-ment 
with  God  ? 

Plotinos  is  not  inclined  to  use  the  word  "  mikrokosm  "  al- 
though he  has  the  full  Aristotelian  conception  of  it.  It  may  be 
proved  that  in  crediting  him  with  it  we  are  not  reading  into  his 
system  that  of  Aristotle  ;  for  his  Aristotelian  psychology,  and 
his  continual  ascription  of  psychological  terms  to  the  World-Soul 
assure  us  that  he  holds  the  mikrokosmic  theory. 

We  will  therefore  proceed  to  give  a  sketch  of  his  psychology, 
in  order  that  our  investigations  in  cosmology  and  theology  may 
become  lucid. 

3.  Psychology. — Every  human  soul  is  the  unity  of  the  following 
seven  elements  : 

1.  "  Ho  Theos,"  The  God  (4). 

2.  '*  Nous  Koinos,"  Universal  Mind 

3.  "Nous  Idios,"  Individual  Mind  (6) 
4^"  Logos,  Dianoia,"  Reason  (T). 

5?  "  To  Aisthetikon   Meros,"  The  psychophysical  mechanism/ 
of  sensation    (8).  Y 

6.  "  To  Phutikon  Meros,"  Vegetable  life  (9): 

7-  "  To  Soma,"  The  form,  body,  matter  (l°). 

In  presenting  this  scheme  of  psychology  we  must  remember 
that  nowhere  does  Plotinos  give  us  a  complete  exposition  of  it  ; 
but  it  may  be  proved  satisfactorily  that  he  holds  it,  since  he 
always  speaks  of  these  particular  faculties  in  a  consistent  man- 
ner. 

The  first  four  of  these  psychological  elements  compose  the 
"  Psuche "  or  soul  ;  the  later  three  compose  the  body,  the 
"Eidolon  Psuches  "  or  image  of  the  body  (n).  The  body  is 
furnished  to  us,  as  we  shall  see,  by  the  World-Soul,  called  the 
"  lunar  gods  (12)."  The  Soul  is  alone  ourselves  ;  it  is  created 
by  God.  It  is  divided  into  two  parts  :  the  ideal,  and  rational 
soul»  (18).  The  rational  soul  is  composed  of  reason  and  indi- 
vidual mind  which  faculties  are  realized  in  almost  every  soul  ; 
the  ideal  soul  consists  of  the  two  highest  faculties  that  are  in 
many  souls  latent,  or  undeveloped. 

The  -faculty  of  reason  constitutes  the  individuality  of  the  Soul, 
for  it  has  the  power  of  identifying  itself  with  the  highest  facul- 
ties or  of  sinking  into  the  lower.  When  the  soul  does  sink  into 
the  flesh,  the  higher  faculties  quiesce,  become  latent,  and  may 
in  extreme  cases  atrophy.  Of  course,  the  latent  faculties  may  at 
some  later  date  be  revivified  (14). 

While  the  soul  is  incarnate,  all  the  seven  faculties  are  indis- 
olubly  bound  together  ;  and  the  bond  is  broken  only  at  death, 
when  the  soul  abandons  the  body  as  an  old  dress. 


24  The  Philosophy  of  Plotinos. 


In  this  scheme  of  psychology  are  assured  both  the  immanence 
of  the  Soul  in  every  part  of  the  body,   as  the   body   is   "  in   thei 
Soul,"  and  the  transcendence  of  the  higher  faculties  of  the  Soul[ 
above  the  body  (15). 

We  must  remember  that  for  Plotinos  to  know  a  thing,  and  to 
become  one  with  it  were  identical  terms  (19).  Therefore  we  canf 
become  one  with  whatever  we  know  :  and  as  we  have  a  God-' 
consciousness,  the  life  of  contemplation  is  the  highest  of  all 
possible  lives  for  it  means  that  we  shall  come  to  know  God  (20). 

As  a  consequence  of  this  we  epitomize  the  universe,  when  in- 
carnate, by  having  organs  by  which  we  can  come  into  com- 
munication with  every  one  of  the  Seven  Realms  of  which  the 
world  consists.  Therefore  man  is  "  Panta,"  all  (16)  ;  he  is  a 
"  Kosmos  noetos,"  an  intelligible  world  (21).  The  soul  is  not  an 
aggregate,  like  a  house,  but  a  unity  revolving  around  a  centre 
into  which  it  can  draw  itself  inwards  (22).  The  soul  ascends  to 
its  highest  heights  not  by  addition,  or  adding  itself  to  God,  but 
by  immanent  union  with  him  (18). 

Once  the  soul  has  incarnated  into  the  body  furnished  by  the 
World-Soul,  it  is  an  indissoluble  unity  with  it,  using  it  as  a  tool 
(22),  not  being  affected  by  its  pains  more  than  the  workman 
is  affected  by  the  injuries  to  his  tools  (29).  Then  the  soul  is  like 
a  man  standing  with  his  feet  in  a  tub  of  water  (30),  reaching 
down  to  the  very  lowest  form  of  being,  matter,  and  being  one 
with  or  having  a  faculty  to  become  one  with  the  cosmical  Nous 
and  even  The  God  (2a).  For  we  know  that  the  soul  is  kin  to  the 
Cosmical  Nous  and  God,  by  faculties  like  them,  though  at  times 
obscured  by  being  fallen  into  the  flesh  (24). 

Plotinos  does  not  always  speak  of  the  various  faculties  of  the 
soul  in  detail.  He  usually  assumes  the  practical  distinction,  soul 
and  body.  The  soul  is  placed  between  God  and  the  World,  so 
that  like  an  amphibian  it  lives  now  here,  and  then  beyond  (25) 
being  able  at  its  will  to  think  without  and  against  the  will  of 
the  body  (32).  Often,  again,  he  divides  the  soul  into  a  double 
self  :  the  inner  or  true  self,  that  lives  in  the  intelligible  world, 
the  "  ideal  "  soul  we  saw  above  (2e)  ;  and  the  external  self  that 
lives  in  the  external  world,  the  "  rational  "  soul  just  mentioned 

(")• 

How  the  incarnation  into  the  body  furnished  by  the  Earth- 
Soul  takes  place  is  not  quite  clear  :  the  soul  is  said  to  emit  a 
kind  of  light  or  heat  (28)  which  is  probably  the  celestial  spiritual 
body  we  shall  see  more  about  later  on,  in  the  Fifth  Realm.  This 
light  or  heat  gives  form  to  the  body  supplied  by  the  World-Soul, 
and  becomes  united  to  the  earthly  spiritual  body,  or  perhaps 
even  forms  it. 

4.  Cosmological  Import  of  Psychology. — In  order  to  show  forth 
the  relation  of  the  small  universe  to  the  large  one,  we  must 
premise  that  each  separate  faculty  of  man,  while  bound  by  an 
indissoluble  tie  to  the  other  faculties,  exists  in  a  universe  of  its  own. 
The  physical  body  dwells  in  a  realm  of  dead  matter  ;  the  vege- 
table soul  in  a  realm  of  organiq  life  in  which  organic  life  is  pos- 


Mikrokosm  and  Makrokosm.  25 


sible,  and  so  on.  Thus  all  human  powers  co-exist  in  the  sepa- 
rate realms  for  which  they  are  fitted  so  that  in  order  to  become 
universal  we  need  only  open  ourselves  to  the  universal  (31). 
These  different  Realms  interpenetrate  each  other  much  as 
the  different  universes  of  Messrs.  Stewart  and  Tait,  in  their 
interesting  book,  "  The  Unseen  Universe." 

The  nature  of  the  whole  process  of  existence  lies  before  us  in 
miniature.  The  First  Realm  is  The  God  who  is  above  all  thinkable 
perfection  and  being  ;  the  Second  Realm  is  the  Divine  Mind,  or 
Nous,  which  is  Divine  being  and  essence,  prope~.  The  third, 
including  the  other  four,  the  Realm  of  soul,  which  cannot  be  said 
to  have  being,  although  it  possesses  existence.  These  universes 
interpenetrate  each  other.  The  Soul  and  the  World,  which  is  its 
image,  are  immanent  in  God  ;  and  God,  in  his  absolute  being 
transcends  all  else.  The  Divine  Mind  is  the  image  of  God  ;  the 
individual  mind  is  the  image  of  the  Divine  Mind  ;  finally,  pro- 
ceedng  similarly  through  all  the  lower  realms  in  their  turn,  the 
body  is  the  form  or  image  of  the  vegetable  life  ;  this  again  is  the 
image  or  form  of  the  sensual  life  ;  this  again  is  the  image  of 
the  individual  mind.  Thus  matter  is  the  lowest  grade  of  being  ; 
beyond  is  that  abstraction  we  may  call  the  darkness  of  nought, 
which  does  not.  even  exist. 

While  in  the  mind  of  Plotinos  the  immanence  and  trans- 
cendence of  these  Realms  is  inseparably  conjoined,  we  will  be 
forced,  for  the  sake  of  clearness  in  exposition,  to  consider  first 
each  Realm  separately,  and  then  to  consider  the  transcendence 
of  God  as  shown  forth  in  his  image,  man. 


CHAPTER  VII. 
THE  FIRST   REALM,  THE  GOD. 

1.  The  One  and  the  Many. — In  order  to  understand  anything, 
it  is  necessary  that  the  mind  should  receive  through  sensation 
and  reflection  ideas  and  representations.     The  more  sharply  de- 
fined these  are,  the  more  thoroughly  understood  are  they  ;  and 
they  will  be  clear  in  the  degree  that  they  are  limited  by  and  dis- 
tinct from  other  ideas  and  representations.     Ratiocination  there- 
fore necessarily  implies  a  Manifold,  which  is  subsumed  under 
the  Unity  of  the  apprehending  mind.     Unity  is  therefore  more 
fundamental  than  Manifoldness. 

If  we  should  apply  these  considerations  to  the  Divine  Being, 
we  see  that  Divine  thought  necessarily  implies  a  Manifold,  the 
duality  of  thinker  and  thought,  of  being  and  activity  (*).  As  a 
consequence  of  this,  the  Divine  activity  called  Divine  Thought 
cannot  be  the  highest  plane  of  Divine  Life.  Above  the  realms 
of  Divine  thought  must  be  the  realm  of  the  Divine  Unity  of 
Apperception,  which  is  above  all  thought.  God  is  then  above 
all  describable  thought,  above  all  Divine  Thought,  above  all 
Divine  Life,  above  all  Divine  Being  (2). 

The  highest  cannot  be  Manifoldness  ;  it  is  Unity  ;  for  Mani- 
foldness is  after  all  only  a  Manifoldness  of  Unity  (3),  and  every- 
thing is  itself  only  because  it  thus  is  One  (4).  God  is  thus  above 
all  Divine  Goodness,  and  even  Divine  Unity  (5),  and  above 
Divine  Being  (6).  If  we  say  that  God  is  Goodness,  then  the 
thought  of  this  Divine  Goodness  has  its  subject  and  object  ;  it 
becomes  good  by  partaking  of  the  quality  of  goodness.  And 
if  it  thus  needs  this  quality,  if  it  thus  depends  on  this  quality, 
then  it  cannot  be  independent  and  self-existent  Goodness.  The 
same  may  be  said  of  the  Divine  Unity  and  Being.  Therefore 
the  simple  must  precede  the  compound  (7),  original  being  must 
be  independent  of  derivative  being  :  cause  must  be  independent 
of  effect,  and  Unity,  of  Manifoldness  (8).  God  is  above  all  cate- 
gories of  Life,  Being,  Thought  and  Activity.  The  God  is  then 
Over-life,  Over-being,  Over-thought,  and  Over-activity.  In 
this  last  point  Aristotle  was  left  behind  by  Plotinos,  who  could 
not  on  logical  grounds  see  his  way  to  call  God  even  "  actus 
purus,"  pure  energy  ;  God  is  above  even  this.  That  there  is  a 
God  at  all  we  only  know  by  seeking  a  first  cause  of  all  other 
causes.  God  is  thus  even  above  the  Prime  Mover  of  Aristotle^ 

2.  The  God  Above  Cognisability. — God  is  therefore  unknowable. 
He  is  above  all  description  (9),  he  is  incomprehensible  and  infin- 
ite (10). 


The  First  Realm,  The  God.  27 


The  highest  we  know  does  not  reach  up  to  him  (u).  As  he 
is  unlimited  (")  he  must  be  formless,  (")  and  therefore  be  even 
above  beauty  (14).  He  is  above  good  and  honourable  qualities 
(15).  Will  as  a  psychological  faculty  does  not  exist  in  God  ;  for 
will  is  a  desire  of  good,  of  which  God  has  no  need  or  lack, 
being  its  fulness  (16).  In  God  thinking  and  willing,  that  is,  over- 
thinking  and  over-willing,  are  the  same,  as  happens  even  in  a 
form  of  God  so  much  lower  than  he  as  the  World-Soul  (17)-  We 
have  already  seen  that  God  is  above  all  activity  (18)  ;  therefore 
he  is  at  rest  while  creating  (19).  Being  above  thought  (20)  he 
is  above  self-consciousness  (21).  Of  him,  therefore,  we  can  only 
tell  what  he  is  not  ;  no  name  or  conception  of  him  is  adequate 

("). 

3.  The  Nomenclative  Symbol  for  the  Divinity. — Although  we 
cannot  describe  or  give  a  name  to  God,  we  are  forced  to  refer 
to  him  in  some  manner  ;  by  some  designation.  Plotinos  there- 
fore follows  Plato  in  calling  God  by  his  most  characteristic 
quality  of  Goodness  in  moral  relations,  and  Unity  in  metaphysi- 
cal reflections.  God  is  therefore  called  "the  Good"  "Tagathon" 
(a)  and  "  the  One  "  "  To  Hen  "  (24)  ;  he  is  often  referred  to  as 
"  the  first,"  for  the  sake  of  briefness  and  technicality  in  the 
aetiological  argument  for  his  existence. 

*  4.  The  God  is  the  First  Cause. — Working  back  from  the  World 
to  God  we  find  that  he  is  the  first  cause.  As  such,  he  is  activity, 
even  is  above  activity,  for  he  is  often  called  "cause"  (25)  and  "the 
first"  C26).  He  is  above  pure  activity,  without  any  outside  him- 
self (2T).  He  is  the  origin  "  Arche  "  of  all  things  ;  although  he 
is  really  above  origin  (2S)  because  the  word  "  origin  "  denotes 
something  which  concerns  us,  not  him  (29).  He  may  be  called 
the  centre  of  all  things,  with  the  same  limitation  as  above  (30). 

5.  The  God's  Necessity  to  Love. — If  God  is  so  perfect  in  his  self- 
existence,  what  can  induce  him  to  beget  anything  at  all  ? 

The  great  argument  of  Irenaeus  against  the  development  or 
emanation  of  God  into  his  world  was  that  this  was  nothing  more 
or  less  than  decay  of  the  Divine  Being.  This  objection  is  how- 
ever founded  on  a  gross  misconception,  induced  perhaps  by 
passionate  antagonism.  If  God  is  perfect,  he  cannot  decay  ;  if 
he  generates  worlds  and  souls  he  does  it  from  any  other  cause 
than  decay  or  degeneration  of  his  Being  (n). 

Why  could  not  the  perfect  Being  remain  alone,  without  creat- 
ing or  begetting  other  Beings?  Because  as  every  perfect  Being 
on  earth  seeks  to  bring  forth  another,  and  the  being  on  earth  is 
in  the  image,  faint  indeed,  of  God,  so  the  most  perfect  of  all 
must  beget,  giving  of  himself  without  envy  (32).  The  world  was 
not  made  by  a  chance  desire  ;  nor  was  it  made  because  of 
ratiocinative  reasons  (M)  :  the  nature  of  himself  (34)  for  it  is  a 
physical  (that  is,  a  non-argumentative)  necessity  of  his  nature 
to  beget.  As  God's  nature  is  eternal,  so  are  the  offsprings  of 
his  nature  also  eternal  (M). 

This  necessity  of  God's  nature  follows  from  the  fact  that  God 
is  love,  for  the  nature  of  Being,  whatever  its  degree,  is  love. 


28  The  Philosophy  of  Plotinos. 


"  The  universal  soul  has  an  universal  love  ;  each  individual  soul 
has  its  individual  love  ;  and  the  love  of  the  highest  soul  is  God 
(36)."  Apart  from  partaking  of  the  Divine  Good  no  things  love 
or  are  loved  (")  and  the  soul  by  the  very  constitution  of  its  na- 
ture loyes  God  and  is  ever  forced  to  begin  over  and  over  to  love 
him  (38). 

6.  Manner  of  Begetting. — Love  is  a  sufficient  reason  for  all  be- 
getting ;  but  the  question  remains,  How  does  this  disinterested 
love  beget? 

This  is  a  question  the  wisest  have  never  been  able  to  explain 
except  by  the  use  of  illustrations  drawn  from  the  natural  world. 
Plotinos  likens  God  to  a  river  which  is  so  full  that  it  overflows 
its  banks  ;  and  the  water  which  has  overflowed  does  the  same, 
extending  itself  ever  in  wider  circuits  (39).  This  figure  must 
however  be  taken  with  caution  ;  for  it  should  not  indicate  either 
a  temporal  becoming  (4"),  since  creation  always  takes  place  from 
the  inner  or  causal  side  (41)  ;  nor  should  it  be  understood  to  be 
an  emanation  such  as  would  abstract  from  the  power  of  the  first 
cause  ;  the  latter  remains  unmoved  and  undiminished,  while  the 
stream  of  being  flows  from  him  (42). 

That  which  proceeds  from  him  ever  remains  in  him  ;  but  he 
is  not  in  it  as  if  contained  by  it  (43).  Plotinos  advances  the  time- 
honoured  illustration  of  the  sun  and  the  ray  of  light  that  pro- 
ceeds from  it  without  diminishing  its  light  or  heat  (44). 

These  illustrations  are  to-day  no  longer  intelligible,  from  the 
fact  that  the  law  of  continuity  demands  that  the  sun's  heat  should 
grow  less  by  just  the  amount  that  is  substracted  from  it  in  the 
form  of  the  light  of  the  ray,  even  though  the  sun's  heat  be  so 
enormous  that  the  loss  be  not  apparent.  Unless  therefore  we 
find  some  other  means  of  explaining  the  continued  self-existence 
ot  God,  in  spite  of  his  eternal  begetting,  which  is  doubtless  the 
case,  the  whole  theory  of  Plotinos  must  be  said  to  be  yet  un- 
proved. Nevertheless,  Plotinos  would  not  suffer  alone  ;  the 
whole  philosophy  of  Christianity  would  fall  together  with  his. 

7.  Relation'  of  Cause  and  World. — The  details  of  the  process  of 
begetting  are  as  follows  :   God  is  the  sun  which  enlightens  the 
Universe  (45)  and  rules  all  existence  with  his  power  (48).     He  is 
the  centre  around  which  everything  revolves   (47)  ;   every  little 
part  is  organically  related  to  the  whole,  so  that  from  knowledge 
of  its  nature,  the  nature  of  the  centre  may  be  deduced  (48).     All 
creation  has  a  natural  longing  for  the  first  cause  (49)  and  turns 
itself  towards  him  as  a  sunflower  to  the  sun,  in  the  degree  that 
its  nature  permits  it  to  do  so  ;  arrd'tne  excellence  of  the  nature 
is  judged  by  the  power  it  possesses  of  turning  to  the  first  cause 
(80).     This  is  the  natural  instinct  of  self-preservation  ;  for  inas- 
much as  the  creature  turns  itself  to  its  creator,  does  it  turn  itself 
to  its  highest  good  (B1)- 

The  process  of  begetting  may  be  likened  to  the  natural  de- 
velopment of  a  plant  from  a  seed  (52)  and  that  which  is  begotten 
may  be  called  the  son  of  the  begettor,  the  latter  thus  becoming 
the  father  of  that  which  it  has  begotten  (M).  The  first-begotten 
is  the  image  of  the  Begettor,  the  second-begotten  of  the  First, 


The  First  Realm,  The  God.  29 


and  so  on  (M)  Unity  and  Perfection  decreasing  simultaneously 
(M).  .Each  thing  is  itself  inasmuch  as  it  is  a  Unity,  and  fulfils  its 
function  and  nature  (6<i).  The  Divine  Mind  impresses  its  Ideas 
in  matter  as  with  a  seal,  so  that  things  are  living  expressions  of 
a  divine  Idea  (5T).  That  which  is  begotten  is  of  course  never  of 
equal  intensity  of  being  with  that  which  begot  it  ;  at  each  be- 
getting of  an  image  the  light  of  perfection  dims  off  into  the 
darkness  of  non-existence,  Manifoldness  increasing,  and  Unity 
disappearing. 

In  matter,  things  are  separated  by  space  ;  but  in  the  Divine 
Mind,  they  are  only  separated  by  form  (ss).  Thus  the  soul  is 
wholly  in  every  single  member  of  the  body  ;  therefore  we  may 
say  correctly  the  body  is  in  the  soul  (5").  Thus  also  God  is 
wholly  in  every  single  part  of  the  world,  for  the  world,  and  all 
that  is,  is  in  him  (**).  The  presence  of  the  divine  is  always,  for 
lower  beings,  mediated  through  the  presence  of  the  intermediate 
stages  of  Being.  Thus  in  the  physical  World  there  are  every- 
where three  stages  of  being  :  God,  the  Nous,  and  the  Earth- 
Soul. 

If  the  centre  of  the  Universe  be  God,  then  the  First  Sphere 
is  that  of  Nous,  enlightened  by  God  :  the  Second  is  that  soul, 
enlightened  by  the  Nous  ;  the  Third  is  that  of  body,  enlightened 
by  that  of  soul  (Ol).  The  body  turns  to  the  soul,  the  soul  to  the 
Nous,  and  through  it  to  God  C52).  Thus  each  sphere  is  a  dif- 
ferent plenitude  of  divinity  C13), each  depending  on  the  next  high- 
est sphere  (64)- 

In  this  manner  all  the  different  Realms  interpenetrate  each 
other.  Plotinos  sought  to  make  this  conception  clear  by  illus- 
trating it  from  the  natural  world  :  The  soul  is  everywhere  in  the 
body,  as  light  as  in  air  (65)  ;  but  the  body  is  in  the  soul  as  air  in 
light  ;  the  light  being  rightly  distinguished  as  the  most  ba'sic 
principle  of  the  two  (°6).  The  intellect  generates  and  governs 
the  lower  powers  as  splendour  is  in  the  ray.  the  ray  in  the  light, 
the  light  in  the  sun  (*7). 

The  question  occured  to  Plotinos,  how  does  each  soul  get  an 
undivided  unit  or  quality  of  life  from  the  World-Soul?  This  dif- 
ficulty was  settled  by  referring  to  the  fact  that  many  ears  can 
hear  the  same  voice,  the  sound  being  in  each  case  undivided  (OT). 
Thus,  wherever  we  are,  are  the  three  presences,  God,  the  Mind, 
and  the  World-Soul,  which  are  known  by  the  goodness,  beauty, 
and  life  which  we  find  inherent  in  all  things  on  earth  (  ). 

What  is  space  in  the  physical  world,  is  excess  of  power,  in- 
tensity, in  all  higher  spheres  (70)  ;  in  the  physical  world  the  cat- 
egories of  space  and  time  represent  nothing  in  the  intelligible 
World,  form  alone  differentiating  beings  there  (n).  Thus,  on  dif- 
ferent planes,  each  faculty  of  man  is  conscious  of  itself  in  its  own 
way,  and  in  its  own  kinds  of  limitation,  connecting  man  with  all 
the  octaves  of  the  universe  (72).  These  major  and  minor  Realms 
interpenetrating  each  other  form  a  perfect  harmony  all  together; 
and  their  activity  produces  that  harmony  of  the  spheres  which 
haunted  all  Greek  philosophy,  and  which  was  the  great  Te  Deum 
of  creation  (7S). 


CHAPTER    VIII. 
THE  SECOND  REALM,  GOD,  COSMIC  MIND. 

1.  Saturn,   the  Cognisable  Deity. — The   first   Realm   was  called 
God.     The   second,Plotinos   calls   Saturn,   for   shortness   of  ap- 
pellation 0). 

We  saw,  iji  speaking  of  the  First  Realm,  that  ratiocination  im- 
plies a  Manifold,  which  shall  be  subsumed  under  the  Unity  of 
apperception,  besides  being  limited  by  a  Unity  of  same  logical 
intension  as  itself.  This  Unity  of  apperception,  which  lies  be- 
hind the  Manifold  and  Unity  of  ratiocination,  was  when  applied 
to  the  universe,  God.  This  Manifold  and  Unity  of  ratiocina- 
tion itself  then  becomes,  applied  to  the  universe,  the  Divine 
Mind,  Nous.  It  is  therefore  no  more  strict  unity,  but  Unity 
with  Manifold  (2),  thinker  and  thought,  subject  and  object  (3). 

What  kind  of  thoughts  does  the  Divine  Mind  think?  It  con- 
templates iself,  and  thus  thinks  of  that  of  which  it  is  the  image, 
just  as  the  human  reason  thinks  of  the  higher  unity  of  appercep- 
tion, which  is  conscious  of  more  than  itself.  God  was  Over-beau- 
tiful; the  Divine  Mind  is  beautiful.  God  is  Over-being,  Over- 
good,  Over-life,  Over-thought  ;  the  Divine  Mind  is  being,  good- 
ness, life,  and  thought.  God  is  Over-activity  ;  the  Divine  Mind 
is  primary  activity  complete  in  its  self  (4).  As  eternity  is  only 
intensity  of  the  intelligible  action  of  the  Divine  Mind  (5),  it  may 
be  said  to  live  in  eternity,  not  in  time  (6).  Thus  it  comprehends 
all  things  that  have  existed,  that  exist,  or  that  shall  exist. 

The  consequence  of  this  determination  is  that  the  Divine  Mind 
knows  of  no  distinction  between  potentiality  and  actuality  in 
thought  (7),  no  progress  from  not-thinking  to  thinking  (8),  no 
inconcluded  thinking  (9),  no  unknown  future  (10)  and  no  mem- 
ory for  the  past  (n).  As  human  powers  of  ratiocination  cannot 
contemplate  the  actual  Unity  of  apperception,  but  still  can  des- 
cribe it  and  grasp  it,  so  the  Nous  can  never  behold  the  actual 
God  (1Z)  but  can  describe  him  (13).  Moreover,  it  cannot  behoM 
what  is  below  it,  because  itself  is  wholly  thought  (14). 

2.  Identity  of  Being  and'  Thought. — God  was   Over-being   and 
the  Divine  Nous  is  full  being.     And  as  Being  and  Thought  are 
identical,  the  system  of  Thoughts  of  the  Divine  Mind  are  reality 
(18).     It  is  on  this  account  that  Plotinos  refutes  the  ten  Aris- 
totelian and  four  Stoical  Categories.    These  treated  of  the  qual- 
ities of  matter  ;  but  if  matter  is  only  an  image  of  mind,  then  if 
there  are  any  Categories  at  all,  they  must  be  Categories  of  Mind, 


The  Second  Realm,  Cosmic  Mind.  31 


beginning  with  Thought  and  Being  (").  The  Divine  Mind  in- 
cludes ideas  of  all  things  and  all  numbers,  so  that  it  is  a  true  in- 
telligible World,  "  Kosmos  Noetos"  (").  The  Divine  Mind  is 
to  its  Ideas  as  the  science  of  geometry  is  to  the  propositions 
contained  in  it  (18) ;  it  thinks  of  all  things  (19)  and  thus  its  uni- 
versal has  all  forms  (20).  It  contains  as  one  power  all  powers,  as 
one  God  all  lower  Gods  (a).  It  possesses  life  in  itself  and  has 
the  original  archetypes  of  all  things  C22).  Even  small  things  (*) 
and  human  powers  (24)  are  represented  in  it.  The  harmony  and 
peace  of  this  world  is  blessedness  (2B)  inasmuch  as  it  accounts 
for  the  beauty  in  all  things,  which  is  as  it  were  the  trace  of  its 
presence  in  any  thing  ;  and  this  beauty  proceeds  from  the  still- 
ness of  perfect  motion. 


CHAPTER  IX.. 
THE  THIRD  REALM  :  THE  SOUL. 

i.  The  Trinity  :  Over-God,  Saturn  and  Zeus-Rhea. — The  so- 
called  Platonic  Trinity  may  be  found,  in  a  form  much  altered 
from  the  original,  in  the  speculations  of  Plotinos. 

It  is  very  true  that  Plotinos  seems  to  be  a  little  uncertain  about 
it  in  some  places.  He  speaks  of  three  successive  states  of  being, 
one  lower  than  the  other, — "Gods,  daemons,  and  men  O." 
Again,  he  speaks  as  if  there  were  four  orders  :  the  Good,  the 
Nous,  the  World-Soul,  and  daemons,  which  are  the  human  souls 
(*)•  Again,  he  speaks  of  souls  of  spheres  and  stars,  spheres, 
and  the  space  below  the  moon,  corresponding  to  divine,  human, 
and  bestial  men  (s). 

Yet,  as  a  rule,  he  does  not  hesitate  in  enunciating  a  three-fold 
order  of  existence  :  God,  the  Nous,  and  the  Soul  (*). 

Of  course  it  is  understood  that  they  are  hierarchically  sub- 
ordinated the  one  to  the  other,  and  in  no  wise  like  the  Christian 
Trinity.  As  the  second  was  the  image  of  the  first  plane  of  being, 
so  is  the  third  the  image  of  the  second,  the  reason  of  this  further 
begetting  being  the  same  that  led  to  the  begetting  of  the  second 
— unargumentative  love  (5).  The  Soul  is  an  Idea  imaged,  and  is 
one  of  the  circles  of  light  which  surround  the  inner  light  of  God. 
The  highest  heaven  is  full  of  fire,  and  therefore  of  light  of  which 
all  souls  partake  individually  (e).  So  much  is  this  the  case  that 
the  world  is  said  to  have  many  lights,  being  adorned  and  en- 
lightened by  many  souls  (7)  who  when  thinking  do  not  speak 
but  simply  glow,  when  not  incarnated  (14).  The  sphere  of  the 
Soul  is  therefore  still  intelligible  light,  although  its  sphere  is  the 
outermost  of  those  which  may  be  called  spheres  of  light;  and  be- 
yond it  begins  illimitable  darkness  (8). 

In  the  Divine  Mind,  there  is  neither  time  or  space  ;  in  the 
Soul  begins  time  (9)  and  in  the  body  beneath  it  begins  space. 
Thus  the  Soul  is  said  "  to  bring  forth  time." 

The  Soul  is  impassible  (10)  ;  therefore  nothing  can  harm  her  ; 
but  she  may  sink  into  the  Manifoldness  of  the  body  (u)  and  be 
stifled  in  the  agonies  and  passions  of  the  flesh.  Yet  she 
is  not  bound  down  to  her  body  as  to  intellection  :  she  reasons 
through  herself,  and  may  understand  through  the  Divine  Com- 
mon Mind  or  Nous,  which  to  its  individual  reason  is  as  form  is 
to  matter  (12). 

It  will  explain  the  position  of  the  soul  if  we  remark  that  the 
process  of  begetting  is  always  a  proceeding  into  Manifoldness 


The  Third  Realm,  The  Soul  33 


from  Unity.  Consequently,  the  Good  was  the  Unity  of  appercep- 
tion, Over-Unity.  The  Nous  was  Unity  mingled  with  Mani- 
foldness, the  Unity  still  predominating.  In  the  Soul  however, 
we  see  Unity  mingled  with  Manifoldness,  the  Manifoldness  pre- 
dominating so  much  as  to  have  discerpted  that  idea  from  all 
others,  so  that  all  others  are  "  other  "  to  it(13).  Beneath  the 
Soul,  in  Reason,  Sense,  Vitality  and  Matter,  the  Manifold  en- 
croaches more  and  more  on  the  Unity,  until  in  matter,  Unity 
is  in  its  last  degree  of  degradation  into  Manifoldness. 

2.  Co-equality  of  Souls. — All  souls  were  originally  equal  ;  they 
all  came  from  the  highest  heaven  (15).     They  were  all  original- 
ly parts  of  the  same  Divine  Mind  (16),  and  that  they  are  alike 
as  to  idea  and  nature  is  proved  from  the  fact  that  they  can  un- 
derstand one  another,  and  in  the  intelligible  world  be  at  the 
same  place  at  the  same  time,  that  is,  that  they  can  communicate 
(")  with  each  other. 

Yet  in  spite  of  this  community  of  origin,  there  is  no  possible 
doubt  that  there  appears  to  reign  much  confusion  injustice  and 
dissimilarity  in  the  dispensation  of  the  world  as  we  know  it.  Yet, 
in  spite  of  this  appearance  of  disorder,  there  reigns  down  below 
here  just  as  absolute  order  as  obtains  in  the  intelligible  world 
above  (w).  The  Souls  come  from  the  same  Nous  and  differ  only 
in  essential  qualities  or  characteristics  (10).  Souls  may  differ  be- 
cause of  these  original  characteristic  differences  (20)  then  by  the 
amount  of  experience  gotten  in  former  incarnations  (21)  the 
bodies  given  them  differed,  being  celestial,  ethereal,  or  of  air  (22), 
or  their  education  or  discipline  may  have  differed  (23)  ;  but 
through  all  this  inequality  runs  the  inexorable  thread  of  Justice, 
which  metes  out  happiness  according  to  goodness,  which  is 
merit.  "  The  good  alone  are  happy  ;  on  this  account  is  it  that 
the  Gods  are  happy  (23)."  The  difference  between  men  and 
Gods  is  only  one  of  development  ;  men  are  incarnated  in  human 
bodies,  the  Gods  have  spheres  or  worlds  as  bodies,  and  are  called 
"  Gods  "  in  respect  to  man  because  they  give  to  their  "  sister- 
souls  "  the  opportunity  of  incarnating.  Men  are  also  divine 
beings  (24)  and  are  the  "  sisters  "  and  "  brothers  "  of  the  souls 
of  the  Gods  (25).  Besides,  Plotinos  states  explicitly  that  human 
souls  will  have  the  same  powers  and  will  hold  the  same  dignity 
as  the  World-Soul,  especially  if  they  will  turn  into  themselves 
without  spot  C26).  0  15 ff 

3.  The  World-Soul.— We  must  now  treat  of  the  World-Soul. 
Plotinos  took  his  conception  of  it,  not  from  the  Stoics  as  some 
authorities  have  thought,  but  from  Plato.     The  latter  seems  to 
have  been  uncertain  whether  the  souls  of  men  proceeded  from 
the  World-^oul,  whether  they  had  all  been  created  by  God,  in  the 
same  mould,  but  smaller  .in  size.     Plotinos  solves  the  difficulty  ) 
by  saying  that  the  souls  of  man  were  born  of  the  World-Soul  in 
respect  to  their  bodies  ;  but  that  their  impassible  self,  the  rea- '••' 
son  and  mind  had  been  created  or  begotten  by  the  same  Nous, 
the  World-Soul  only  offering  her  sister-souls  opportunities  for^ 
development.    We  would  thus  explain  the  fact  that  we  saw  above 


34  The  Philosophy  of  Plotinos. 


that  everywhere  on  earth  there  were  three  presences,  God,  the 
Nous,  and  the  World-Soul,  and  that  yet  human  souls  and  the 
World-Soul,  also  called  Jupiter  for  short  C27),  were  brethren,  and 
equal  as  to  origin. 

Plato  never  defined  accurately  whether  his  World-Soul  was 
the  Soul  of  the  whole  physical  universe,  or  only  of  the  earth. 
The  Stoics  distinctly  looked  to  the  Soul  of  the  Universe  when 
speaking  of  a  World-Soul,  from  which  all  other  souls  were  be- 
gotten. Plotinos  was  the  first  philosopher  to  limit  this  World- 
Soul  to  the  earth,  assuming  that  each  star  soul  possessed  its  own 
soul.  He  says  :  "  One  single  life  inheres  in  the  one  sphere,  and 
each  sphere  is  located  in  one  living  being.  Thus  all  creatures 
which  are  on  the  sphere  return  to  the  same  one  life,  and  thus  all 
souls  on  one  sphere  are  to  a  certain  extent  one  (28)." 

We  must  now  enquire  more  particularly  concerning  the  nature 
of  this  World-Soul.  The  argument  by  which  we  rise  to  the 
certainty  of  its  existence  is  the  Stoical  one  :  just  as  in  pur  body 
is  a  soul,  which  keeps  the  body  together,  so  every  physical  body 
is  kept  together  by  a  soul  in  which  the  body  is  (29).  For  bodies 
are  in  the  souls,  which  pervade  them  (30).  The  form  of  its  body 
is  spherical,  because  it  is  perfect;  for  when  unincarnate,  the  form 
of  the  spiritual  bodies  of  human  souls  are  also  spherical  (81). 

4.  The  Transcendent  Over-Soul. — In  the  Third  Realm, that  of  in- 
dividual mind,  as  we  have  seen,  human  souls  and  the  World-Soul 
are  different  as  to  individuality,  and  coequal  as  to  origin  (82). 
Nevertheless,  the  intellectual  powers  of  the  World-Soul  are  so 
much  more  developed  than  ours  that  she  is  called  "  pure  intel- 
lect C33),"  knowing  things  not  through  organs  of  sense  but  by 
direct  intuition  (84).    She  is  outside  of  the  world-body,  and  bears 
all  that  is  bodily  within  herself  (35).     Her  self-consciousness  (**) 
is  so  much  higher  than  ours  that  she  neither  has  nor  needs  any 
memory  (8T).     Since  she  has  all  knowledge  present  to  her  mind, 
which  to  Plotinos  seems  to  be  the  characteristic  of  the  memory 
of  stable  souls,  that  is,  the  higher  faculties  of  the  soul,  which  are 
impassible  and  which  are  not  left  behind  at  death  (M).    Nor  does 
the  World-Soul  possess  reason,  that  is,  reflection,  of  the  Fourth 
Realm  (89),  "  Logizesthai,"  since  an  equal  and  perfect  thought 
has  as  little  need  of  ratiocination  as  for  a  search  after  facts  which 
were  known  in  the  past.     She  has  no  receptivity  for  sensual 
things,  having  no  organs  of  sense  (w)  the  sky  serving  her  as  an 
eye.     She  creates,  like  God,  above  ratiocination  or  conscious 
choice,  impelled  by  the  same  divine  necessity  of  love  (**).     She 
never  enters  into  connection  with  matter,  her  time  being  spent 
in  undisturbed  meditation.     There  is  also  a  lower  World-Soul, 
belonging  to  the  Sixth  Realm,  called  Rhea  (**),  which  is  related 
to  the  human  race  in  its  lower  realms  much  like  the  soul  of  a 
tree  is  related  to  the  fruits  born  by  the  tree  (**).    It  is  begotten 
by  the  higher  one,  Zeus,  as  its  image  ;  and  is  intimately  connect- 
ed with  the  matter  of  the  world's  body. 

5.  Interrelation  of  Over-Soul  and  Souls. — We  have  already  seen 
that  the  World-Soul  is  to  men  a  God,  affording  them  oppor- 


The  Third  Realm,  The  Soul.  35 


tunities  for  incarnation.  That  men  are  incarnated  in  the  body 
of  the  World-Soul  does  not  necessitate  that  the  World-Soul 
should  conflict  with  the  higher  independent  faculties  of  human 
souls  ;  they  are  not  as  intimately  connected  with  it  as  our  mem- 
bers are  part  of  our  bodies  (").  The  relation  of  the  human  soul 
to  the  World-Soul  may  aptly  if  unelegantly  be  compared  to  the 
relation  existing  between  the  human  soul,  and  the  soul  of  the 
maggot  which  feasts  on  an  amputated  leg  C46). 

The  World-Soul  rules  and  guides  men  (*),  besides  ruling  her 
body  which  obeys  her  better  than  our  bodies  do  us,  since  every- 
thing is  well-disposed  (4T).  Our  bodies  are  made  for  us  "  by  a 
good  soul,"  the  World-Soul,  our  sister  (*).  The  World-Soul 
pities  us  in  our  sorrows,  and  during  the  intervals  between  the 
incarnations  the  human  souls  are  protected  by  her,  rising  to  the 
height  that  is  appropriate  to  their  development  in  goodness  (*8). 
While  incarnate  human  souls  can  attain  to  be  as  blessed  and 
powerful  as  the  World-Soul,  averting  or  minimizing  the 
blows  of  fortune,  and  becoming  the  World-Soul's  colleague  in 
ruling  her  body  (*°).  Thus  the  World-Soul  and  all  human  souls 
are  equal,  inasmuch  as  they  are  only  different  manners  of  work- 
ing of  the  Universal  Mind  ;  different  revelations  of  the  same 
life — just  as  one  light  streams  in  many  directions  (51). 


CHAPTER  X. 
THE   FOURTH   REALM,   REASON. 

1.  Individual  Mind. — This  Realm  of  reason  is  lacking  in  the 
World-Soul  C).     Although  the  "  individual  Mind  "  of  the  Third 
Realm  is  the  essential  characteristic  of  what  makes  a  soul  a  soul, 
yet  this  lower  faculty  of  reason  conjoined  to  it  is  the  individual 
faculty  by  which  man  may  identify  himself  with  his  higher  or 
lower  powers.     Thus  the  soul  is  represented  as  choosing  be- 
tween its  two  loves,  its  two  daemons  :  the  higher  and  lower  (2). 
The  ''individual  Mind"  of  the  Third  Realm  may  be  looked  upon 
as   double  :    containing    intellect   and   imagination.      Therefore, 
when  the  reason  identifies  itself  with  the  "  individual  Mind  "  it 
occurs  that  intellect  and  imagination  appear  doubly  changed,  as 
discursive   and   permanent   reason    (3).      Consequently   we    may 
distinguish   in   every   "  rational "    soul,    as   contrasted   with   the 
"  ideal  soul,"  three  parts  :  mind  (individual  Nous)  rational  soul 
(reason)    and    irrational    soul    (sense    vitality   and    matter)    (4). 
Besides,  the  human  reason  is  called  "  rational  "  reason,  "  Logos 
Logikon,"  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  its  ever  incarnating  in 
the  body  of  animals  (5). 

In  this  realm  of  reason  man  is  responsible  for  his  destiny. 
When,  however,  man  identifies  his  reason  with  his  individual 
Nous,  it  is  plain  that  the  reason  ceases  to  exist  as  separate  facul- 
ty. This  then  happens  in  the  case  of  World-Souls,  called  Gods, 
who  have  become  so  good  that,  as  it  were,  the  possibility  of 
falling  has  disappeared  (6). 

This  realm  is  the  essentially  human  one,  and  is  also  called 
"  Dianoia."  It  is  the  lowest  part  of  the  eternal  impassible  soul  ; 
but  it  may  become  so  buried  in  the  flesh  as  to  lose  its  individu- 
ality, and  becoming  useless  atrophy. 

2.  Other    World-Souls.— As    the    World-Soul    called    Zeus    is 
only  the  Soul  of  the  Earth,  there  must  be  similar  souls  of  "Gods" 
in  the  other  stars.     They,  like  Zeus,  are  the  most  perfect  souls 
O,  and  consequently  are,  as  to  their  body,  the  visible  Gods,  the 
image  of  the  invisible  Gods  (8).     Like  Zeus,  the  Earth-Soul, they 
contemplate  the  cosmic  Nous  steadily  from  far  (9)  and  live  quiet- 
ly,  peacefully,    harmoniously,   producing   as   we   have   seen   the 
music  of  the  spheres  (10).     Again,  like  Zeus,  the  Earth-Soul, they 
have  neither  reason,  nor  memory  nor  ratiocinative  powers,  for 
the  same  reason  the  Earth-Soul  lacks  them  (u). 


CHAPTER   XL 
•    ;  THE   FIFTH    REALM,    SENSE. 

1.  The  Senses  of  the  Over-Soul. — This  Fifth  Realm  is  also  ap- 
parently lacking  in  the  World-Souls,  as  well  as  to  all  higher  souls 
of  Gods.    The  Earth-Soul  has  no  sense  organs;  yet  in  allegorical 
fashion  Plotinos  makes  the  sky  its  eyes,  and  the  races  of  animals 
its  veins  (').     The  highest  Earth-Soul,  called  Zeus,  has  no  need 
to  gather  information  through  sensation. 

It  might  at  first  sight  seem  that  if  these  realms  are  lacking  to 
the  Earth-Soul,  it  is  impossible  that  each  lower  one  should  he 
begotten  in  the  image  of  the  next  higher  one,  as  is  the  rule  in 
the  system  of  Plotinos.  It  will  however  be  seen  on  reflection, 
that  this  objection  overlooks  the  great  factor  of  development. 
Since  the  reason  becomes  merged  into  the  individual  Mind  dur- 
ing process  of  development,  it  is  plain  that  it  must  have  existed 
at  some  time  oi  the  Earth-Soul's  career.  Besides,  nothing  pre- 
vents that  though  merged  into  the  individual  Nous  the  reason 
and  the  sense  man  may  still  subsist  in  perfect  order,  and  be  able 
beget  their  image  as  well  as  when  existing  separately. 

2.  Unity  of  Souls  in  the  Fifth  Realm. — It  is  in  this  realm   of 
sense  that  human  souls  and  the  Earth-Souls  are  for  the  first  time 
organically   united  ;    for  it  will   be   remembered   that   the   kind 
Earth-Soul  affords  her  sister  souls  opportunities  for  education  by 
incarnating  in  her  body,  furnishing  to  every  incarnate  soul  her 
three  lowest  faculties  of  sense,  vitality,  and  matter  (*).     Plotinos 
insists  on  this  fact  continually. 

3.  Human  Sense-Realm. — This  Realm  of  Sense  furnishes  to  our 
psychical  life  its  sensations  and  passions   (3).     Yet,  it  is  much  \ 
more  than  this.     It  is  here  that  we  meet  the  spiritual  body  of  1 
which  the  physical  body  is  so  perfect  an  image.     This  spiritual  \ 
body  is  again  two-fold.     The  higher  part  belongs  to  the  im- 
passible, eternal  soul  itself,  the  lower  belongs  to  the  order  and 
dispensation  of  the  Earth-Soul.     They  are  identical  in  form;  but 
they   are   separable  at   death.     The   earthy   spiritual   body   lasts 
longer  than  the  physical  body,  though  both  are  by  nature  cor- 
ruptible.    The    life    which    association    with    the    rational    soul 
has  given  the  earthly  spiritual  body  recedes  with  the  departure 
of  the  Soul,  as  the  light  follows  the  withdrawal  of  a  lighted  can- 
dle.    The  separation  between  the  earthly  and  celestial  spiritual 
bodies  takes  place  when  all  vitality  has  left  the  former.    We  may 
suppose  that  Plotinos  would  have  explained  the  appearance  of 


38  The  Philosophy  of  Phtinos. 


ghosts  shortly  after  the  death  of  the  person,  as  being  appear- 
ances of  the  earthly  spiritual  body  before  its  utter  extinction. 

4.  Celestial  and  Physical  Senses. — What  have  these  two  spiritual 
bodies  to  do  with  sensations?     Much,  every  way.     On  the  sup- 
position of  Plotinos,  man  has  two  sets  of  senses,  corresponding 
to  the  two  spiritual  bodies  ;  a  celestial,  and  an  earthly  set  of 
senses.     In  this  fact  Plotinos  sees  the  long-sought  connection 
between  cerebral  modifications  and  the  psychical  perception  of 
them.      During  the  time   of  incarnation,   both   spiritual   bodies 
are  closely  united,  each  reacting  on  the  other.     Consequently, 
physical    excitations   will   be   opportunities   of   celestial   vision  ; 
while  at  times,  as  in  dreams,  the  celestial  set  of  senses  is  alone 
active.     A  case  in  point  would  be  that  of  the  somnambulistic 
subject  who  relishes  the  ideal  apple  suggested  to  her  by  the 
operator. 

It  is  thus  that  Plotinos  explains  the  fact  that  the  Earth-Soul  has 
perfect  knowledge  of  all  things  without  any  sensation  or  organs 
of  sense.  The  Earth-Soul  possesses  a  celestial  set  of  senses  in 
her  spiritual  body,  (celestial  spiritual  body),  the  earthly  spirit- 
ual body  having  become  useless. 

5.  Senses  of  Animals. — We  here  have  an   opportunity   of  en- 
quiring concerning  the  nature  of  animals.    The  earthly  spiritual 
body  of  animals  is  present  to  them  equally  and  of  like  nature 
with  that  of  men,  so  that  upon  the  quiescence  of  the  higher  hu- 
man faculties,  a  low  human  soul  might  if  degraded  enough, — 
although  this  would  be  a  most  extreme  case — incarnate  in  the 
body  of  an  animal.    The  souls  of  animals  and  vegetables  are  of 
one  nature  with  human  souls,  although  infinitely  less  developed. 
Plotinos  even  asserts  that  they  have  a  developed  Reason  (Fourth 
Realm)  (4).     Nothing  would  oppose  that  as  in  the  case  of  bad 
men,  so  in  animals  the  higher  faculties  would  be  present,  but 
only  in  an  dormant  or  quiescent  state. 


CHAPTER  XII. 
THE   SIXTri   REALM,   VITALITY. 

1.  The  Sixth  Realm. — The  Sixth  Realm  in  the  human  being  is 
the  vegetable  life  of  the  body  ;  the  vitality  present  in  every  pro- 
toplasmic cell,  and  which  makes  all  the  difference  between  a 
living  and  a  dead  body,  when  considered  apart  from  conscious- 
ness. 

2.  The  Sixth  Realm  of  the  Over-Soul.     The  Earth-Soul  has  also 
a  Sixth  Realm  ;  a  lower  soul,  which  we  have  already  spoken  of, 
and  which  is  called  Rhea,to  distinguish  it  from  the  higher  Earth- 
Soul  called  Zeus  (*).     At  times  this  lower  soul,  is  in  some  of 
its  lower  phases  also  called  Aphrodite  (2),  as  the  representant  of 
the  reproductive  functions  of  all  vitality.     This  lower  Earth-Soul 
is  tfce  begotten  image  of  the  higher,  through  the  two  original 
mediators,  which  are  probably  indicated  by  the  word  "  other," 
"  allo  "  (3).     The  lower  Earth-Soul  is  connected  with  the  earth - 
body  as  human  life  is  connected  with  the  human  body  (*).    This 
lower  soul  is  the  substrate  of  sensible  appearance,  its  name  is 
Nature  (8).     It  cannot  meditate  as  the  highest  soul  can  ;  it  is 
thought,  but  not  self-conscious  ;  but  is  simple,  and  purposeless 
(*).     It  may  be  said  to  have  sensation  just  as  a  body  sleeping 
has  sensation  ;  it  differs  therefore  very  much  from  the  sensation 
of  the  body  in  its  full  psychical  state  (7).     Her  products  are  "the 
materials  that  dreams  are  made  of  ;  "  its  quiet  working  proceeds 
with  the  certainty  of  instinct,  without  interruption  of  ratiocina- 
tion.    It  begets  the  matter  of  the  earth-body  as  its  image,  from 
the  same  inner  necessity  of  love  which  led  to  the  begetting  of  the 
Cosmic  Nous;  only  in  a  much  lower  degree;  it  cannot  avoid  shin- 
ing with  its  light  upon  that  which  is  below  it,  and  which  does  not 
yet  exist  (8).    This  necessity  of  love  was  from  everlasting  ;  and 
as  on  this  account  the  Cosmical  Nous  was  eternal,  therefore  the 
Cosmical  Nous  begat  all  its  images  eternally.     The  consequence 
is  that  the  world  is  eternal  (').    Yet  there  are  cyles  in  the  history 
of  the  world,  just  as  in  that  of  man  ;  but  they  are  not  Stoic  or 
Platonic   in   rigid   fatalistic   repetition.     They   only   furnish   the 
various  circumstances  necessary  for  the  development   of  souls 
(10).        • 

3.  The  Doctrine  of  Sympathy.— In  certain  senses  Nature  may 
be  said  to  be  imperfect  :  but  if  we  look  we  may  see  in  her  the 
impress  of  the  perfect  divine  nature.     She  is  its  offspring  and 
image.     On  it  she  depends  for  being.     She  only  has  existence 


40  The  Philosophy  of  Plotinos. 


inasmuch  as  the  Divine  exists  in  her  (u).  She  is  not  built  up 
of  foreign  elements,  as  an  aggregate,  as  a  house  is  built  of  sep- 
arate bricks.  She  is,  in  her  body  and  souls,  an  organic  whole, 
an  organism,  whose  elements  are  all  united  in  the  highest  Earth- 
Soul  (12).  As  in  a  human  body  the  members  are  in  mutual  har- 
mony, there  is  a  unity  although  it  be  composed  of  sounds  low 
and  high  (14).  As  in  a  human  body,  so  in  the  human  organ- 
ism every  member  is  interdependent.  All  things  act  and  react 
on  each  other,  by  all  means  physical  and  psychical.  This  is  the 
doctrine  of  "  sympathy,"  which  the  modern  doctrine  of  resul- 
tance  of  forces  has  re-established,  and  which  was  used  by  Lotze 
as  his  supposititiously  original  proof  of  Causation. 

4.  The  Beautiful. — There   is   nothing   which   is   nearer   to   the 
heart  of  Plotinos  than  the  belief  that  the  world  is  beautiful  ;  the 
most  beautiful  world  possible.     Plotinos  had  to  enforce  his  view 
against  heathen  Gnostics  and  also  Christian  Gnostics,  whom  he 
mentions  in  this  polemic  as  being  those  who  say  that  the  world- 
creator  and  the  world  are  evil   (1B).     Plotinos  thinks   (16)   that 
the  world  should  be  composed  of  matter  if  it  was  to  be  the 
image  of  God  (of  course  he  assumes  that  matter  is  the  image  of 
God)  ;  and  within  this  sphere  of  matter  which  is  the  image  of 
God,  we  could  not  imagine  a  more  beautiful  world  than  ours. 
It  was  made  so  beautiful  in  order  that  the  higher  spirits  should 
not  be  forced  to  pollute  their  glance  by  looking  out  into  the 
night  of  non-existence  ;  and  especially  to   remind   man   oj  the 
goodness  of  God,  whose  image  it  is,  and  who  can  therefore  be 
known  by  contemplating  the  world,  his  image.    Again,  (")  How 
can  man  be  said  to  honour  the  invisible  Gods,  if  he  despises 
their  visible  images?     How  can  the  guidance  of  Providence  be 
admitted  in  the  direction  of  minor  matters  if  it  be  not  admit- 
ted in  that  of  major  ones?     How  can  a  man  be  called  immortal, 
if  you  deny  immortality  to  the  beautiful  stars,  and  that  these 
have  souls  like  men  have? 

5.  Astrology  and   Vaticination. — The  above  explained  doctrine 
of  "  sympathy  "   or  the   coherence   of  things,   or  law   of  resul- 
tance  of  forces  (18)  explains  all  the  truth  there  is  both  in  Astrol- 
ogy and  Vaticination.     Plotinos  cannot  see  his  way  to  accepting 
a  crude  Astrology  (19)  which  supposes  that  the  daily  position  of 
the  stars  influences  our  daily  life  in  a  supernatural  way.     If  the 
Star-Souls  are  Gods  they  are  good  ;  why  then  should  their  dif- 
ferent position  alter  their  influence?  What  have  we  little  men 
done  to  the  stars  that  they  should  wish  us  evil?    The  influence 
of  the  stars  can  be  little  more  than  that  of  their  natural  influence, 
as  of  the  moon  on  the  tides,  the  sun  on  the  life  and  spirits  of 
men  (21).     The  deeds  of  men  which  as  responsible  creatures  they 
commit  are  just  as  important,  if  not  more  so  (21).     Of  course  the 
life-giving  influence  of  the  sun  is  part  of  the  physical  influence 
which   the  soul   finds   in   her  incarnation   into  the  body  of  the 
Rarth-Soul  ;  for  evidently  the  sun  exerts  much  influence  on  the 
growth  of  nature,  and  the  powers  of  men  (25).     Thus  the  Realm 
of  Sense  and  Vitality  of  man  are  affected  by  the  state  of  the 


The  Sixth  Realm,  Vitality.  41 


physical  influences  of  the  sun  and  moon  ;  but  the  higher  im- 
passible soul  escapes  them,  except  in  a  reflex  manner  through 
the  body  (*'). 

As  to  Vaticination,  Plotinos  does  not  go  beyond  the  scientific 
vaticination  which  from  consideration  of  a  single  tooth  or  bone 
can  reconstruct  the  nature,  age,  and  powers  of  a  long  extinct 
race.  Therefore,  granting  the  law  of  coherence  or  sympathy,  if 
we  are  skilful  enough,  we  can  conclude  from  the  condition  of 
one  part  of  the  cosmical  organism  to  the  conditions  of  the  other 
parts,  as  easily  as  the  dancer  judges  of  the  position  of  the  foot 
from  that  of  the  hand  £;4).  Both  are  consequences  of  the  same 
cause;  therefore  they  will  tell  of  each  other  (26).  The  heavens  are 
a  celestial  writing  in  which  the  skilful  can  read  what  will  happen, 
because  all  things  are  interdependent  (i!6).  "The  entrance  of  souls 
into  the  world,  and  the  general  course  of  their  actions  is  part  of 
the  universal  order  of  nature  (27).  A  good  analogy  of  inter- 
dependence of  the  phenomena  of  this  world  may  be  found  in 
the  fact  that  two  eyes  are  not  the  same  yet  follow  each  other's 
motions,  so  that  from  the  position  of  one,  one  may  tell  the  po- 
sition of  the  other  (28). 

In  connection  with  Astrology  and  Vaticination,  we  should 
speak  of  the  state  of  the  dead.  They  can  still  harm  us,  or  do 
us  good  ;  they  can,  by  showing  themselves,  prove  that  souls 
exist  after  death  ;  finally,  they  can  inspire  the  Oracles,  as  they 
see  clearer  than  we  do,  not  being  fettered  by  the  flesh  (29). 

6.  Free-Will. — We  are  now  led  to  the  question  of  the  relation 
of  this  world-order  to  the  free  individuality  of  the  soul.  His  po- 
sition on  the  subject  is  almost  exactly  that  of  Kant.  Virtue  and 
the  motion  of  tlie  soul  in  the  intelligible  realm  are  free  ;  but  the 
soul's  deeds  in  the  world  are  part  of  the  law  of  continuity,  psy- 
chical as  well  as  physical  (30).  Plotinos  has  no  taste  (81)  for 
the  crude  predestination  of  fatalism,  and  like  immoral  doctrines. 

The  design  of  all  the  world  and  what  should  happen  in  it  was 
part  of  the  Providence  of  the  divine  Mind,  not  anteceding  in 
time,  but  in  causality,  for  the  world  is  the  image  of  the  Divine 
Nous  dwelling  within  it,  so  that  it  cannot  be  said  to  degenerate 
or  go  wrong  (32).  Therefore  the  soul  is,  in  respect  to  her  three 
lowest  faculties,  which  belong  to  the  World  Order,  rigidly  con- 
ditioned ;  for  this  lower  soul  had  been  given  it  by  the  Earth- 
Soul.  Yet,  in  its  higher  impassible  self  it  is  free  as  self-existence 
can  make  it  ;  "and  the  soul  will  therefore  be  free  exactly  accord- 
ing to  whether  she  identifies  herself  with  her  higher  or  lower  fa- 
culties (33).  Man  is  therefore  a  slave  of  body,  (when  his  reason 
has  identified  itself  with  his  vitality  and  matter)  (34)  ;  a  slave  of 
fortune,  (when  his  reason  has  identified  itself  with  his  sense- 
world  (35).  But  man  is  free  (when  his  reason  has  identified  itself 
with  his  individual  Nous,)  turning  all  things  to  intellect  (36)  ; 
and  man  is  free  (when  his  reason  has  identified  itself  with  the 
Cosmic  Nous,)  when  the  soul  lives  in  contemplation  neglecting 
all  else  (37)-  Freedom  is  serving  one's  own  good,  rather  than  ser- 
ving that  of  another,  that  is,  of  the  lower  faculties  contributed  to 


42  The  Philosophy  of  Plotinos. 


it  by  the  Earth-Soul  C38).  While  therefore  many  actions  depend 
entirely  on  circumstances  (39),  the  highest  God  is  freedom,  rather 
than  even  master  of  his  nature  C40)  which  would  introduce  Plur- 
ality into  his  utter  Unity. 

7.  The  Daemon. — We  have  seen  that  there  were  men  and  dae- 
mons and  Gods.  This  word  daemon  must  be  carefully  guarded 
from  its  later  evil  meaning  which  was  given  it  by  Christianity. 
In  the  days  of  Homer,  it  was  interchangeable  with  God,  "  Dai- 
mon,"  and  probably  remained  quite  as  high  in  all  classical  lit- 
erature, with  which  Plotinos  was  so  thoroughly  acquainted. 
They  are  souls  who  are  at  a  stage  of  development  intermediate 
between  men  and  Gods.  Like  the  latter  they  are  eternal  (*), 
and  can  see  in  the  intelligible  realm  by  their  spiritual  celestial 
senses  (42),  implying  the  possession  of  a  celestial  spiritual  body 
(43)  hearing  their  prayers.  They  have  no  physical  language  (44)  ; 
but  of  course  none  is  needed  as  we  have  seen  that  souls  in  the 
intelligible  world  communicate  thoughts  to  each  other  _by  an 
increased  glow  of  their  inherent  light. 


CHAPTER    XIII. 
THE  SEVENTH   REALM,   MATTER. 

i.  Evil. — If  God  is  Unity,  without  any  Manifoldness,  then 
matter  is  the  greatest  possible  Manifoldness,  with  just  enough 
Unity  admixed  to  it  to  make  it  recognizable  as  such.  Utter 
Manifoldness  without  Unity  could  not  exist  at  all  C).  Therefore 
since  proximity  to  God  is  Goodness,  the  furthest  distance  from 
him  compatible  with  any  kind  of  existence  is  evil  (2).  On  this 
account  matter  is  "  Proton  Kakon,"  the  greatest  evil  possible, 
Evil  itself.  Absolute  Evil,  if  it  existed,  would  have  no  existence. 
It  is  nothing  but  deprivation,  emptiness,  absence  of  good  (3). 
Evil  can  therefore  only  exist  in  something  else,  in  Being,  either 
in  that  intensity  of  Being  called  soul,  or  matter  (4).  Matter  it- 
self, for  itself,  is  perfect.  But  when  we  look  at  Matter  from  a 
higher  intensity  of  good,  say  Vitality  or  Sense,  then  we  call  it 
evil,  because  it  is  absence  of  a  certain  amount  of  good.  There- 
fore nothing  is  evil  in  itself  ;  a  thing  is  only  evil  if  you  consider 
it  from  a  higher  stand-point  (5).  But  as  Matter  is  the  lowest 
form  of  being,  it  is  evil  when  considered  from  any  stand-point 
except  itself  (fl).  Good  and  Evil  are  not  therefore  opposed  in 
a  contrary  manner  ;  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  dualism  in  na- 
ture. The  utmost  opposition  of  evil  to  good  is  a  sub-contrary 
one,  a  logical  contrary  (7).  Evil  therefore  does  not  exist 
in  what  exists  really  ;  only  in  that  which  declines  to  non-exis- 
tence (8).  There  are  as  many  grades  of  evil  as  there  are  grades 
of  Being  (9).  Matter  is  therefore  not  evil  because  it  has  any 
evil  qualities,  but  just  because  it  has  no  qualities  at  all  ;  for  qual- 
ity is  an  intelligible  limitation  or  form  ;  and  God  is  pure  form 
or  rather  above  it.  Matter  is  almost  formless,  without  quality 
(10).  As  a  consequence  of  this,  evils  are  not  sent  by  God,  but 
are  only  degeneration  or  declinations  of  qualities  already  pos- 
sessed (n).  There  is  nowhere  unmixed  evil;  everywhere  the 
good  and  evil  are  mixed  (12).  But  the  saddest  side  of  this  view 
of  matter  and  evil  is  that  if  it  be  true,  then  it  is  hopeless  to  look 
forward  to  a  time  when  evil  will  have  disappeared  from  the 
world  as  at  present  constituted,  for  evil  is  only  a  low  form  of 
good  (18).  And  it  will  always  be  necessary  that  there  should 
exist  different  grades  or  forms  of  good  ;  they  are  all  necessary 
to  the  perfection  of  the  world  :  as  the  painter  who  must  use 
more  than  one  colour  or  shade  of  colour  in  his  picture  ;  or  the 
poet  who  would  have  none  but  heroes  in  his  tragedy  (").  In 
one  single  part  therefore  we  should  not  require  the  perfection  of 


44  The  Philosophy  of  Plotinos. 


the  whole,  nor  in  one  part  should  we  require  the  characteristic 
that  belongs  to  another  part  (15).  Besides  if  there  is  one  source 
of  good,  it  is  only  reasonable  that  there  should  be  a  gradual 
diminution  of  it  into  annihilation,  pure  privation,  emptiness  (18). 

The  soul  can  never  be  called  evil  :  at  the  utmost,  it  is  the 
fourth  reduction  of  evil,  or  only  a  declension  or  disposition  to 
lower  forms  of  being  (17). 

Matter  itself  is  formless  stuff  (18)  and  without  quality  (ltt).  It 
is  not  size,  but  that  which  size  makes  (space)  ;  it  is  not  measure, 
but  measure  assumes  it  unto  itself  (20).  It  is' not  bodily  ;  it  is 
"Asomatos"  (21).  It  is  not  Being;  it  is  only  possibility  of  Being 
(22).  It  is  a  weak  image,  shadow  and  declension  of  the  spiritual 
C23).  It  is  unsatisfied  yearning  after  Being  C'4).  It  is  the  thought 
of  nothing  (25). 

2.  Uncognisability  of  Matter. — So  little  is  known  of  the  Sixth 
Realm  of  Being,  that  it  is  only  natural  that  its  process  of  be- 
getting its  image,  matter,  should  also  be  dark.  To  be  sure,  we 
have  the  general  principle  that  generation  takes  from  the  in- 
telligible side  of  the  world,  and  is  like  the  germination  of  a  seed; 
and  these  two  principles  we  shall  have  to  apply  here. 

The  things  of  sense  are  formed  by  their  spermatic  forms,  or  the 
Ideas  active  in  the  seed.  This  idea  Plotinos  owed  to  the  Stoics. 
Each  act  of  begetting  has  an  idea  in  the  cosmic  Nous  corres- 
ponding to  it,  as  well  as  a  suitable  number.  Thus  we  may  say 
that  seed  is  an  active  idea,  the  form  of  the  future  form,  and 
dwelling  in  the  seed. 

,  3.  Intelligibility  of  Matter. — Since  Being  and  Thought  are  identi- 
cal, the  lowest  form  of  being  is  also  the  lowest  form  of  what 
is  intelligible.  Therefore,  matter  is  still  being,  and  is  still  in- 
telligible in  its  nature.  This  is  the  marrow  of  the  contention  of 
the  Idealists,  that  matter  is  in  itself  intelligible.  Plotinos  of 
course  never  pushed  the  questions  of  epistemology  far  enough 
to  be  driven  to  this  result,  to  which  he  comes  by  another  road. 
He  thinks  that  matter  is  intelligible,  and  that  there  must  be  some 
sort  of  unity  between  us  and  matter  (23),  as  his  cosmology  shows 
at  length. 


CHAPTER    XIV. 
REINCARNATION. 

1.  Need  for  Reincarnation. — Before  asking  ourselves  why  we 
should  reincarnate,  it  will  be  worth  while  asking  why  it  is  at 
all  necessary  to  incarnate. 

The  aim  of  life  is  an  ethical  one.  The  end  of  life  is  vision  of 
God.  This  happiness,  like  all  happiness,  can  only  be  gotten  by 
meriting  it;  for  even  Gods  are  only  happy  because  they  have 
merited  it.  It  is  necessary  therefore  to  have  an  opportunity  of  gain- 
ing merit,  to  let  our  reason  decide  of  its  own  will  whether  it  will 
identify  itself  with  its  lower  or  higher  faculties  Therefore  it  is 
necessary  for  souls  to  be  in  the  world  that  they  may  learn  to 
seek  the  good  stedfastly,  and  work  off  all  lower  attractions  (*). 
Experience  is  after  all  a  better  teacher  than  mere  knowledge  (2)  ; 
and  experience  can  only  be  had  in  a  body.  The  reason  for  in- 
carnation is  on  the  part  of  the  soul  a  desire  for  procreation  (3), 
a  lower  form  of  divine  love,  evidently.  "  Unless  she  have  a 
body,  the  soul  will  never  progress,  for  there  is  another  place 
where  the  soul  may  propagate  itself  naturally.  And  if  the  soul 
will  progress,  then  it  will  build  itself  a  place  of  habitation,  and 
will  therefore  generate  a  body  (*)."  Thus  the  soul  collaborates 
with  the  Divine  Will  in  working  out  the  World-Drama  (5). 

The  purpose  of  incarnation  is  therefore  a  moral  one  ;  and  for 
a  man  as  serious  as  Plotinos,  this  moral  purpose  seemed  worthy 
of  the  creation  of  heaven  and  earth  for  this  especial  end  (*). 

2.  Justice. — We  have  already  seen  why  one  single  life  is  not 
long  enough  for  this  development  of  soul.     The  Divine  Justice 
cannot  be  vindicated  if  souls  have  not  other  lives  in  which  the 
present  inequalities  are  satisfactorily  accounted  for. 

But  here  is  another  purpose  in  reincarnation.  Retribution  (T) ; 
and  the  souls  are  led  or  enticed  to  come  of  their  own  free  will 
into  such  circumstances  furnished  by  the  Earth-Soul  (8)  as 
will  purify  the  souls  by  retribution  (9),  these  circumstances  be- 
coming indissoluble  parts  of  her  as  soon  as  she  has  incarnated 

In  order  to  make  this  retribution  clear,  Plotinos  quotes  the 
famous  passage  of  Plato  (")  which  sets  forth,  for  instance*,  that 
foolish  kings  will  be  reincarnated  as  eagles,  quiet  citizens  as 
bees,  etc.  (»). 

Superficial  readers  have  seized  upon  this  passage  to  prove  that 
Plotinos  taught  a  theory  of  reincarnation  which  made  no  dif- 
ference between  human  and  animal  bodies.  There  can  not,  how- 


46  The  Philosophy  of  Plotinos. 


ever,  be  the  slightest  doubt  that  Plotinos  held  no  such  theory  ; 
and  as  a  matter  of  fact,  many  commentators  have  been  led  into 
this  blunder  because  Plotinos,  in  quoting  this  passage  from 
Plato,  does  not  state  that  it  is  not  his  own,  as  is  his  custom, 
when  quoting  Plato,  who  was  "  the  philosopher." 

In  the  first  place,  we  have  already  seen  that  Plotinos  took  the 
trouble  to  say  that  the  human  reason  was  "  rational  "  so  that 
it  should  not  be  likely  to  desire  to  incarnate  in  the  body  of  an 
animal  (13).  Besides,  in  the  Cosmical  Nous  the  Idea  of  a  cow  or 
dog  are  as  natural  as  those  of  men,  and  therefore  it  would  be 
unnatural  for  a  human  mind  to' enter  into  an  animal  body  ("). 

Such  a  scheme  of  haphazard  interchange  would  interfere  with 
strict  retribution  among  men. 

Plotinos's  own  scheme  of  reincarnation  (15)  will  be  found  very 
rational  :  bad  masters  become  slaves,  rich  people  who  have  used 
their  wealth  badly,  poor  ;  murderers  are  murdered,  and  rapers 
are  raped. 

During  the  intervals  between  incarnations  souls  (which  are  in 
this  condition  often  confused  with  daemons)  go  to  that  part  of 
the  World-Soul  which  is  appropriate  to  their  merits  and  their 
condition,  the  good  souls  being  at  rest,  and  the  evil  ones  suf- 
fering in  the  meanwhile  (16). 

The  idea  of  a  physical  resurrection  was  most  repugnant  to 
Plotinos  ;  as  the  body  is  no  more  than  the  tool  or  prison  of  the 
soul,  it.  would  be  cruel  to  enclose  the  soul  in  it  and  all  its  im- 
perfections forever  (1T)-  After  death,  the  soul  goes  whither  its 
inclination  leads  it,  so  that  true  friends  will  meet  once  more  : 
when  the  soul  reincarnates  it  reincarnates  in  the  body  most  suit- 
able for  it  (18).  When  the  soul  has  left  its  body,  it  becomes  that 
towards  which  it  had  directed  its  activity  (")• 

Thus  it  may  indeed  happen,  that  on  account  of  utter  and  re- 
peated wickedness  a  soul  may  sink  into  matter  and  die  in  bes- 
tial circumstances  (*°)  so  that  it  will  reincarnate  in  an  animal  or 
vegetable  body  (21)  ;  for  if  the  soul  has  become  bestial,  it  is  not 
able  to  form  for  itself  anything  more  than  a  bestial  body. 

The  souls  that  need  no  more  reincarnations  on  earth  are 
placed  on  the  stars,  whence  they  may  see  the  universe,  and  be 
in  such  circumstances  as  are  most  fitted  to  develop  them.  The 
purest  souls  turn  themselves  towards  the  Cosmical  Nous,  and  re- 
turn for  ever  to  their  intelligible  home. 

3.  The  Three  Factors. — There  are  three  factors  in  each  reincar- 
nation. 

There  is  in  all  Being  the  yearning  of  love  ;  to  communicate 
of  itself  to  that  which  is  below.  For  such  a  reason,  The  God  begat 
the  Nous  in  his  own  image.  Likewise  souls  seek  to  beget  their 
image,  and  to  give  of  themselves  or  the  things  below  them. 
From  such  a  divine  mission  the  soul  returns  better  than  she  was 
when  she  incarnated  ;  for  she  has  been,  as  Methodius  says,  to  a 
certain  extent  a  Christ.  She  must  become  individualized,  and 
self-determined  to  seek  the  good,  till  there  be  no  more  possi- 
bility of  falling  (M)  although  in  another  place  Plotinos  says  that 


Reincarnation.  47 


even  unto  the  highest  development  a  soul  can  reach  on  earth, 
there  is  always  for  her  the  possibility  of  falling  C28).  Her  first 
desire  is  to  care  for  and  to  enlighten  the  world  of  the  senses;  but 
if  she  forgets  herself  in  this  occupation,  and  becomes  anxious 
for  the  welfare  of  the  body  and  for  its  lusts,  she  is  held  down  by 
it  ("). 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  from  her  own  inclination,  and  de- 
sire that  she  incarnates  in  any  particular  body  (M). 

Yet,  lastly,  this  very  desire  of  hers  was  foreseen,  foredeter- 
mined — her  destiny  (*")  ;  in  the  fulness  of  time,  with  magical 
powers  she  enters  the  body  the  Earth-Soul  has  prepared  for  her; 
for  she  was  not  strong  enough  to  remain  in  the  intelligible 
world  C27). 

4.  Objection  from  Oblivion. — The  usual  objection  to  the  theory  of 
Reincarnation  is  the  contention  that  in  the  present  life  human 
souls  do  not  remember  their  former  incarnations. 

Plotinos  meets  this  objection  in  the  following  way.  The  lower 
faculties  of  the  soul,  including  Sense,  Vitality,  and  Body — wliich 
include  also  the  passions  and  the  physical  memory,  are  furnished 
by  the  Earth-Soul  new  to  every  soul  which  incarnates.  We  have 
already  seen  that  at  death  the  soul  leaves  behind  the  earthy 
spiritual  body,  with  its  passions  and  memories  (M).  This  earthly 
spiritual  body  lasts  longer  than  the  physical  body,  but  begins  to 
decay  at  death,  having  in  itself  all  that  was  learnt  on  earth,  with 
all  the  remembrance  of  the  petty  things  of  the  life  (29).  As  we 
have  seen,  there  is  a  higher  memory  in  the  eternal  impassible 
soul  which  also  has  the  records  of  the  life  :  and  when  the  in- 
carnate soul  will  have  developed  far  enough,  it  will  come  into 
the  consciousness  of  a)l  its  past  lives.  Thus  Plotinos  says  that 
in  the  interval  between  incarnations  much  would  be  forgotten, 
anyway,  and  consequently  the  Platonic  recollection  is  put  aside 
for  the  lower  faculties  of  the  soul  ("). 

In  order  to  make  the  point  of  Potinos  clear,  we  may  make  use 
of  an  illustration.  A  College  graduate,  in  middle  life,  has  prob- 
ably forgotten  most  if  not  all  the  definite  facts  he  learnt  at  Col- 
lege, and  yet  he  uses  that  mental  training  which  that  learning 
gave  him,  to  the  end  of  his  years. 

5.  Objection  from  Suicide. — There  is  still  another  objection  to 
reincarnation.     If  reincarnation  be  true,  then  suicide  is  not  only 
safe,  but  a  very  efficient  means  to  free  oneself  from  circum- 
stances that  have  become  unendurable  for  the  time  being. 

On  the  contrary,  the  theory  of  reincarnation  is  the  only  theory 
that  will  yield  an  adequate  argument  against  suicide.  It  is  fool- 
ishness to  waste  opportunities  of  development  ;  and  it  is  foolish 
to  leave  the  world  until  the  soul  is  ready  to  abandon  the  cir- 
cumstances surrounding  it,  and  has  learnt  all  possible  lessons 
from  them  (w). 


CHAPTER   XV. 
ETHICS. 

As  we.  have  already  pointed  out,  the  main  import  of  tne  phil- 
osophy of  Plotinos  is  ethical,  or  practical.  The  end  of  his  sys- 
tem is  the  highest  attainment  possible  to  man  ;  and  that  is  the 
contemplative  or  theoretic  life.  But  we  have  also  seen  how  sup- 
remely important  to  this  life  is  morality  (-1). 

i.  Virtue  and  Vice. — All  virtues  are  purifications,  by  which  the 
scful  may  disentangle  itself  from  the  lusts  of  the  flesh.  These 
purifications  cannot  change  the  soul,  since  it  is  impassible  and 
eternal  ;  but  they  alter  its  relation  to  the  body,  giving  it  the 
upper  hand  (2)  and  freeing  it  from  the  lusts  and  disturbances  of 
the  flesh  (3).  It  then  appears  in  its  original  purity  (4),  in  which 
state  its  likeness  to  God  appears  patent  to  all  (5).  Purity  of  soul 
consists  in  the  reason  seeking  to  identify  itself  with  the  individ- 
ual Nous,  or  Mind  (6).  As  long  as  it  keeps  its  purity,  the  soul 
finds  nothing  evil  ;  let  purity  be  lost,  and  life  is  an  evil  ;  for  life 
is  good  only  inasmuch  as  evil  is  repelled  (7).  The  soul  itself  is 
not  evil,  as  long  as  it  does  not  descend  from  the  good  (8). 

What  are  the  impediments  of  the  soul?  Anger,  cupidity,  lust, 
pain,  fear,  gluttony,  intemperance,  avarice  (9).  What  are  the 
goods  we  must  attain?  Just  habits,  pure  temperance,  fortitude, 
modesty,  calmness,  divinity  of  mind  (10). 

What  are  virtues?  "The  energy  of  the  soul,  that  which  is 
good  for  her  according  to  her  nature  (")."  Virtue  is  the  most 
effective  means  of  development,  being  more  effective  than  even 
prayer  (12).  What  beauty  is  to  the  body,  that  is  virtue  to  the 
soul  (13). 

The  four  Platonic  Cardinal  Virtues  are  Temperance,  Courage, 
Magnanimity,  and  Prudence.  Those  who  are  unpurged  by  vir- 
tue lie  in  Hades.  Temperance  is  the  fleeing  of  bodily  lusts,  sen- 
sual gratification,  and  pleasure — the  attainment  of  utter  purity. 
Courage  is  but  the  overcoming  of  the  fear  of  death,  that  is,  fear 
of  the  soul  of  being  outside  of  the  body.  This  implies  indiffer- 
ence to  all  earthly  advantages,  or  anything  which  cannot  be 
taken  away  wth  the  soul  at  the  time  of  death.  Magnanimity  is 
the  contempt  of  all  advantages  on  earth.  Prudence  is  wisdom 
in  turning  away  from  lower  things,  and  turning  to  the  things 
above  (14). 

It.  would  be  hard  to  find  a  more  searching  rule  of  life  than 
this,  or  a  discipline  that  leads  to  a  higher  end  than  this  :  the  end 
of  our  life  is  not  to  avoid  evil  or  copy  the  examples  of  good 
men,  but  to  become  God  (15). 


Ethics.  49 


2.  Philosophy  of  Sin.— We  must  now  enquire  concerning  the 
nature  of  sin.     It  is  the  agreement  of  the  higher  with  the  lower 
faculties,  instead  of  compelling  them  to   obedience   (16).     The 
rational  soul  itself  can  never  sin,  but  the  lower  soul  may  cease 
to  be  its  image,  and  break  loose  from  its  control  and  influence 
(1T).     The  death  of  the  soul  occurs  when  it  is  merged  into  the 
body,  and  thus  dies  along  with  it,  when  buried  in  the  ground. 
This  externalization  of  the  soul  is  what  is  meant  by  Hades  (18). 
The  weakness  of  the  body  which  leads  to  sin  is  laziness,  whereby 
the  soul  becomes  overweighted  with  matter  in  generating  off- 
spring (19).    The  natural  appetites  of  the  body  are  in  themselves 
good,  so  long  as  they  are  not  misused  C20)  ;  likewise,  the  world 
is  beautiful  by  nature,  so  that  souls  may  be  recalled  to  God. 
Pain  and  sorrow  are  the  first  perceptions  of  some  dissolution 
(21).     The  causes  of  sin  are  "  rashness,"  primary  "  otherness," 
and  a  desire  to  belong  to  oneself  C22).     But  above  all,  the  first 
cause  of  sin  is  "  falling  into  generation   (23)."     The  meaning  of 
temperance  is  turning  into  oneself  from  the  flesh  and  its  lusts  (")• 

Yet  the  definite  reason  for  turning  away  from  the  flesh,  its 
lusts,  and  the  body,  has  not  yet  been  assigned.  The  reason  of 
it  is  as  follows  :  we  have  seen  that  all  actions  of  the  body  in  the 
dispensation  of  the  world-order  have  been  strictly  predeter- 
mined, and  that  liberty  exists  only  in  the  intelligible  world.  It 
is  plain,  therefore,  that  if  the  reason  identifies  itself  with  the 
body,  it  becomes  absolutely  the  slave  of  the  determinism  of 
external  causality.  If  however  it  identifies  itself  with  its  "  ideal  " 
soul,  or  with  its  individual  Nous,  then  it  has  identified  itself  with 
that  part  of  itself  which  is  free,  and  outside  of  the  sphere  of  de- 
terminism. The  lusts  of  the  flesh  lead  to  slavery  ;  purity  leads 
to  freedom  and  self-determination.  We  are  not  to  be  a  live 
body,  but  an  embodied  spirit  (25).  Inside  the  body,  the  soul  is 
preordained,  along  with  all  things  ;  outside  of  it  she  is  free. 
Therefore  the  aim  of  her  struggles  is  to  separate  herself  from 
the  body  (M). 

3.  The  Path  of  Enlightenment. — This  part  of  the  Soul's  develop- 
ment is  called  "  enlightenment  C27),"  for  she  is  herself  a  light. 
This  development  may  be  divided  into  three  C28)  or  seven  (29)  de- 
grees: I.  Purification  by  virtues;  II.  Prayer;  III.  The  adorning 
and  purification  of  the  soul;  IV.  Beginning  to  be  conscious  of 
the  intelligible  world^V.  Perseverance  in  this  course  ;  VI.  Full 
fruition  in  it  ;  becoming  like  God,  and  unable  to  fall  back  ;  VII. 
Becoming  God  (30).     Thus  the  development  of  every  successive 
faculty,  assisted  by  knowledge  of  the  right  doctrine. 

Although  this  path  of  development  is  the  same  for  all  souls, 
yet  as  there  are  different  kinds  of  souls,  or  souls  with  differing 
characteristics,  it  is  plain  that  the  course  of  development  must 
be  changed  for  each,  although  probably  the  same  stages,  or  like 
stages  will  occur. 

This  Plotinos  calls  "  the  threefold  return  of  the  soul  to  God 
(31)  ."  Each  soul  must  progress  in  its  own  manner,  since  the 
perfect  life  is,  in  each  degree,  to  live  according  to  nature  (w). 


50  The  Philosophy  of  Plotinos. 


There  are  three  kinds  of  Souls  :  the  Musician,  who  learns  by 
experience  ;  the  Philosopher,  who  seeks  knowledge,  and  the 
Lover,  whose  characteristic  power  it  is  to  love  (33).  Active  and 
sensual  men  are  exiles  from  their  true  home  ;  the  Active  re- 
turn to  their  fatherland  easier  than  the  Sensual  men,  who  are 
like  beasts  laden  down  with  prey — Plotinos  then  says  that  the 
Musician  is  led  upward  from  harmonious  sounds  to  harmony  in 
general,  and  from  this  to  ideality  whence  the  path  to  the  in- 
telligible world  is  plain  (34).  The  Lover  is  at  first  entangled  in 
the  beauty  of  the  flesh,  but  rises  by  his  utter  unselfishness  to  the 
beauty  of  morals,  and  thence  to  science  and  the  Nous  (35). 
Lastly,  the  Philosopher,  who  seeks  knowledge,  is  so  near  to 
perfection  that  he  only  needs  a  guide  to  free  him  from  the  weak- 
ness of  the  body  (3e). 

4.  The  Daemon  of  Conscience. — But  who  shall  this  necessary 
guide  be?  Conscience,  the  Daemon.  Plotinos's  explanation  of 
the  phenomena  of  conscience  is  singularly  clear  and  interesting. 
The  Daemon  is  not,  as  might  be  supposed,  a  supernatural  guide. 
It  is  only  a  natural  phenomenon  of  psychology.  It  is  not  an 
intelligence  external  to  ourselves  ;  it  is  only  our  own  higher  self. 
We  have  seen  that  man  epitomizes  in  himself  many  principles. 
His  reason,  as  a  rule,  has  identified  itself  with  some  one  particu- 
lar principle  of  his  nature,  either  his  individual  Nous,  or  his 
senses.  The  Daemon  that  leads  him  and  warns  him  is  that  facul- 
ty of  his  which  is  next  above  the  one  with  which  his  reason  has 
identified  itself.  Let  us  suppose,  for  instance,  that  the  reason  of 
a  man  has  identified  itself  with  his  senses,  and  their  lusts.  Tne 
next  higher  principle  will  then  guide  him  and  warn  him  of  the 
consequences  of  his  self-indulgence.  In  this  case  the  Daemon 
would  be  his  own  individual  Nous.  Again,  suppose  his  reason 
has  identified  itself  with  his  individual  Nous  :  the  Daemon  in 
this  case  will  be  the  Cosmic  Nous  or  Mind.  Once  more,  if  his 
reason  should  further  identify  itself  with  his  Cosmic  Nous,  then 
the  Daemon  could  be  God  himself. 

The  question  arises,why  could  not  God  himself  lead  him  in  the 
very  first  instance.  Plotinos  is  not  very  clear  on  this  point  ;  it 
would  seem  he  doubts  the  lower  man  could  hear  the  Voice  of 
God.  Thus  man  chooses  his  own  Daemon,  according  to  the 
choice  of  principle  on  which  he  will  act  (3T).  Thus  no  man  is 
left  to  flounder  in  the  dark,  by  God  ;  if  man  will  but  listen  to 
his  inner  voice,  which  will  change  with  his  own  change  for 
better  or  worse  C38),  he  will  be  led  into  the  full  glory  of  Divinity. 

The  inner  voice  is  heard  by  prayer  ;  and  the  value  of  prayer 
is  great.  Mere  intellectual  will  and  desire  will  certainly  get  an 
appropriate  answer  through  the  law  of  the  coherence  of  things 
(3U)  ;  but  true  prayer  is  adoration,  not  command  of  the  Divinity 

o. 

We  thus  come  to  the  full  meaning  of  the  maxim,  know  thy- 
self (41).  The  highest  self  of  every  man  is  God.  This  divinity 
of  every  man  is  quiescent  in  him  until  he  have  developed  it.  To 
become  God,  we  have  only  to  know  ourselves.  The  human 


Ethics.  Si 

soul  is  not  an  aggregate  ;  it  is  an  organic  unity  of  which  God 
is  the  highest  phase.  We  develop  by  simplification  of  soul  (**). 
To  enter  into  oneself,  is  to  enter  into  God  (**).  Only  with  the 
presupposition  of  such  a  psychology  can  the  true  meaning  of  the 
famous  maxim  appear  (**).  Plotinos  claimed  to  have  received 
the  conception  from  tradition  that  was  secret  (**)  ;  Philo  Judaeus 
claimed  the  same  origin  for  many  of  his  dogmas.  Thus,  by  the 
purification  of  virtue,  we  rise,  and  are  delivered  from  the  bond- 
age of  the  flesh  and  the  world  and  ascend  to  'the  life  of  godlike 
men  and  Gods,  when  in  beatific  vision  we  shall  see  God,  "  Phuge 
monou  pros  monon,"  the  flight  of  the  Single  to  the  Single,  face 
to  face. 

5.  Ecstasy. — Plotinos  had  attained  to  ecstaic  union  with  the 
Deity  four  times  during  the  years  that  Porphyry  lived  with  him. 
Hence,  he  described  it  as  an  objective  fact  (**)  :  "  Often  having 
been  awakened  to  myself  outside  of  the  body,  and  having  come 
to  be  outside  of  all  other  things,  but  within  myself,  I  saw  a 
marvellous  light  and  beauty  ;  then  there  came  over  me  an  ab- 
solute certainty  that  my  destiny  was  a  great  one  ;  for  when  I 
lived  my  highest  life,  and  co-operated  with  the  Deity  in  it,  and 
when  I  arrived,  in  it,  to  its  activity,  then  I  established  myself 
above  all  intellectual  things." 

We  must  now  explain  the  process  of  ecstasy.  Ratiocination 
is  a  mediate  process  which  is  subsumed  under  the  Unity  of  ap- 
perception. It  is  therefore  not  the  highest  mental  activity  (4T). 
We  must  proceed  beyond  it,  and  yield  ourselves  to  the  higher 
being  (48).  We  must  prepare  ourselves  for  absolute  receptivity, 
by  being  disturbed  by  no  ratiocination  (49).  Thus  can  we  be 
suddenly  filled  with  the  higher  light  that  streams  from  Deity 
(M)  just  as  the  soul  emits  the  light  to  form  the  celestial  spirit- 
ual body,  and  to  join  it  to  the  earthly  one.  Now  we  have  Deity 
without  being  able  to  describe  it  (51)  because  the  healthiest  states 
of  the  body  are  often  unconscious  ones  (M).  Being  united  to 
that  which  is  above  thought,  the  soul  is  no  more  soul  or  self, 
but  pure  rest  in  God  ;  and  it  is  in  "  ekstasis,"  (standing  out 
above),  "  Haplosis,"  (simplification),  and  is  in  a  state  to  be 
compared  only  with  intoxication  or  love-madness  (M).  The  in- 
telligible light  cannot  be  sought  ;  it  must  be  awaited  like  the 
rising  sun  ;  suddenly  it  appears  in  the  soul — it  is  there,  it  has 
not  come  (M).  It  fills  with  joy  and  gladness,  (M)  which  however 
cannot  last  long  (M).  The  soul  abandons  the  Deity  not  out  of 
fear,  but  out  of  natural  restlessness  and  weakness,  so  that  it 
must  fall  from  the  Divine  hypostatic  union  (5T)  as  long  as  it  is  in- 
carnate, for  it  has  not  yet  completely  severed  the  ties  that  bind 
it  to  earth  (M).  Yet,  as  long  as  life  will  last,  there  will  be  an  un- 
quenchable desire  to  behold  the  Divine  Light  once  more  (59). 

Yet,  we  must  reoeat,  it  is  not  every  soul  that  can  behold  God. 
If  the  eye  is  unclean,  it  cannot  see.  "  The  eye  can  never  hope 
to  see  the  sun,  unless  it  have  become  fit  to  see  it  ;  nor  can  any 
soul  hope  to  see  that  which  is  Beautiful, unless  it  be  beautiful  it- 
self. Let  everyone  who  would  behold  God  and  the  Beautiful 


52  The  Philosophy  of  Plotinos. 


become  godlike  and  beautiful  himself  (60)."  The  soul  must  re- 
turn to  herself,  and  if  she  does  not  find  herself  beautiful,  she 
must  polish  herself  as  the  sculptor  polishes  his  statue. 

In  the  act  of  ecstasy  there  are  three  stages  :  expectation  of 
the  Divine,  absoluts  trust  in  it,  and  final  self-immolation,  which 
is  above  conscious  thought  in  silence  and  peace.  Nor  can  we 
then  see  God  :  for  if  we  could,  God  would  be  outside  of  our- 
selves, whereas  God  rises  into  us  from  within  (82).  Thus  God 
is  the  Light  which  is  seen,  but  which  is  lost  in  the  very  vision  of 
it  :  for  "  Ta  duo  hen  gignetai,"  both  become  one  (81).  Eternal 
felicity  comes  from  eternal  proximity  to  God  (82),  the  eternally 
beautiful,  so  that  the  soul  loves  God  and  is  ever  forced  to  begin 
again  to  love  him  (63). 

"Since  God  admits  no  Diversity  into  himself,  he  is  always  pre- 
sent; and  we  become  present  to  him  whenever  we  put  away  Di- 
versity from  us.  He  does  not  seek  us,  as  though  he  were  forced 
to  live  for  us;  but  we  seek  him  and  live  for  him.  Although  indeed 
we  are  ever  revolving  around  him,  we  do  not  see  him  contin- 
uallv  :  but  as  a  choir  of  singers  which  turns  around  the  supreme 
Master  may  for  a  short  while  be  distracted  from  contemplation 
of  the  Master,  and  blunder  in  the  harmony,  yet  when  they  turn 
to  him  then  everything  is  perfect  once  again,  thus  do  we  always 
revolve  around  God,  even  when  we  forget  about  it.  But  when 
we  look  towards  him  again,  then  is  our  utmost  wish  crowned, 
and  we  sing  to  him  a  Divine  song,  ever  revolving  around  him. 
(«4)."  «  Every  Soul  in  its  natural  state  loves  God,  desiring  to  be 
united  to  him,  affecting  the  honest  love  of  a  pure  virginity  (M)." 
"  Such  is  the  life  of  Gods,  of  divine  and  blessed  men,  turning 
away  from  the  desolate  life  here  below,  flying  alone  to  meet 
God  alone,  face  to  face  C66)." 

6.  Happiness. — Such  are  the  delights  of  ecstasy.  These  are 
however  not  given  to  .all.  Happiness  is  the  most  that  many  are 
able  to  reach  ;  and  intelligible  happiness  all  can  have,  although 
they  cannot  all  be  free  from  pain  (6T).  As  the  intelligible  world 
is  outside  of  time,  so  there  can  be  no  addition  of  pleasure  by  re- 
petition of  ecstasy  ("*)  ;  the  only  possible  increase  is  a  sound- 
ing of  deeper  depths  within  (89).  The  famous  Aristotelian  quib- 
ble about  the  happiness  of  life  being  only  known  when  life  is 
over  and  at  an  end  is  nothing  but  a  very  transparent  sophism  (T0) 
since  happiness,  after  all,  does  not  depend  on  deeds  (71). 

The  wise  man  will  have  both  joy  and  sorrow  (72),  for  nothing 
can  be  added  to  him  or  taken  from  him.  If  they  are  equally 
wise,  the  rich  and  the  poor  man  will  be  equally  happy  ;  for  if 
external  goods  cannot  add  anything  to  intelligible  things,  how 
can  they  add  aught  to  intelligible  happiness  (T  ).  Happiness  is 
of  the  soul  so  that  even  the  change  of  death  has  no  power  to  dis- 
turb it  (74).  Death  is  after  all  nothing  more  terrible  than  a 
change  of  dress  on  the  stage  (7B).  It  is  only  terrible  to  children, 
not  to  men  (78).  The  soul  should  use  the  body  as  a  tool,  and  not 
be  more  affected  by  its  injuries  than  a  workman  is  affected  by 
the  injury  to  his  tool  (7T).  Even  in  the  bull  of  Phalaris. the  wise 


Ethics.  53 


man  is  happy  (7*).  Plotinos  is  not  always  so  Stoical  ;  he  has 
usually  more  common  sense,  as  when  he  says  the  end  of  virtue' 
is  to  separate  soul  from  body  ;  but  that  until  that  time  its  pains 
and  sorrows  must  be  borne  as  well  as  possible  (79).  Misfortune 
is  nothing  to  the  good,  and  to  the  evil  it  is  a  means  of  educa- 
tion. While  we  have  bodies,  they  are  certain  to  be  sick  at  one 
time  or  another  and  we  must  bear  the  inextirpablc  evil  as  well 
as  possible.  After  all,  the  purpose  of  life  is  to  give  souls  an  op- 
portunity to  become  happy,  and  it  is  our  own  fault  and  weakness 
if  we  are  not.  "  What  is  the  wonder  if  souls  do  not  enjoy  a 
divine  life  if  they  do  not  seek  to  become  godlike  (80)?"  The 
wise  man  enjoys  the  highest  happiness  of  the  world,  the  unsel- 
fish intuitions  (81).  For  the  fleshly,  this  happiness  therefore  can- 
not exist  (82),  and  though  the  wise  man  may  not  enjoy  all  the 
different  pleasures  of  life,  he  sounds  its  deepest  depths  O53). 
Circumstances  can  only  affect  the  external  consciousness  of  the 
happy  man  ;  so  that  when  the  soul  awakens  into  itself  it  forgets 
its  earthly  nightmare  of  misery,  and  its  real  waking  hours  are 
continually  with  God  (84). 


CHAPTER   XVI. 
AESTHETICS. 

1.  God,  the  Over-Beautiful. — Plotinos  is  so  passionately  fond  of 
Beauty,  that  a  review  of  his  philosophy  could  not  be  complete, 
if  it  did  not  set  forth  his  opinion  on  the  subject. 

As  God  is  Over-Good,  so  is  he  Over-Beautiful.  The  Cosmic 
Nous  is  beautiful,  because  it  is  the  image  of  God  (')  ;  the  World 
is  beautiful,  because  it  is  the  image  of  the  Nous  (*}.  There  are 
therefore  three  most  beautiful  things  :  the  Cosmic  Nous,  the 
World-Soul,  and  the  World-Body.  Men  who  are  slaves  to 
Venus  do  not  understand  that  what  seems  beautiful  to  them  is 
only  beautiful  because  it  is  in  some  faint  way  the  image  of  one 
of  these  three  things  (3).  When  we  behold  beautiful  things,  we 
become  beautiful  ;  when  we  ignore  them,  we  are  ugly  (4).  Any- 
thing is  beautiful,  therefore,  only  inasmuch  as  it  is  an  image, 
however, faint,  of  one  of  these  three  things  (5).  Beauty  therefore 
lies  in  form  (6).  In  as  far  then  as  any  begotten  image  of  the 
Cosmic  Nous  resembles  its  Idea  in  the  Nous  (its  Unity)  is  it 
beautiful  (7).  Thus  again,  Unity  is  beautiful,  the  Manifold  is 
ugliness.  The  Divine  Nous  is  the  "  Protos  kalon,  mega  kallos, 
noeton  kalon"  ;  and  beauty  is  in  Soul  as  begotten  of  the  Nous 
(8).  Beauty  is  form  vanquishing  matter,  the  Divine  Idea  ex- 
pressing itself  through  matter  ;  therefore  matter  is  the  last  beau- 
tiful (")  the  beauty  of  matter  being  more  fully  revealed  in  the 
Realm  of  nature  (10). 

2.  Human   Beauty. — The   soul,    being   itself   an   image    of   the 
Nous,  possesses  in  itself  an  innate  formula  or  reason  (since  the 
inner  self  is  The  God,  the  Over-Good),  by  which  she  recognizes 
instinctively  the  beautiful.     This  formula  is  a  Divine  Idea  ("). 
Beauty  is  both  sensutffand  incorporeal  (12).     Sensual  beauty  is 
especially  that  of  the  eye  or  ear.  Incorporeal  beauty  is  the  beauty 
of  virtue,  or  the  beauty  of  the  soul,  which  is  the  Divine  Light 
itself.  ;  A 

As  nobody  can  speak  of  physical  beauty  until  he  have  seen 
it  himself,  so  nobody  should  dare  to  judge  of  incorporeal  beauty 
until  he  have  perceived  it  himself  by  the  faculties  of  his  own 
mind.  Corporeal  beauty  is  outside  of  the  man  ;  incorporeal 
within  ;  consequently,  a  man  cannot  judge  of  incorporeal  beauty 
until  he  have  returned  to  himself,  or  rather  become  perfect 

As  our  physical  sight  or  hearing  must  be  perfect  before  we  can 
judge  of  the  beaiJty  of  a  statue,  or  of  a  song,  just  so  must  we  be 
normally  beautiful  ourselves  before  we  dare  give  a  judgement  on 


Aesthetics.  55 


incorporeal  beauty.  We  must  return  to  ourselves,  and  if  we  find 
we  are  not  beaut.iful,  we  must  polish  and  cut  until  the  inner 
statue  be  perfect. 

The  good  and  beautiful  is  that  after  which  every  soul  strives  : 
"  Hou  oregetai  pasa  psuche,"  (13).  "  Those  who  penetrate  into 
the  holy  of -holies  must  first  be  purified  by  taking  off  their  gar- 
ments, and  enter  naked  into  that  which  they  seek  ;  and  there 
they  exist,  and  live,  and  understand — Whoever  therefore  sees 
this,  with  what  a  love  does  he  burn,  with  what  a  desire  does  he 
yearn  to  be  at  one  with  the  beloved  ;"  for  the  beauty  of  the 
vision  of  God  is  the  end  of  all  souls,  whose  sorrows  and  trials 
keep  them  from  forgetting  the  desire  for  eternal  bliss.  "  There" 
(")  "  is  the  fatherland  whence  we  came  ;  and  there  is  our 
Father."  To  fly  to  God  we  need  no  fleet  or  ships  ;  "  we  must 
throw  away  all  things,  neither  strive  to  see  any  more  ;  but  hav- 
ing closed  the  eye  of  the  body,  we  must  assume  and  resurrect 
another  vision,  which  all  indeed  possess,  but  which  very  few  in- 
deed develop." 


CHAPTER   XVII. 
PLOTINOS  AND  PAGANISM. 

1.  Pagan  Deities. — It  has  been  supposed  that  in  framing  his 
system  of  philosophy,  Plotinos  was  seeking  to  rehabilitate  Pa- 
ganism as  a  religion,  by  furnishing  it  with  a  dogmatical  basis 
such  as  it  had  not  had  before.     Such  a  conception  is  totally  mis- 
taken.   His  references  to  the  Gods  are  merely  illustrative,  for  the 
sake   of  cutting  his   explanations   short  ;   and  he  does   not  act 
differently  from  Plato  in  the  matter.     Besides,  if  we  glance  over 
the  full  list  of  references  we  find  many  duplications  of  nomen- 
clature, such  as  the  Earth-Soul,  which  is  sometimes  called  Zeus, 
Aphrodite,  Rhea,  and  Hermes  ;  we  find  many  totally  incompa- 
tible conceptions,  as  for  instance,  that  Uranus  and  Kronos  are 
still  ruling  deities,  which  still  give  Zeus  all  the  power  he  wields, 
and  that  Zeus  and  human  souls  are  "  sister-souls."     Then  we 
find  a  total  lack  of  order  in  the  nomenclature,  many  of  the  most 
important  names  being  left  out  entirely,  with  no  possibility  of 
finding  cosmic  realities  to  which  to  apply  them. 

2.  Monotheism. — If  the  pagan  names  of  Deities  used  by  Plotinos 
indicated  a  dogmatical  system,  then  the  Pagan  religions  would 
have  to  be  changed  ;  for  the  system  of  Plotinos  is  a  rigid    mono- 
theism ;  and  his  whole  conception  of  the  One  only  source  of 
life  and  light  seems  incompatible  with  the  Pagan  Olympic  Re- 
public. 

3.  Augustine's  Debt  to  Plotinos. — Proof  of  this  may  be  found  in 
the  fact  that  Augustine  of  Hippo  took  the  whole  conception  of 
monotheism   in   its   cosmic   relations   as   it   stood   in    Plotinos's 
works  into  his  De  Civitate  Dei,  without  any  material  alterations. 
Besides,   when    Herennius    divided   each   of  the   three    Plotinic 
orders  of  existence  into  other  three,  this  conception  was  almost 
literally  transcribed   into   Christian   monotheism   by  merely  al- 
tering the  nomenclature,  is  it  not  certain  that  it  could  not  be 
the  basis  of  Pagan  dogma,  unless  we  are  willing  to  admit  that 
Pagan  dogma  and  Christian  dogma  were  at  bottom  the  same  ? 

4.  The  Last  Light  of  Greece. — Plotinos  is  the  last  great  light  of 
the  Greek  world.     He  summed  up  in  himself  almost  all  that  was 
worth  preserving  in  the  labours  of  his  predecessors,  and  proving 
that  it  was  possible,  outside  of  Christianity,  to  conceive  of  God 
as    absolutely    just,    as    absolute    Love,    and    absolute    beauty. 
Augustinian  Christianity  could  not  do  as  much.     The  absolute 
justice  of  God  is  supposed  to  have  demanded  the  damnation  of 


Plotinos  and  Paganism.  57 


the  whole  race  he  had  made,  unbaptised  infants  and  all  else,  in- 
discriminately. The  absolute  love  of  God  could  only  be  vindi- 
cated by  a  super-natural  mediation  to  tide  over  the  emergency  of 
the  ruin  of  his  creatures.  And  we  need  not  scruple  to  say  Au- 
gustine had  no  conception  of  God  as  the  absolute  Beauty. 

Plotinos  looked  forward  to  the  salvation  of  all,  after  salutary 
education  ;  Augustine  still  speaks  of  eternal  fire  and  of  the  worm 
that  dieth  not.  ,- 

The  difficulty  of  Plotinos  to  explain  his  conception  of  the  way 
in  which  God  begets  his  creatures,  affects  Christianity  equally  : 
and  Christianity  has  the  additional  difficulty  of  providing  an  ex- 
planation for  the  other  mode  of  origination  called  "  creating." 

Both  Plotinos  and  Christianity  preach  lofty  morality  ;  but  the 
guidance  of  human  life  of  Plotinos  is  God  himself  ;  whereas 
Augustine  hesitates  to  say  as  much,  lest  the  glory  of  the  Son 
be  surpassed. 

Christianity  preaches  the  physical  resurrection  ot  the  flesh  ; 
Plotinos  cannot  away  with  it  ;  he  does  not  look  forward  with 
any  degree  of  comfort  at  being  enclosed  for  all  eternity  in  the 
limitations  of  the  old  body,  even  when  glorified.  He  guards  the 
truth  implied  in  it  by  the  fact  that  souls  when  reincarnating 
reassume  flesh,  without  condemning  them  to  it  for  all  eternity. 

Last  of  all,  Plotinos  explains  every  little  injustice  in  the  world, 
every  sorrow,  every  tear  ;  for  reincarnation  furnishes  a  scheme 
of  absolute  justice.  Christianity  closes  its  eyes  to  the  injustice, 
and  inequality  of  this  world  in  its  sublime  faith  that  somehow 
God  is  just  ;  but  the  Christian  priest  is  mute  before  the  cry  for 
justice  in  this  world  from  the  sorrowful  and  oppressed. 

Plotinos  is  long  since  dead  ;  his  philosophy,  as  his  own,  is 
long  dead  ;  but  it  has  never  died  :  for  it  has  strutted  about  in 
borrowed  plumes  since  his  day  till  now.  Yet,  the  world  cannot 
look  back,  it  has  too  much  in  the  future  to  crown  it  with  suc- 
cess :  few  will  have  the  time  or  leisure  to  look  at  the  page  of 
ancient  history  on  which  we  read  the  name  of  Plotinos.  Yet.it 
will  be  a  satisfaction  for  us  to  know  that  even. in  those  gloomy 
days,  God  was  in  his  world,  and  revealed  himself  as  ever  through 
his  prophets  and  his  saints. 


NOTES 


NOTES. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Where  no  name  is  given  "  Poemandres  "  is  understood. 
ill  Justin  Martyr,  Apol.  1  :  21,  22  ;  2  :  6.  Tertullian.  c.  Val.  15.  de 
Aniinsi.  2.  33.  Cyprian,  de  Idol.  Van.  Euseb.  Pamph.  Hist.  Lib.  5:  8. 
Clem.  Al..  Strom.,  1:  21;  6:  4.  Firm  Lact.  Div.  Inst.  1:  6,  11;  2:  9.  Bpit. 
c.  4.  Div.  Inst.  2:  11,  13,  15,  16;  4:  8,  9,  6.  5:  65.  6:  25.  7:  4,  9,  13,  18. 
Arimbius  Adv.  Gent.  2:  13.  Aug.  de  Civ.  Dei,  8:  23,  26.  Cyril  Al.  c. 
Jul.  1:  30a,  31b,  33c;  2:  52a,  56b,  57b,  63e,  64c;  8:  274c;  5:176b.  Quoted. 
(2)  Lact.  Div.  Inst.  4:  9.  (3)  Cyril  Al.  c.  Jul.  33c.  (4)  13:  21.  (5)  13:  4. 
(6)  1:  12.  (7)  13:  2.  (8)  5:  4.  (9)  9:  6.  (10)  1:  9.  (11)  1:  4.  (12)  1:  5.  (13) 
1:  9;  5:  7.  (14)  12:  19.  (15)  1:  12,  31;  4:  11;  5:  8;  8:  25;  9:  5;  12:  16. 
(16)  1:  26.  (17)  1:  26.  (18)  1:  9-11;  3:  3;  11-7.  (19)  12:  22.  (20)  13:  15.  (21) 
10:  13.  (22)  10:  13;  12:  16.  (23)  1:  8;  5:  11;  8:  2,  5;  9:  8;  10:  12,  14;  11: 
4.  (24)  Of  Hermes  of  Thai,  to  Tat.  Ex  'Stobaeus  Phys.  699  Meinecke, 
1:  190.  Patritius,  p.  4.  (25)  10:  1-3.  (26)  1:  10;  2:  16;  7:  5;  14:  9.  (27)  12: 
8.  (28)  1:  10.  (29)  12:  1.  (30)  1:  8.  (31)  11:  17.  (32)  1:  8,  9,  13,  14;  8:  2. 
(33)  2:  1-4;  8:  5.  (34)  2:  17;  4:  8.  (35)  10:  19,  20.  (36)  9:  6;  10:  23.  (37) 
4:  3,  6.  (38)  10:  23.  (39)  4:  6.  (40)  4:  11.  (41)  10:  20.  (42)  11:  21.  (43)  11: 
22.  (44)  1:  31.  (45)  13:  2.  (46)  13:  7.  (47)  13:  12.  (48)  10:  19.  (49)  12:  23. 
(50)  10:  0.  (51)  13:  14.  (52)  10:  19.  (53)  12:  1.  (54)  1:  26;  10:  6.  (55)  4:  8. 

CHAPTER  V. 

Where  no  name  is  given  "Ennead  "  is  understood. 

(It  Vita.  Plotini.  Porphyry,  c.  3.  (2)  Eusebius,  H.  E.  6:  19,  7.  (3)  Bigg. 
Christian  Platonists  of  Alex.  p.  46.  Note  2.  (4)  3:  9:  2.  (5)  1:  1:  12;  1: 
2:  1  Beg.  1:  3:  1  Beg.  3:  91:  1  Beg.  6:  6:  17,  p.  690  D.  (6)  3:  4:  2.  (7) 
4:  4:  22.  (8)  3:  7,  proem  325,  C.  (9)  5:  1:  8.  (10)  3:  7,  proem  325,  C.  (11) 
2:  4:  7.  (12)  4:  3:  1.  "Let  us  be  persuaded  by  the  commandment  of 
the  God  to  know  ourselves"  "Peithouinetha  de  an  t6  tou  Theou  parkel- 
cusmati  hautous  gignoskein." 

CHAPTER  VI. 

(1)  Knn.  4:  3:  1.  (2)  1:  1:  12.  (3)  3:  8:  4,  5  seqq.  (4)  6:  9:  11;  4:  7:  12: 
1:  1:  8.  See  in  general  1:  4:  9,  16;  4:  7:  12,  1:  7:  2.  (5)  4:  7:  12;  1:  1: 

8.  (6)  1:  1:  8;  4:  7:  12;  5:  3:  3.  (7)  1:  6:  5;  3:  5:  4;  6:  7:  4.  (8)  1:  4: 

9.  (9)  1:  4:  9,  6:  4:  15.  (10)  1:  4:  9,  10;  6:  4:  15.  (11)  6:  4:  15.  (12)  2: 
3:  12;  2:  1:  5.  See  1:  4:  9;  2:  1:  5;  2:  3:  12,  13;  2:  9:  17.  (13)  6:  7:  6. 
(14)  4:  4:  4.  See  6:  7:  15;  5:  2:  1;  5:  3:  3;  6:  5:  12;  6:  7:  6;  3:  5:  4;  1; 
4:  9,  10.  (15)  1:  1:  12;  4:  3:  23;  6:  4:  16.  (16)  6:  7:  6.  (17)  6:  7:  14;  3:  2: 
7;  4:  4:  36.  (18)  6:  7:  30.  (19)  3:  8:  5,  6.  (20)  3:  8.  Int.  (21)  2:  1:  5,  3:  4: 
3.  (22)  4:  3:  20-24;  4:  7:  1;  6:  4:  16.  (23)  6:  7:  5;  3:  4:  3;  4:  3:  12;  4:  7: 
13:  4:  8:  8.  (24)  4:  7:  12.  (25)  1:  1:  9;  4:  8:  4;  6:  3:  1;  6:  4:  14.  (26)  1: 


62  The  Philosophy  of  Plotinos. 


1:  7;  2:  10;  5:  1:  10.  (27)  1:  1:  10;  1:  4:  16;  1:  7:  4;  6:  7:  5.  (28)  1:  1: 
7;  1:  8:  5;  5:  7:  5;  6:  4:  15.  (29)  1:  1:  3,  4.  (30)  6:  9:  8.  (31)  6:  5:  11.  (32) 
5:  1:  10. 

CHAPTER  VII. 

(1)  3:  8:  7,  8;  5:  1:  4;  5:  3:  10;  5:  6:  2;  6:  7:  39;  6:  9:  6,  7.  (2)  5:  3: 
10-13;  6:  7:  37.  (3)  5:  3:  12;  5:  6:  3;  6:  6:  13.  (4)  6:  9:  1.  (5)  3:  8:  10;  5: 
3:  17.  (6)  6:  2:  17.  (7)  5:  4:  1.  (8)  5:  3:  11;  6:  7:  17;  6:  9:  6.  (9)  3:  8:  9. 
(10)  6:  8:  11.  (11)  1:  7:  1;  1:  8:  2;  6:  8:  16  End.  (12)  4:  3:  8;  6:  7:  17; 
6:  9:  6.  (13)  6:  7:  17,  32,  33;  6:  8:  11;  6:  9:  3.  (14)  1:  6:  6,  9;  5:  8:  8. 
(15)  5:  5:  12.  (16)  6:  8:  12;  6:  9:  6.  (17)  4:  4:  9,  10.  (18)  1:  7:  1;  6:  7:  17; 
6:  8:  12;  (19)  5:  3:  12.  (20)  3:  8:  10;  3:  9:  3;  5:  3:  11,  12;  5:  6:  2.  (21) 
6:  7:  41;  5:  3:  13.  (22)  5:  3:  13;  14;  5:  5:  6,  10;  6:  7:  32;  6:  U:  :>,.  (23)  r>: 
5:  13  Beg.;  6:  2:  12,  17;  6;  7:  38  Beg.  (24)  5:  5:  6;  6:  2:  9;  6:  9:  5.  <2o) 
1:  8:  2;  3:  8:  8;  5:  5:  9;  6:  9:  6.  (26)  3:  8:  9;  4;  8:  6;  5:  3:  16;  5:X4:  1; 
6:  9:  5.  (27)  6:  8:  12,  J6,  20;  5:  4:  2.  (28)  6:  8:  8.  (29)  6:  9:  3  Bud.  (30) 
6:  9:  8.  (31)  2:  9:  4,  8;  3:  2:  1,  2.  (32)  3:  2;  2;  3:  3:  7  Beg;  5:  3:  12  Beg; 
5:  4:  1;  4:  8:  6;  6:  7:  1,  3;  6:  8:  18  End.  (33)  6:  7;  3.  (34)  2:  9:  3.  (35) 
2:  1:  2;  2:  9:  3.  (36)  3:  5:  4.  (37)  6:  7:  22.  (38)  6:  7:  31.  (39)  5:  1:  6;  5: 
2:  1.  (40)  5:  1:  6.  (41)  2:  3:  12.  (42)  3:  8:  9;  5:  1:  3;  6:  5:  3  Beg;  6:  9: 
5;  5:  1:  6.  (43)  5:  5:  9.  (44)  1:  6:  3;  3:  8:  9;  5:  1:  6;  5:  3:  12,  15.  (45) 
5:  5:  7;  6:  4:  9;  6:  8:  18.  (46)  1:  7:  1;  6:  5:  5;  6:  8:  18.  (47)  1:  7:  1;  1:  8: 
2.  (48)  3:  2:  3:  (49)  6:  7:  16.  (50)  1:  7:  1;  1:  8:  2;  5:  1:  6;  5:  5:  12;  6: 
4:  8;  6:  5:  10.  (51)  6:  5:  1.  (52)  3:  2:  16.  (53)  3:  8:  10;  5:  8:  12.  (54)  1:  7: 
1;  3:  3:  7;  6:  2:  11;  6:  4:  9.  (55)  6:  2:  11;  6:  5:  1.  (56)  5:  5:  5;  6:  2:  11; 
6:  9:  1.  (57)  4:  4:  13.  (58)  4:  4:  16.  (59)  6:  5:  6.  (60)  5:  5:  9;  6:  5:  3,  4,  6: 
6:  2:  3;  6:  4:  3,  2;  6:  5:  1.  (61)  4:  3:  12;  5:  5:  9;  6:  5:  4.  (62)  1:  7:  ± 
(63)  3:  2:  16.  (64)  5:  1:  7.  (65)  6:  4:  7.  (66)  4:  3:  22;  5:  1:  3.  (67)  5:  2:  2. 
(68)  6:  4:  13,  14.  (69)  6:  4:  2,  3.  (70)  6:  4:  13.  (71)  6:  5:  2.  (72)  5:  3:  1. 
(73)  2:  3:  18. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

(1)  5:  1:  7;  5:  9:  1-13.  (2)  5:  1:  5;  5:  3:  15;  5:  9:  6;  6:  9:  5.  (3)  5:  6:  2. 
(4)  1:  8:  2.  (5)  3:  7:  5.  (6)  5:  1:  4.  (7)  2:  9:  1;  5:  3:  7.  (8)  5:  1:  4;  5:  35. 
(9)  1:  8:  2;  5:  3:  9;  5:  5:  1;  5;  9:  7;  6:  2:  21.  (10)  6:  2:  8.  (11)  4:  3:  25; 
r>:  5:  1.  (12)  5:  3:  7,  11.  (13)  5:  6:  2.  (14)  5:  3:  6.  (15)  1:  8:  2;  3:  6:  6; 
5;  3:  6;  6:  2:  21.  (16)  6:  1-3.  (17)  6:  2:  2.  (18)  6:  2:  20.  (19)  6:  7:  8.  (20) 
6:  7:  13.  (21)  3:  2:  1;  5:  8:  3,  4;  6:  7:  15.  (22)  6:  7:  8.  (23)  6:  7:  9.  (24) 
5:  !>:  11.  (25)  5:  1:  4;  5:  8:  4;  6:  2:  21. 

CHAPTER  IX. 

fl)  1:  8:  2.  (2)  2:  9:  2.  (3)  2:  9:  9.  (4)  2:  9:  13;  4:  3:  10;  6:  5:  10;  6: 
7:  42.  (5)  5:  1:  7;  5:  2:  1;  5:  8:  12.  (6)  2:  1:  7.  (7)  4:  3:  14.  (8)  4:  3:  17. 
(9)  4:  4:  25;  5:  8:  12;  3:  7:  10,  12.  (10)  4:  7:  13.  (11)  3:  9:  1;  4:  1:  1;  4: 
2:  1.  (12)  1:  1:  13.  (13)  1:  9:  1.  (14)  4:  3:  18.  (15)  4:  3:  17.  (16)  4:  9:  4. 
(17)  4:  9:  5.  (18)  4:  3:  16.  (19)  4:  3:  5;  4:  8;  3;  5:  7:  1.  (20)  4:  3:  5.  (21) 
3:  2:  18;  4:  3:  6.  (22)  3:  2:  18;  4:  3:  6,  15.  (23)  3:  2:  4.  (24)  4:  7:  13.  (25) 
4:  7:  12.  (26)  5:  1:  2.  (27)  4:  4:  9,  10  etc.  (28)  6:  5:  9.  (29)  4:  9:  1;  2:  9: 
7.  (30)  4:  3:  20,  21.  (31)  2:  2:  2.  (32)  4:  3:  2.  (33)  5:  1:  3.  (34)  4:  4:  1,  2, 
5.  (35)  3:  4:  4;  3:  9:  2.  (36)  4:  4:  24.  (37)  4:  4:  6.  (38)  4:  3:  25-27,  29-32. 
4:  4:  6.  (39)  4:  4:  10,  12.  (40)  4:  4:  24.  (41)  4:  3:  10;  4:  4:  10.  (42)  5:  1:  7. 
(48).  3:  1:  4;  4:  3:  4.  (44)  4:  3:  2,  3.  (45)  4:  3:  6.  (46)  3:  2:  17.  (47)  2:  9:  7. 
(48)  2:  9:  17.  (49)  4:  3:  12.  (50)  2:  9:  17.  (51)  3:  5:  4;  4:  3:  4;  4:  9:  3. 


Notes.  63 

CHAPTER  X. 

(1)  4:  4:  12.  (2)  3:  5:  4.  (3)  5:  3:  2.  (4)  5:  3:  3.  (5)  6:  7:  4.  (6)  2:  9:  5, 
18;  4:  4:  6.  (7)  2:  9:  5,  18.  (8)  2:  9:  8;  3:  5:  6;  4:  3:  11;  5:  1:  2,  4;  5: 
8:  3.  (9). 5:  8:  3.  (10)  4:  4:  8.  (11)  2:  2:  2  End.  4:  4:  6-8,  42,  30. 

CHAPTER  XL 

(1)  4:  4:  41.  (2)  1:  1:  7;  2:  1:  5;  2:  3:  12,  13,  15,  9.  2:  9:  17.  4:  3:  27.  6: 
4:  r,.  6,  12,  15,  16.  (3)  1:  1:  7.  (4)  6:  5:  12. 

CHAPTER  XII. 

ill  5:  1:  7.  (2)  3:  5:  2,  8;  5:  8:  13;  6:  8:  6.  (3)  3:  8:  4.  (4)  2:  1:  5;  2: 
:.:  :».  17,  18;  3:  5:  2,  3,  6;  4:  9:  4;  3:  4.  (5)  2:  3:  17;  3:  8:  3;  4:  4:  13.  (6) 
:'.:  x:  2,  3.  4:  4:  13.  (7)  3:  8:  3.  (8)  2:  9:  2;  3:  2:  2;  3:  3:  3;  4:  3:  10;  4: 
4:  10:  6:  7:  1,  3.  (9)  2:  1:  1-4;  3:  2:  1;  4:  3:  9.  (10)  4:  3:  12;  5:  7:  1.  (11) 
'_':  !>:  17;  5:  1:  2;  5:  9:  5;  Beg;  6:  4:  2;  6:  3:  15.  (12)  3:  2:  7;  4:  4:  36. 
(IX)  4:  4:  45.  (14)  3:  2:  16.  (15)  2:  9.  (16)  2:  9:  4,  8,  13,  Beg  17.  (17)  2: 
'.»:  r>.  6,  18.  (18)  2:  3:  7;  3:  3:  7;  3:  4:  1;  4:  4:  22,  23,  26,  30.  (19)  2:  3: 
1  U,  8.  13,  16,  26;  3:  1:  6;  4:  4:  31,  34.  See  2:  3:  12,  15.  (20)  3:  1:  6.  (21) 
2:  .">:  14;  3:  1:  16.  (22)  4:  4:  35.  (23)  2:  3:  9:  11.  (24)  4:  4:  33,  35,  39;  2: 
:<:  7;  3:  1:  6;  4:  3:  12.  (25)  4:4:  34,  39.  (26)  2:  3:  7;  3:  1:  6.  (27)  4:  3:  12. 
CJXi  3:  3:  6.  (29)  4:  7:  15.  (30  4:  4:  6,  39.  (31)  3:  1.  (32)  3:  2:  1.  (33)  2: 
:!:  !>:  3:  1:  9.  (34)  6:  8:  2.  (35)  6:  8:  2.  (36)  6:  8:  3.  (37)  6:  8:  3.  (38)  6: 
x:  4.  (39)  6:  8:  5.  (40)  6:  8:  12.  (41)  3:  5:  6.  (42)  5:  8:  10  Beg.  (43)  3:  5:  6. 
i44»  4:  4:  43.  (45)  4:  3:  18. 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

il)  6:  9:  3.  (2)  1:  8:  5.  (3)  1:  8:  11.  2:  4:  13,  14,  16.  (4)  1:  8:  11.  (5)  1: 
X:  10.  (6)  1:  8:  11;  6:  .7:  23;  1:  8:  3.  10-13:  2:  4:  16.  (7)  1:  8:  6.  (8)  1: 
X:  ;{.  (9)  1:  8:  4,  8.  (10)  1:  8:  10,  12.  (11)  2:  3:  11.  (12)  3:  2:  4.  (13)  3: 
•J:  r>:  (14)  3:  2:  11.  (15)  3:  2:  14.  (16)  1:  8:  7;  2:  3:  18;  3:  2:  5;  4:  3:  9. 
(17)  1:  8:  4.  (18)  2:  7:  3.  (19)  2:  4:  8.  (20)  2:  4:  7,  11;  3:  6:  16-18.  (21) 
2:  4:  8;  3:  6:  7.  (22)  2:  5:  5.  (23)  3:  8:  10. 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

(1)  4:  7:  14.  (2)  4:  8:  7.  (3)  4:  8:  7.  (4)  _4lj^JL_ (5)  4:  7:  13.  (6)  2:  1:  2. 
(7)  3:  2:  4,  13.  (8)  2:  3:  15.  (9)  4:  3:  24.  (10)  2:  3:  16.  (11)  Phaedo  82 
A.  Tim.  91.  de  Rep.  10:  6:  20.  (12)  3:  4:  2.  (13)  6:  7:  4.  (14)  6:  7:  7.  (15) 
3:  2:  13.  (16)  3:  4:  6,  4:  8:  5.  (17)  3:  6:  6.  (18)  4:  3:  13,  15.  (19)  3:  4:  2. 
iL'(»  1:  8:  13  (21;  3:  4:  2.  (22)  4:  8:  5,  7.  (23)  4:  4:  5.  (24)  4:  3  17;  4:  7: 
18:  4:  8:  4.  (25)  3:  2:  12;  4:  8:  5;  5:  1:  1.  (26)  4:  3:  13.  (27)  4:  8:  5,  6. 
ii'Xi  1:  1:  10,  12;  1:  10:  6.  (29)  4:  7:  14;  4:  18:  5.  (30)  4:  3:  25,  27,  o2;  4: 
I:  1-5.  (31)  1:  9:  1;  2:  3:  10;  2:  9:  17. 

CHAPTER  XV. 

(1)  (>:  7:  15.  (2)  3:  6:  5;  1;  2:  5.  (3)  1:  2:  3;  1:  6:  6.  (4)  1:  2:  3.  (5)  1: 
•2:  1.  (6)  1:  2:  4.  (7)  1:  7:  3.  (8)  1:  8:  5.  (9)  1:  2:  5;  1:  6:  5.  (10)  1:  6: 
r>.  (11)  1:  7:  1.  (12)JJ:Jh  15.  (13)  2:  9:  16.  (14)  1:_6:  6.  (15)  1:  2:  6,  7 
See  1:  6:  6  etc.  (16)  1:  1:~9.  (17)  1:  1:  12.  (18)  1:  8:  13;  2:  3:  17.  (19)  1: 
8:  14.  (20)  1:  8:  15.  (21)  4:4:  19.  (22)  5:  1:  1.  (23)  3:  5:  1,  5:  1:  1.  (24) 


64  The  Philosophy  of  P latinos. 


1:  2:  7;  1:  6:  5.  (25)  2:  3:  9,  15.  (26)  3:  1:  8.  (27)  3:  9:  *.  (28)  5:  8:  11. 
(29)  6:  7:  36.  (30)  6:  7:  36;  6:  9:  4.  (31)  1:  3  Title.  (32)  1:  4.  3.  (33)  5:  9: 
1:  (34)  1:  3:  1:  (35)  1:  3:  2.  (36)  1:  3:  3.  (37)  3:  4:  5,  6.  (88)  3:  4:  6. 
(39)  4:  4:  26,  38.  (40)  2:  9:  14.  (41)  1:  4:  3,  4.  (42)  1:  2:  7;  6:  9:  11.  (43) 
5:  8:  11;  6:  7:  34;  6:  9:  11;  4:  8:  1;  5:  5:  7;  5:  3:  17;  6:  9:  7,  11;  4: 
7:  10;  5:  3:  3.  (44)  4:  3:  1.  (45)  6:  9:  11.  (46)  4:  8:  1;  6:  9:  4,  9.  (47) 
1:  4:  9;  3:  9:  3;  4:  4:  4.  (48)  6:  7:  35.  (49)  6:  7:  34.  (50)  5:  3:  17,  6: 
9:  4.  (51)  5:  3:  14.  (52)  5:  8:  11,  See  6:  9:  8.  (53)  5:  3:  1;  5:  5:  8;  5: 
8:  10,  11;  6:  7:  35;  6:  9:  10,  11.  (54)  5:  3:  17;  5:  5:  7,  8;  6:  7:  36.  (55) 
6:  7:  34.  (56)  5:  5:  8.  (57)  6:  9:3.  (58)  6:  9:  9,  10.  (59)  6:  9:  11.  (60) 
1:  6:  9.  (61)  6:  7:  35.  (62)  6:  7:  32.  (63)  6:  7:  31.  See  1:  4:  6.  (64)  6:  9: 
8.  (65)  6:  9:  9.  (66)  6:  9:  11.  (67)  1:  4:  6.  (68)  1:  5:  Quest  2.  (69)  1: 
5:  Quest  3.  (70)  1:  5:  Quest  5.  (71)  1:  5:  Quest  10. (72)  1:  4:  16.  (73)  1: 
4:  15.  (74)  1:  4:  14.  (75)  3:  2:  15.  (76)  1:  4:  8.  (77)  1:  1:  3.  (78)  1:  4: 
13.  (79)  1:  2:  5.  (80)  3:  2:  5.  (81)  1:  4:  12.  (82)  1:  4:  11.  (83)  1:  4:  10. 
(84)  4:  8:  1. 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

(1)  1:  6:  9;  5:  8:  3,  8,  13;  ,6:  2:  21.  (2)  5:  8:  13.  (3)  5:  8:  8.  (4)  5:  8: 
13.  (5)  5:  8:  8.  (6)  1:  6:  8;  5:  8:  2.  (7)  1:  6:  3;  5:  8:  13.  (8)  1:  6:  4; 
5:  8:  3.  (9)  It  6:  2,  6.  (10)  5:  8:  2.  (11)  1:  6:  3.(12)  1:  6:  4.  (13)  1:  6: 
7.  (14)  1:  6:  8. 

Note  from  Zeller,  with  additions. 

The  Father  of  all  Gods  Uranus  is  God;  Kronos,  who  devours  his 
children  is  the  Nous  who  retains  within  itself  all  its  active  ideas. 
Xeus,  when  escaping  from  him,  is  the  begetting  of  the  Soul  beyond 
the  Nous.  5:  8:  12;  5:  1:  4,  7.  The  tale  of  Lynkeus  describes  the  trans- 
parence of  the  intelligible  world,  5:  8:  4.  The  World-Soul  is  called 
Zeus,  5:  5:  3;  6:  4:  6;  2:  3:  31;  5:  8:  10.  It  is  also  called  Aphrodite,  and 
the  double  soul  is  explained  as  the  double  Aphroditg,  3:  5:  2,  8;  6:  8: 
6;  5:  »T  13.  Again,  Hgre,  Dgmeter  and  Hestia  are  explained  by  the 
World-Soul,  as  well  as  Zeus,  4:  4:  27.  Apollo  is  Unity  as  denying 
Manifoldness,  5:  5:  6.  Hermes  is  the  Logos,  3:  6:  19,  which  can  rise  or 
8iuk.  The  sinking  of  the  soul  into  the  entangling  flesh  is  shown  by 
Narcissus,  and  its  flight,  by  the  myth  of  Ulysses  fleeing  Circe  and 
Calypso,  1:  6:  8.  The  story  of  Prometheus  and  Pandora  explains  the 
world  adorned  with  gifts,  4:  3:  4.  As  image  of  the  intelligible  world 
the  physical  world  is  called  the  mirror  of  Dionysios,  4:  3:  12.  Minos 
becoming  guest  of  Zeus  is  the  soul  beholding  Unity, 6:  9:  7.— TheLower 
Earth-Soul  is  also  called  Rhea,  5:  1:  7. 


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